Hambrick v. Lorain Corr. Inst.
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[Cite as Hambrick v. Lorain Corr. Inst., 2001-Ohio-3956.]
IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO
WALLACE HAMBRICK
:
Plaintiff
:
CASE NO. 2000-11304
v.
:
MAGISTRATE DECISION
:
Steven A. Larson, Magistrate
LORAIN CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTION
:
Defendant
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant was
negligent for failing to assign him to a lower bunk in accordance
with a medical restriction issued by defendant during plaintiff’s
prior incarceration.
Plaintiff claims that he was injured when
he fell from the top bunk on his first night of his reincarceration.
The case was tried to a magistrate of the court
on the sole issue of liability.
At all times relevant hereto, plaintiff was an inmate in the
custody and control of defendant at Lorain Correctional
Institution (LorCI), pursuant to R.C. 5120.16.
On February 9,
2000, plaintiff was convicted in Cuyahoga County and then
transferred to a corrections reception center at LorCI to begin
serving his sentence.
Plaintiff, whose real name is Wallace
Hambrick, admitted entering LorCI using the alias of “Ronnie
Hambrick,” his brother’s name.
Plaintiff had previously served
several years at LorCI under his real name and inmate number 302480.
He was paroled from LorCI on March 1, 1999, but was
subsequently convicted of the offense for which he is now
incarcerated.
On February 9, 2000, plaintiff arrived at LorCI some time
between 3:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.
During the intake process,
plaintiff was interviewed by a registered nurse who asked
plaintiff for his health history.
Plaintiff informed the nurse
that he had a history of epilepsy with seizures, for which he was
taking prescription medication.
The nurse noted the information
on plaintiff’s health history form.
After the intake process was
completed, plaintiff was transferred to a cellblock “pod” and
assigned a cell and an upper bunk.
The upper bunk assignment had
been made by the “count office” prior to completion of the
medical intake.
Plaintiff testified that, upon his arrival in the pod, he
told Corrections Officer (CO) Beverly Reddick that he had an
upper bunk restriction, but that she ordered him to sleep in his
assigned bunk.
Plaintiff stated that he complied because he was
tired from the day’s events.
Plaintiff testified that after going to sleep his next
memory was awaking on the floor of his cell surrounded by COs and
medical personnel.
an apparent seizure.
Plaintiff had fallen from the top bunk during
Once an ambulance arrived, he was
transferred to a local hospital for treatment and returned to
LorCI a few hours later.
Upon his return, he was given a
permanent bottom bunk restriction because of his seizure
disorder.
In order for plaintiff to prevail upon his claim of
negligence, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant owed him a duty, that it breached that duty, and that
the breach proximately caused his injuries.
Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 285.
Strother v.
In the context of a
Case No. 2000-11304
-3-
MAGISTRATE DECISION
custodial relationship between the state and its prisoners, the
state owes a common law duty of reasonable care and protection
from unreasonable risks.
204, 207.
McCoy v. Engle (1987), 42 Ohio App.3d
Reasonable or ordinary care is that degree of caution
and foresight which an ordinarily prudent person would employ in
similar circumstances.
2 Ohio St.2d 310.
Smith v. United Properties, Inc. (1985),
Accordingly, the issue is whether defendant
breached its duty of reasonable care under the circumstances of
this case.
Plaintiff asserts that defendant knew or should have known
that he suffered from epilepsy with a history of seizures because
defendant was in possession of plaintiff’s medical records from
his prior incarceration.
Plaintiff introduced his health history
form that had been completed by defendant on February 22, 1995,
which indicates that plaintiff reported his medical condition to
defendant on that date.
Additional records introduced by
plaintiff indicate that plaintiff had a permanent bottom bunk
restriction during his prior incarceration at LorCI because of
his seizure disorder.
Defendant presented evidence that defendant could not have
had knowledge of plaintiff’s prior medical condition on
February 9, 2000, because the records were not available.
June
Newman, Health Care Administrator for LorCI, testified that
because plaintiff had not been at LorCI since March 1999, his
medical records had been closed and placed in storage in
Columbus; that plaintiff’s medical records were not readily
available on the institution’s computer system due to patient
confidentiality; that it normally takes at least three to four
weeks to retrieve medical records from storage in Columbus; and
Case No. 2000-11304
-4-
MAGISTRATE DECISION
that plaintiff’s use of an alias further complicated the record
retrieval process.
However, after a review of plaintiff’s intake records from
February 9, 2000, Newman determined that plaintiff was, in fact,
issued a bottom bunk restriction on that date.
The restriction
was based solely on the medical history of epilepsy and seizures
given by plaintiff.
Newman explained that three copies of the restriction are
created and are usually distributed to the count office, pod
officer, and inmate.
For an undetermined reason, only the count
office’s copy was distributed.
The copies that are normally
distributed to the pod officer and inmate were left in the
medical file.
Since the count office closes at 3:00 p.m., it
could not have set up the restriction until the next day.
Plaintiff was assigned to CO Reddick’s pod on the evening of
February 9, 2000.
That pod was an intake pod which was very busy
and routinely moves twenty, thirty, or forty inmates in or out in
a single day.
CO Reddick explained that an inmate with a bottom
bunk restriction usually has a copy of the restriction with him
upon arrival and that she enforces the restriction upon receipt.
She further explained that if an inmate claimed that he had a
bottom bunk restriction but did not have a copy, she would call
the medical unit to verify the restriction.
CO Reddick did not
have the authority to change a bunk assignment without a copy of
the restriction from the medical unit or a verification by
telephone.
Even upon receipt of a copy or verification, the
final authority to move an inmate rests with either the shift
captain or lieutenant.
Case No. 2000-11304
-5-
MAGISTRATE DECISION
CO Reddick vaguely remembered an inmate complaining that he
should have been placed on a bottom bunk restriction on
February 9, 2000.
She could not remember if the inmate was
plaintiff and no such request was entered in the pod’s log,
although such requests are not routinely logged.
Defendant maintains that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent because he did not notify CO Reddick of his bottom bunk
restriction.
Defendant asserts that if plaintiff had, as he
claims, requested a bottom bunk restriction from CO Reddick, she
would have called the medical unit and discovered its existence.
Plaintiff’s own negligence bars his recovery pursuant to Ohio’s
comparative negligence statute, R.C. 2515.19, if his own
negligence is greater than defendant’s.
The court finds that defendant could not be expected to have
had knowledge of plaintiff’s medical condition based upon closed
records from his prior incarceration at LorCI.
His previous
lower bunk restriction could not reasonably have been discovered
by defendant on plaintiff’s first day of re-incarceration.
However, absent any information regarding plaintiff’s prior
incarceration, a nurse issued a lower bunk restriction solely on
the basis of information provided by plaintiff during his medical
intake interview.
For reasons which are unknown, defendant
failed to follow usual procedures and did not give a copy of the
bottom bunk restriction to plaintiff or the pod officer.
As a
result, plaintiff was not reassigned to a bottom bunk as directed
by the nurse.
Thus, the court finds that defendant breached its
duty of reasonable care by not implementing the bottom bunk
restriction which was ordered for plaintiff’s own safety.
[Cite as Hambrick v. Lorain Corr. Inst., 2001-Ohio-3956.]
The court further finds that defendant failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff failed to notify CO
Reddick of his request for a lower bunk.
CO Reddick testified
that she vaguely remembered an inmate requesting a bottom bunk on
February 9, 2000.
Although she had no independent recollection
of plaintiff or his request for a bottom bunk, she acknowledged
that LorCI procedures required her to verify a bottom bunk
restriction if an inmate claimed to have one.
In contrast,
plaintiff testified that he specifically asked CO Reddick to
investigate his bottom bunk restriction, without result.
The court concludes that plaintiff has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendant breached its duty of
reasonable care, and that defendant’s breach was the proximate
cause of plaintiff’s injuries, if any.
Accordingly, judgment is
recommended in favor of plaintiff on the issue of liability.
________________________________
STEVEN A. LARSON
Magistrate
Entry cc:
Wallace Hambrick, #385-957
2500 S. Avon-Beldon Road
Grafton, Ohio 44044
Pro se
Matthew J. Lampke
65 East State St., 16th Fl.
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Assistant Attorney General
SAL/cmd
Filed 12-27-2001
To S.C. reporter 2-4-2002
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