In re Jack Fish & Sons Co., Inc.
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[Cite as In re Jack Fish & Sons Co., Inc., 2002-Ohio-4222.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SCIOTO COUNTY : : : : IN THE MATTER OF: : : Case No. 01CA2812 Jack Fish & Sons Co., Inc. : : : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY : : : Released 8/13/02 : ___________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES: Betty D. Montgomery, Ohio Attorney General, by Mollie A. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellant. Jeffrey D. Fish, White and Fish L.P.A., Inc., Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. Michael H. Mearan, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellee. ___________________________________________________________ Harsha, J. {¶1} The Ohio Motor Vehicle Salvage Dealers Licensing Board (Board) appeals the trial court s reversal of its revocation of Jack Fish & Sons s (Fish) salvage dealer's license. The Board contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting newly discovered revoke Fish s evidence license and in because reversing reliable, the decision probative to and substantial evidence supported its finding that Fish was not primarily engaged in the sale of salvage vehicle parts. argues that the circumstances Board because entirely for parts. did he not sold consider many of the the totality salvage Fish of the vehicles Therefore, Fish reasons the Board should consider the salvage vehicles that he sold only for parts as salvage "parts sales," rather than the sale of a vehicle. The Board did not specifically determine whether it is permissible to sell a salvage vehicle "for parts only." In the absence of such a finding, we cannot effectively review the merits of this appeal. Since the Board is in the best position to interpret its own technical requirements, Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 1993-Ohio-122, 614 N.E.2d 748, syllabus, we must remand this case to the Board for a finding of whether salvage vehicles sold solely for parts are vehicle sales or alternatively, parts sales. {¶2} In 1999, after receiving an anonymous complaint, the Board started an investigation into Fish s business practices. William Leach Leach's inspection revealed a lack conducted of of the Fish s salvage investigation business parts. for property Moreover, the and Leach Board. records reviewed various accounting ledgers and calculations maintained by Fish s accountant, Jeffrey Dever. After his review, Leach compared total salvage parts sales to total car sales over a six-month period and determined that only 7% of Fish s total sales were attributable to salvage parts sales. The rest of the sales were for salvage vehicles. {¶3} Stuart Fish, the president of Fish & Sons, testified that his record keeping practices made it appear that he was selling salvage vehicles because he was forced, under threat of prosecution, to transfer the title to the vehicle even if the vehicle was sold solely for parts. However, Mr. Fish stated that he was in the process of changing his record keeping system so that, in the future, salvage vehicle sales would be divided into salvage vehicles and salvage vehicles sold for parts. Moreover, Mr. Fish reasoned that if the Board considered the totality of the circumstances, it would find that his business operated primarily for the sale of salvage vehicle parts during the six months in question since he sold many of the salvage vehicles solely for parts. Nevertheless, the Board revoked Fish s salvage dealers license and Fish appealed to the Scioto County Common Pleas Court. {¶4} The trial court granted Fish's motion to supplement the record with Dever s deposition1. 1 The court found, based on In his deposition, Dever stated that Fish changed his record keeping system in order to reflect the number of salvage parts sold, the number of salvage vehicles sold and the number of salvage vehicles sold for parts. Dever used this new record keeping system, which Mr. Fish discussed in his testimony before the Board, to show that Fish was primarily engaged in the sale of salvage parts during the time that Leach s inspection alleged that Fish was not primarily engaged in the sale of salvage parts. its review of the record and Dever s deposition, that reliable, probative and substantial evidence did not support the Board's decision to revoke Fish's license. reinstated Fish s license. {¶5} Therefore, the trial court This appeal by the Board followed. The Board assigns the following errors: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶6} THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE REVOCATION ORDER OF THE OHIO MOTOR VEHICLES SALVAGE DEALER S [SIC] LICENSING BOARD AS THAT ORDER WAS SUPPORTED BY RELIABLE, PROBATIVE AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶7} THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED BY SUPPLEMENTING THE CERTIFIED RECORD WITH EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT "NEWLY DISCOVERED" AS REQUIRED BY R.C. 119.12. {¶8} common The Board argues that we should reverse the court of pleas supplementing because the the record court with abused Jeffrey its discretion Dever s in deposition. Moreover, the Board contends that the court further abused its discretion because reliable, probative and substantial evidence supports the Board s decision to revoke Fish s license. We do not reach the merits of the Board s assignments of error because the Board did not determine whether a salvage dealer licensee may properly sell a salvage vehicle "for parts only." {¶9} The Board did not make an express determination on a central issue in this case, e.g., whether a salvage dealer may sell a salvage vehicle solely "for parts." This omission is critical to our ability to carry out our review function. Thus, we must remand to the Board because administrative agencies are in the best position to interpret the technical requirements of its profession and reviewing courts must, absent an abuse of discretion, defer to those interpretations. at 621-22. this when Pons, 66 Ohio St.3d The Ohio Supreme Court noted the policy reasons for it stated [t]he purpose * * * in providing for administrative hearings in particular fields [is] to facilitate such matters by placing the decision on facts with boards or commissions composed of people equipped with the necessary knowledge and experience pertaining to a particular field. Id. at 621-22, quoting Arlen v. State (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 168, 173, 399 N.E.2d 1251. {¶10} The Board decided that Fish was not primarily engaged in the sale of salvage vehicle parts. But the Board did not decide whether salvage vehicles sold solely for parts can be considered parts sales. In light of Fish's undisputed testimony that he sold some salvage vehicles solely for parts, the Board should have expressly decided whether salvage vehicles sold solely for parts are properly considered parts sales, as opposed to being vehicle sales. The Board must make this determination in order to facilitate effective appellate review. It is important that the Board make this determination so that all salvage dealers businesses. licensee s can properly operate their If salvage dealers are permitted to sell salvage vehicles for parts only, they must take steps to ensure that their record keeping systems properly reflect this practice since salvage dealers licensee s must operate primarily in the sale of salvage vehicle parts. However, if salvage vehicles cannot be sold solely for parts, salvage dealers must be put on notice that they must physically break down the vehicle before it is considered a parts sale. Therefore, we reverse and remand this matter to the Board for a de novo determination of this matter. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED. JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED AND REMANDED and that Appellant recover of Appellee herein taxed. The Court appeal. finds there were reasonable grounds CAUSE costs for this It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. Any stay previously granted by this terminated as of the date of this entry. Court is hereby A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. Abele, P.J. & Evans, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. For the Court BY: _______________________ William H. Harsha, Judge NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
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