Wax v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.
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[Cite as Wax v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2001-Ohio-1856.]
IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO
LISA WAX
:
Plaintiff
:
CASE NO. 2000-02232
v.
:
DECISION
:
Judge J. Warren Bettis
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Defendant
:
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
This matter came to trial on the sole issue of liability.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s negligent failure to post
warning signs proximately caused her injuries.
Defendant denies
liability.
The accident underlying plaintiff’s claims occurred near the
intersection of Miamisburg-Springboro Road and Byers Road, in
Montgomery County.
On April 21, 1998, at approximately 11:30
p.m., plaintiff drove to the Third Base Tavern where she consumed
three twelve-ounce beers before leaving for home at approximately
2:00 a.m.
It was raining as plaintiff traveled north on Wood
Road to the intersection of Miamisburg-Springboro Road where she
turned right or east.
Plaintiff had traveled approximately
three-tenths of a mile from Wood Road toward the Byers Road
intersection when she encountered a barricade with two large
signs in the eastbound lane which read “ROAD CLOSED TO THRU
TRAFFIC; DETOUR.”
The barricade stood one hundred twenty-six
feet east of the intersection with Byers Road.
The Miamisburg-
Springboro Road was barricaded in both directions for a short
distance beyond the signs due to repair work on a bridge that
crossed Interstate 75.
[Cite as Wax v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2001-Ohio-1856.]
When plaintiff became aware of the warning signs and applied
her brakes, she lost control of her vehicle.
It skidded left
across the centerline and came to rest in a culvert.
Although
she was seriously injured, plaintiff extricated herself from the
vehicle and walked to a nearby house for assistance.
She was
later flown to the Miami Valley Hospital for treatment.
While plaintiff was being treated at the hospital, a police
officer arrived to investigate the accident.
Plaintiff refused
the officer’s request to submit to a blood test to measure the
concentration of alcohol in her body.
However, on April 22, at
4:45 a.m., plaintiff’s blood was drawn during the course of her
medical treatment.
Laboratory results revealed that her blood
alcohol level was 0.084 mg.
Although plaintiff was charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol, the charges were
subsequently dismissed.
Plaintiff was eventually convicted for
failure to control her vehicle.
Plaintiff claims that defendant was negligent per se for
failing to comply with mandatory standards contained in the Ohio
Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (Manual).
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to post
advance warning signs on Wood Road as required by the Manual and
that, as a result, the barricade near the intersection of
Miamisburg-Springboro Road and Byers Road became a hazard to
motorists.
In order for plaintiff to prevail upon her claim of
negligence, she must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that defendant owed her a duty, that it breached that duty, and
that the breach proximately caused her injuries.
Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 285.
Strother v.
ODOT has the duty to
Case No. 2000-02232
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DECISION
exercise ordinary care to keep highways free from unreasonable
risk of harm.
White v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 56 Ohio
St.3d 39, 42.
However, ODOT is not an insurer of the safety of
its highways.
Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 67 Ohio
App.3d 723, 730.
Possible ways in which ODOT may meet its duty
to the motoring public in construction zones include utilizing
traffic control barrels, reducing the applicable speed limit and
erecting construction warning signs.
Id.
A court must consider
the totality of the circumstances for it to be able to determine
whether defendant acted in a manner that would maintain the
highway free from unreasonable risk of harm to the traveling
public.
Id.
The scope of defendant’s duty to ensure the safety of state
highways is defined by the Manual.
Leskovac v. Ohio Dept. of
Transp. (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 22, 27, 593 N.E.2d 9.
Certain
portions of the Manual are permissive, meaning some decisions are
within defendant’s discretion and engineering judgment.
Perkins
v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 487, 584 N.E.2d
794.
“The issue of whether an act constitutes a mandatory duty
or a discretionary act determines the scope of the state’s
liability because ODOT is immune from liability for damages
resulting from not performing a discretionary act.”
Gregory v.
Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1995) 107 Ohio App.3d 30, 33-34, 667
N.E.2d 1009 citing, Winwood v. Dayton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 282,
525 N.E.2d 808.
A deviation from the mandatory standards of the
Manual renders ODOT negligent per se and liable in damages if
proximate causation is established.
Madunicky v. Ohio Dept. of
Transp. (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 418; Perkins v. Ohio Dept. of
Case No. 2000-02232
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DECISION
Transp. (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 487, 494.
When the duty, or
standard of care, is not detailed in defendant’s Manual, “the
proper standard should be that of a reasonable engineer using
accepted practices at the time.”
Lunar v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.
(1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 143, 147, 572 N.E.2d 208.
The sections of the Manual that address the design and
application of traffic control devices use the words “shall,”
“should,” and “may” to describe specific conditions concerning
these devices.
“The use of the word ‘shall’ indicates a
mandatory requirement, whereas the use of the word ‘should’ is
merely advisory but not mandatory, and ‘may’ indicates a
permissive condition.”
Kocur v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1993), 63
Ohio Misc.2d 342.
Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim concerns the standards
set forth in Sections 7D-4 and 7D-8 of the Manual.
7D-4
provides:
The Road Closed Ahead sign is intended for use
in advance of a point at which a roadway is
closed to all traffic. It carries the legend
ROAD CLOSED AHEAD. A distance plate *** may be
added. It will normally be used in conjunction
with other Construction Approach Warning signs,
but where a local road is closed without
provisions of a detour it may be repeated.
(See Figure C-28.)
Section 7D-8 provides:
The Detour Ahead sign shall be used in advance
of a point at which traffic is diverted over an
alternate roadway due to a closure of the
regular street or road. It carries the legend
of DETOUR AHEAD. *** It may be used in
Case No. 2000-02232
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DECISION
repetition or in combination with other
appropriate Construction Approach Warning
signs. A typical use of the Detour Ahead sign
is illustrated in Figure C-25.
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant maintains that it did not violate any provisions
of the Manual since Sections 7D-4 and 7D-8 are not specific with
regard to sign placement.
The court disagrees.
Defendant placed two warning signs on Miamisburg-Springboro
Road in a manner that was consistent with the diagram of “typical
application of traffic control devices for closed street and
detour” that is referenced in 7D-4 and depicted in figure C-28 in
the Manual.
However, no warning signs were posted on Wood Road.
Defendant’s engineering expert, Paul Box, opined that it was
within defendant’s discretion not to place warning signs on Wood
Road.
Box based his opinion on his analysis of the construction
plan and his calculations regarding the distance at which the
barricade signs would be visible to motorists traveling east on
Miamisburg-Springboro Road.
Box concluded that, even in a heavy
rain, plaintiff should have been able to see the barricade signs
from a distance of at least seven hundred feet.
According to
Box, the signs were adequate to warn plaintiff of the road
closure in sufficient time to allow her to react and stop her
vehicle.
Plaintiff’s engineering expert, William Jackman, testified
that defendant failed to comply with the Manual’s minimum safety
specifications by failing to place any “road closed ahead” and
“detour” signs on Wood Road.
According to Jackman, defendant was
required by its own Manual to perform an engineering study, prior
Case No. 2000-02232
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DECISION
to finalizing its construction plans, in order to determine the
proper placement of warning signs in the construction zone.
Section 1D of the Manual provides:
ENGINEERING STUDY REQUIRED
The decision to use a particular device at a
particular location should be made on the basis
of an engineering study of the location. Thus,
while this Manual provides standards for design
and application of traffic control devices, the
Manual is not a substitute for engineering
judgment. ***
Section 7D-3 provides:
Construction Approach Warning signs are for the
purpose of alerting traffic, well in advance,
to serious obstructions or restrictions due to
road work. Various circumstances will occur
which will require extra advance warning
because of limited sight distance or the nature
of the obstruction may require a motorist to
bring his vehicle to a stop. Therefore,
specified standards or a set sequence of signs
are not noted. The determination of the sign
or signs to be used shall be on the basis of an
engineering study using the following sections
as guidelines. (Sections 7D-4 through 7D-10.)
(Emphasis added.)
Although the standards set forth in the Manual give
defendant discretion to determine the proper placement of advance
warning signs, the Manual directs that these decisions shall be
based on an engineering study.
Defendant’s assertion that
plaintiff has the burden to prove that an engineering study was
not performed is not well taken.
Daniel Christiansen,
defendant’s project manager, testified that he was the sole
Case No. 2000-02232
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DECISION
person to review the construction plans for defendant and that he
was not aware of any engineering study that may have been
conducted for the project.
“ROAD CLOSED AHEAD” and “DETOUR” signs were posted 0.4 and
0.1 mile west of Wood Road, respectively.
Consequently, any
motorist traveling north on Wood Road who turned east onto
Miamisburg-Springboro Road would not encounter any advance
warning signs prior to the barricade which stood one hundred
twenty-six feet beyond the Byers Road intersection.
There was no
warning sign at the Byers Road intersection.
The court finds that, even if the failure to post advance
warning signs on Wood Road was the result of a decision based
upon an engineering study, defendant failed to comply with the
mandatory language of Section 7D-8 which requires a “detour
ahead” sign to alert motorists about a road closure.
Consequently, the court finds that defendant was negligent for
its failure to erect proper advance warning signs on Wood Road.
The court further finds that defendant’s negligence was a
proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
In addition to defendant’s negligence, the court finds that
plaintiff was also negligent.
Ohio’s comparative negligence
statute, R.C. 2315.19, bars plaintiff from recovery if her
contributory negligence is greater (more than fifty percent) than
defendant’s.
In this case, plaintiff failed to exercise a
reasonable degree of care for her own safety.
Just prior to the
accident, plaintiff consumed enough alcohol to result in her
blood alcohol level measuring 0.084 mg. approximately three hours
after the incident.
The westbound lane of Miamisburg-Springboro
Case No. 2000-02232
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DECISION
Road was open and could have been used by plaintiff to stop her
vehicle.
Nevertheless, plaintiff lost control of her vehicle and
traveled into a ditch prior to reaching the barricade.
The court
concludes that plaintiff’s alcohol use contributed to her
inability to control her vehicle.
The court finds that
plaintiff’s own negligence was equal to that of defendant.
Therefore, the court apportions plaintiff’s fault at fifty
percent.
[Cite as Wax v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2001-Ohio-1856.]
Judgment shall be rendered accordingly in favor of
plaintiff.
___________________________________
J. WARREN BETTIS
Judge
[Cite as Wax v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2001-Ohio-1856.]
IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO
LISA WAX
:
Plaintiff
:
CASE NO. 2000-02232
v.
:
JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
Judge J. Warren Bettis
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Defendant
:
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
This case was tried to the court on the sole issue of
liability.
The court has considered the evidence, and for the
reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently herewith,
judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff in an amount to be
determined after the second phase of the trial dealing with the
issue of damages.
As stated in the court’s decision, any
compensatory damages recoverable by plaintiff shall be reduced by
fifty percent, to account for plaintiff’s contributory
negligence.
The court shall issue an entry in the near future
scheduling a date for trial on the issue of damages.
________________________________
J. WARREN BETTIS
Judge
Entry cc:
Thomas A. Hansen
345 W. Second St.
Suite 400
Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Plaintiff
Eric A. Walker
65 East State St., 16th Fl.
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Assistant Attorney General
AMR/cmd/Filed
9-26-2001/Jr. Vol. 681, Pg. 103/To S.C. reporter 10-4-2001
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