State v Stroud
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority . Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e . NO. COA11-72 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 6 December 2011 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. Mecklenburg County No. 06 CRS 244166 No. 08 CRS 46152 JOHN ARTHUR STROUD Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 September 2009 by Judge Court. Timothy S. Kincaid in Mecklenburg County Superior Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 August 2011. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Richard H. Bradford, for the State. Gilda C. Rodriguez for defendant-appellant. BRYANT, Judge. Where the trial court s ruling implicates a violation of defendant s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and where the State fails to show this violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we must grant defendant a new trial. Facts and Procedural History -2On 18 September 2006, officers in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department arrested John Arthur Stroud ( Defendant ) for possession of cocaine. Defendant was subsequently indicted on 14 July 2008 for being an habitual felon. This case was called for trial for at least the fourth time on 21 September 2009. In a pre-trial motion, defendant moved to withdraw his court-appointed counsel. After hearing from both parties, the trial court found that there were legal grounds to require counsel to withdraw or remove counsel of record. The trial court then gave defendant two choices: [y]ou may either keep Mr. Sanders as your attorney and try this thing or you waive counsel and try it without one. Defendant elected to keep his counsel rather than represent himself. Also pre-trial, the State moved to proffer the lab analyst [Agent Jennifer Leiser] as an expert in forensic chemistry and her opinion that the fact that the evidence in this case was tested positively to be cocaine. Defense counsel confirmed that he is not going to object when the State introduces the lab report and tenders the Agent Leiser as an expert witness and only requested the opportunity to cross-examine her at trial. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of possession of cocaine on 23 September 2009, and defendant also pled guilty to being an habitual felon. The trial court sentenced defendant to -3a minimum of imprisonment. 120 months and a maximum of 153 months Defendant appeals. _______________________________________ On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by (I) denying defendant s request for a new attorney, and (II) admitting a laboratory report of a non-testifying forensic analyst and the testimony of a substitute analyst. I. Defendant defendant s existed argues request legal the for grounds trial new to court counsel dismiss erred after current by ruling counsel. denying that there Defendant contends that this error by the trial court essentially denies him any relief Amendment. This or effective representation under Sixth We are constrained to agree. Court reviews an appeal alleging defendant s constitutional rights de novo. defendant's rights under the a violation of State v. Graham, 200 N.C. App. 204, 214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009). the the Constitution A violation of of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (2009). N.C.G.S. § 15A 1443(b) If an error is found, the State bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. -4When a defendant seeks to obtain substitute counsel, defendant must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict. Covington, __ N.C. App. __, __, 696 S.E.2d 183, State v. 185 (2010) (quoting State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 372, 230 S.E.2d 524, 529 (1976)). In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel, the obligation of the court [is] to inquire into defendant's reasons for wanting to discharge his attorneys and to determine whether those reasons [are] legally sufficient to require the discharge of counsel. State v. Hutchins 303 N.C. 321, 335, 279 S.E.2d 788, 797 (1981). that new A defendant does not have the right to insist counsel be appointed dissatisfied with the omitted). Similarly, merely attorney's the because services. effectiveness he Id. of has become (citations representation cannot be gauged by the amount of time counsel spends with the accused; such a factor is but one consideration to be weighed in the balance. Id. (citations omitted). In the absence of any substantial reason for the appointment of replacement counsel, an indigent court, defendant unless he must wishes to accept present counsel his appointed own by defense. the Id. (citation omitted). [A] trial court is constitutionally required to appoint substitute counsel whenever representation by counsel originally -5appointed would amount effective assistance of to denial counsel, of that defendant's is, when right the to initial appointment has not afforded defendant his constitutional right to counsel. State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 352, 271 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1980) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has stated that a motion to withdraw is ordinarily a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . . State v. Thomas, 310 N.C. 369, 375, 312 S.E.2d 458, 461 (1984) (citation omitted). When a trial court exercises its own judgment in rendering a decision, the abuse of discretion standard is applied. Appliance Sales & Service v. Command Electronics Corp., 115 N.C. App. 14, 21, 443 S.E.2d 784, 789 (1994). A ruling committed to a trial court's discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (citing Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 271 S.E.2d 58 (1980)). Further, [b]ecause of the potential these challenges have for disrupting the efficient dispensing of justice, appellate courts ought to be reluctant to overturn the action of the trial judge absent a showing of a Sixth Amendment violation by the court. State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 337, 279 S.E.2d 788, 798 -6(1981); see also State v. Covington, __ N.C. App. __, __, 696 S.E.2d 183, 185 (2010). Here, defendant requested new counsel and specifically complained to the trial court that: I called this man every day. I got the number in my phone. I called him every day. I never got no response whatsoever, and I'm here today to go to trial. I got a list of witnesses right here that would have been here. They were ready. They came down here two times before -- ran down here before, but he said he was going to subpoena them. I called him every day to see if he subpoenaed them. I haven't heard from him myself. He still has not talked to me about my case. In reply, defense counsel informed the court that: Mr. Stroud and I did have quite a bit of phone tag back and forth. I did [have] a lengthy meeting with him on the 8th of June where we discussed this case in some detail. I did ask Mr. Stroud to provide a list -- if he had any witnesses that he wanted me to subpoena or wanted me to contact, I asked him to provide a list of witnesses and contact information at that time. I still have not received any witnesses or any way to contact those witnesses. Your Honor, Mr. Stroud did call me probably at least five times last week, and I did return every one of those calls. Unfortunately, I recall I now -- today when I called the wrong number; I had one digit wrong. His -- I thought I was calling the right number, but I want the Court to know I did call him back probably five or six times. Unfortunately, I had the wrong number. But just so the Court will know, I have discussed the case with Mr. Stroud, and I'm -7prepared to go to trial if he wants to have me as his counsel. If he doesn't want me to have as his counsel, that's certainly his prerogative. I'm ready to go if needed, Your Honor. Both defendant and counsel acknowledged that the case was over three years old. there were After review, the trial court concluded that legal grounds to remove defense counsel. two choices: either require counsel to withdraw or The trial court then gave defendant keep existing defense counsel or waive counsel and try the case without an attorney. We are confronted in this case with the trial judge s determination that there were legal grounds to require counsel to withdraw or remove defense counsel ; yet, instead of appointing substitute counsel, the trial judge gave defendant the option of keeping the same counsel and proceeding pro se. defense counsel or waiving The record does not indicate any findings of fact or conclusions of law set forth by the trial court that would provide guidance to this Court in evaluating the trial court s actions. All we have is the trial court s declaration that there were legal grounds to withdraw or remove defense counsel, a declaration which defendant s motion to remove counsel. court that further legal grounds explication, exist appears to to effectively granted This ruling of the trial discharge implicate counsel, a absent violation of -8defendant s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.1 As such, this is a constitutional error and such errors are presumed prejudicial unless the State reasonable doubt. shows that the error is harmless beyond a N.C.G.S. § 15A 1443(b) (2009). In rebuttal, the State argues that defendant forfeited his constitutional right to counsel by his behavior pursuant to State v. Montgomery, 138 N.C. App. 521, 530 S.E.2d 66 (2000). We find this argument unpersuasive, since in Montgomery the defendant was actually verbally disruptive in the courtroom on two occasions, leading to trial delays, as well as physically disruptive when he assaulted his attorney. Id. at 525, 530 S.E.2d at 69; see also United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he threatened his attorney with harm). After careful review, defendant s we find nothing in the record to actions constitute indicate that forfeiture of counsel. Montgomery, 138 N.C. App at 524, 530 S.E.2d at 69 ( A forfeiture results when the state's interest in maintaining an orderly trial schedule and the defendant's negligence, indifference, or possibly purposeful delaying tactic, combine to 1 Even assuming it could be determined that the trial court s ruling did not implicate defendant s constitutional right to counsel because the trial court did not specifically find that counsel s assistance was ineffective, the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion in not allowing substitute counsel after determining there were legally sufficient grounds to discharge original counsel. -9justify a forfeiture of defendant's right to counsel. . . (citation and quotations omitted)). However, notwithstanding its forfeiture argument, the State fails to harmless demonstrate beyond a that the reasonable presumption of prejudice. error by doubt, the thereby trial court was overcoming the Consequently, we must grant defendant a new trial. II. Defendant also alleges the trial court erred by admitting a laboratory report of a non-testifying forensic analyst and the testimony of a substitute analyst. However, we decline address this issue as we have granted defendant a new trial. Reverse and remand for a new trial. Judges GEER and BEASLEY concur. Report per Rule 30(e). to
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
