Ohio School Facilities Comm. v. John Doe Individuals

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[Cite as Ohio School Facilities Comm. v. John Doe Individuals, 2008-Ohio-2447.] Court of Claims of Ohio The Ohio Judicial Center 65 South Front Street, Third Floor Columbus, OH 43215 614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 www.cco.state.oh.us OHIO SCHOOL FACILITIES COMMISSION Plaintiff/Counter Defendant v. JOHN DOE INDIVIDUALS, et al. Defendants and RIVERSIDE MASONRY L.L.C. dba C&R MASONRY OF MICHIGAN, et al. Defendants/Cross-Claim Defendants and GREENWICH INSURANCE CO. Defendant/Counter Plaintiff/Third-Party Plaintiff/Counter Defendant v. WELLSTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION Third-Party Defendant/Counter Plaintiff/Cross-Claim Plaintiff [Cite as Ohio School Facilities Comm. v. John Doe Individuals, 2008-Ohio-2447.] Case No. 2005-07704-PR Case No. 2005-07704-PR Judge Joseph T. Clark Referee John W. McCormac JUDGMENT ENTRY -3- JUDGMENT ENTRY [Cite as Ohio School Facilities Comm. v. John Doe Individuals, 2008-Ohio-2447.] {¶1} On March 28, 2008, the referee issued a decision recommending judgment for defendant/cross-claim defendant/counter plaintiff, J & H Reinforcing and Structural Erectors, Inc. (J&H), on its motion for summary judgment as to the amended complaint filed by plaintiff/counter defendant, Ohio School Facilities Commission (OSFC), the counterclaim/cross-claim of Wellston City School District Board of Education (Wellston), and the cross-claims filed by defendant/cross-claim defendant and cross-claim plaintiff, Riverside Masonry L.L.C., d.b.a. C&R Masonry of Michigan (C&R), and defendant/counter plaintiff/third-party plaintiff/counter defendant/cross-claim plaintiff, Greenwich Insurance Co. (Greenwich). {¶2} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i) states, in part: A party may file written objections to a magistrate s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that fourteen-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). OSFC and Wellston timely filed three objections. {¶3} In their first objection, OSFC and Wellston argue that the referee erred in finding that the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 1302.98 barred their cause of action against J&H. They note that R.C. 1302.98 is a general statute of limitations and that as such it does not apply to the state. See Ohio Dep t of Transp. v. Sullivan (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 137 (holding that the state is exempt from a generally worded statute of limitations unless there is express language to the contrary). The second and third objections merely restate arguments that were considered and rejected by the referee. {¶4} J&H contends that Sullivan does not apply to the facts of this case inasmuch as J&H entered into a contract with Wellston and was paid by Wellston from the school district s funds. According to J&H, OSFC merely authorized Wellston to execute the contract. Thus, J&H maintains that OSFC may assert its claim only through Wellston and that Wellston is subject to the statute of limitations such that an exemption is not warranted. {¶5} While the state of Ohio is not subject to the general requirements of statutes of limitations, unless specifically provided for in the statute, the state's exemption is an attribute of sovereignty only. The exemption from limitations does not extend to school districts or boards of education. Ohio Dept. of Transp. v. Sullivan (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 137, 139, 527 N.E.2d 798, 799-800; State ex rel. Bd. of Edn. v. Case No. 2005-07704-PR -5- JUDGMENT ENTRY Gibson (1935), 130 Ohio St. 318, 4 O.O. 352, 199 N.E. 185, paragraph two of the syllabus. A board of education or school district, clothed with the capacity to sue and be sued, is thereby rendered amenable to the laws governing litigants, including the plea of the statute of limitations. Id. Beavercreek Local Schools v. Basic, Inc., (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 669, 684-685. See also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World Indus. (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 846, 856 (holding that pursuant to Beavercreek, the statute of limitations applied such that the board s cause of action was time-barred). {¶6} Upon review of the record, the magistrate s decision and the objections, the court finds that the magistrate did not err in finding that the cause of action asserted against J&H was not timely filed. In addition, the court finds that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Therefore, the objections are OVERRULED and the court adopts the magistrate s decision and recommendation as its own, including findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. Judgment is rendered in favor of J&H. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. _____________________________________ JOSEPH T. CLARK Judge cc: Chadwick K. Sayre 267 Lincoln Lane Lucasville, Ohio 45648 Donald B. Leach Jr. Michael F. Copley Michael V. Passella 191 West Nationwide Boulevard, Suite 300 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Mark A. Foley Special Counsel to Attorney General 471 East Broad Street, Suite 1820 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Matthew T. Green 250 West Street P.O. Box 165020 Columbus, Ohio 43216-5020 Case No. 2005-07704-PR Roger L. Sabo 250 West Street Columbus, Ohio 43215-2538 Ken Hoder c/o C&R Masonry 535 Griswold Street, Suite 1800 Detroit, Michigan 78226 SJM/cmd Filed May 8, 2008 To S.C. reporter May 21, 2008 -6- JUDGMENT ENTRY Scott Branam William C. Becker Assistant Attorneys General 150 East Gay Street, 23rd Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130

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