In The Matter Of: A.C.R
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA11-782 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 20 December 2011 IN THE MATTER OF: Dare County No. 06 JT 18 A.C.R. Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 24 2011 by Judge Amber Davis in Dare County District Court. March Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 November 2011. Sharp, Michael & Graham, L.L.P., by Steven D. Michael, for petitioner-appellee Dare County Department of Social Services. Ryan McKaig for respondent-appellant father. Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Ashley A. Edwards and Jennifer G. Case, for guardian ad litem. STEELMAN, Judge. Where father s appeal does not challenge the three grounds for termination of his parental rights, he has forfeited his constitutionally protected status as a parent. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating father s parental rights. -2I. Factual and Procedural Background On 16 March 2006, the Dare County Department of Social Services ( DSS ) filed a juvenile petition alleging that A.R.,1 who was two years old at the time, was an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile. A.R. was taken into nonsecure custody by DSS on the same day. mother. The At the time, A.R. was living with his trial court entered an order adjudicating A.R. neglected based upon mother s stipulation that the allegations contained in the petition were true. The trial court found that mother admitted to selling drugs; that father was incarcerated in Virginia and had a history of domestic violence; and that mother had a history of involvement with DSS and has had two other children removed from her custody. In the dispositional portion of the order, the trial court directed that A.R. remain in DSS custody. On 3 January 2007, DSS returned A.R. to mother s custody. Father was released from incarceration in October 2007 after having served three years and four months for a conviction of the offense of carnal knowledge. After his release, father moved subsequently to Petersburg, Virginia. taking a job in another town. 1 He moved after This was a violation of his To conceal the juvenile s identity, we refer to his parents as mother and father. -3probation. Father was arrested in July 2008 and returned to prison. On 29 alleging July that 2009, A.R. and dependent juveniles. inter alia, controlled evicted that their filed his a second half-sister juvenile were petition neglected and On 14 October 2009, the trial court found, mother substances; from employment. DSS had that tested she residence; and and positive her that for children mother several had lacked been stable A.R. and his half-sister began residing with their maternal aunt and uncle shortly before the petition was filed. In this adjudication and disposition order, the trial court gave DSS custody of A.R. and his half-sister, but they remained in the placement with their aunt and uncle. On or about 4 June 2010, DSS filed a petition to terminate mother and father s parental rights to A.R. The grounds alleged for failure termination were neglect and willful to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juvenile as a ground for termination against each parent, and failure legitimate as a ground for termination against father. to See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (3), (5) (2009). The trial court conducted a hearing on 11 January 2011 and 22 February 2011. At the time of the hearing, father was still -4incarcerated, with an anticipated release in June 2011. At a deposition prior to the hearing, father asserted that he planned to move in with his girlfriend and their child upon his release from prison. He also claimed that he had participated in a re- entry program in prison, received his OSHA certification, and wanted to obtain a job upon release. Father admitted that he had not made much of an effort to stay in contact with A.R., but claimed that he did not want to lose A.R. and was willing to provide support for the child. In an order entered 24 March 2011, the trial court found all of the grounds for termination alleged in the petition. trial court concluded interests to terminate appealed. that it was in the juvenile s both parents rights to A.R. The best Father Mother did not appeal. II. Challenge to Dispositional Phase In his only argument, father contends that the trial court erred in determining that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the child. We disagree. A. Standard of Review After an adjudication determining that grounds exist for terminating consider parental six rights, statutory the trial factors in court is required determining to whether -5termination is in the juvenile s best interests. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2009); In re S.C.H., 199 N.C. App. 658, 66667, 682 S.E.2d 469, 474 (2009), aff d per curiam, 363 N.C. 828, 689 S.E.2d 858 (2010). We review the trial court s determination that a termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the juvenile for an abuse of discretion. In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). B. Analysis Respondent acknowledges that the trial court properly considered the factors mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). He nevertheless argues that the facts of his case do not support the trial because he court s has decision made to efforts terminate to improve his parental his life, rights wants a relationship with A.R., and wants to provide support for A.R. In light of his constitutionally protected status as a parent and our Juvenile Code s favored protection of family bonds, father argues that the trial court should have exercised its discretion not to terminate his parental rights. We are not persuaded. As an initial matter, we note that the existence of a single ground for termination of parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 is sufficient to demonstrate that a parent has -6 forfeited his or her constitutionally protected status. See Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 145, 579 S.E.2d 264, 267 (2003). In the instant case, the trial court found the existence of three grounds justifying termination of father s rights, none of which are challenged on appeal. parental Father has forfeited his constitutionally protected status as a parent, and the trial court correctly determined that it was in the best interests of the child that father s parental rights be terminated. Father s remaining arguments center upon his desires rather than the child s needs. At the disposition stage, the trial court s focus is on the best interests of the child, not the circumstances surrounding the parents. 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d See In re Montgomery, 246, 251 (1984) ( [T]he fundamental principle underlying North Carolina s approach to controversies involving child neglect and custody [is] that the best interests of the child is the polar star. ). Moreover, based on our review of the record, the court was certainly aware of father s circumstances. statutorily mandated After proper consideration of the factors, the trial court interests ultimately concluded that it was in A.R. s best to terminate father s parental rights. We discern no abuse of discretion by -7the trial court. We affirm the order of the terminating father s parental rights to A.R. AFFIRMED. Judges GEER and HUNTER, JR., Robert N. concur. Report per Rule 30(e). trial court
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