In The Matter Of: K.R.M

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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA11-505 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 18 October 2011 IN THE MATTER OF: K.R.M. Appeal parental Haywood County No. 09 JT 114 by rights respondent-father entered 3 from March orders 2011 by Wijewickrama in Haywood County District Court. terminating Judge Roy his T. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 September 2011. Rachael J. Hawes, for petitioner-appellee Haywood County Department of Social Services. Robin E. Strickland, for respondent-appellant father. Pamela Newell, for guardian ad litem. CALABRIA, Judge. Respondent-father ( respondent ) appeals from the trial court s orders terminating his parental rights. The hearing for termination separately of the respondent s hearing. We affirm. mother s rights was held from The mother is not a party in the appeal. -2- I. Background K.R.M. ( Kate )1 was born 14 January 2000. At the age of four, a court in Virginia granted custody of Kate to respondent. Since Kate, respondent and his wife ( stepmother ) (collectively the family ) moved from Tennessee to North Carolina when Kate was eight years old, the Tennessee Department of Children s Services referred the family to the Haywood County Department of Social Services ( DSS ). The family has a documented history with social services in three states beginning in 2007. On 29 September 2009, DSS filed a petition alleging that Kate had not been provided adequate medical physically abused and not properly fed. treatment, was On 30 November 2009, Judge Richard K. Walker ( Judge Walker ) concluded the juvenile was abused, neglected and dependent and entered an order that adjudicated the juvenile abused, neglected, and dependent. In a separate disposition order, Judge Walker approved a permanent plan of custody. reunification and ordered Kate s placement in DSS Judge Walker also ordered respondent and stepmother to participate in Kate s therapy and follow all recommendations from Kate s therapist. 1 We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of the children and for ease of reading. -3On 4 October 2010, Judge Danya L. Vanhook s ( Judge Vanhook ) order changed the permanent plan to a concurrent plan of legal guardianship respondent to comply or adoption. individual with Judge Vanhook therapy to ordered address his depression and aggressive behavior and to continue with therapy while he had supervised visitation with Kate. arranged a Capacity to Parent In June 2010, DSS evaluation, during which respondent blamed his parenting problems on Kate s Mosaic Turner Syndrome. In addition, he was unable to identify any changes he could make to provide more appropriate structure or discipline for Kate. On 5 November 2010, DSS filed a petition to terminate the biological alleged parents four parental grounds for rights. termination: As (1) to respondent, abuse and DSS neglect (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2009)); (2) willful placement outside of the home or in foster care without a showing of reasonable progress (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2009)); (3) willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (2009)); and (4) incapability to provide for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a dependent juvenile (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2009)). -4On 8 February 2011, foster care worker Kristie Krejci ( Ms. Krejci ) was the only witness at the termination hearing. March 2011, termination the and trial court concluded found there that was grounds sufficient On 3 existed for evidence to support all four grounds alleged by DSS as to respondent, and that it was in Kate s best interests to terminate respondent s parental rights. The trial court ordered the termination of respondent s parental rights. Respondent appeals. II. Termination of Parental Rights Respondent s first argument on appeal is that the trial court improperly concluded that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights. At the We disagree. adjudicatory stage of a termination of parental rights hearing, the burden is on the petitioner to prove that at least one ground for termination exists by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f) (2009); See In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). The standard of review is whether the court s findings of fact are based upon clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether the findings support the conclusions of law. In re Huff, (2000) 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d (internal quotations and citation omitted). 838, 840 -5We note that although the trial court concluded grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1),(2),(3), and (6) to terminate dispositive that the father s parental rights, we the evidence supports termination find it of his parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6). See In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003) (a finding of one statutory ground is sufficient to support the termination of parental rights). The trial court may terminate a respondent s parental rights upon a finding: That the parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a dependent juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101, and that there is a reasonable probability that such incapability will continue for the foreseeable future. Incapability under this subdivision may be the result of substance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or any other cause or condition that renders the parent unable or unavailable to parent the juvenile and the parent lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6). A dependent juvenile further defined as: A juvenile in need of assistance or placement because the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or custodian responsible for the juvenile s care or supervision or is -6whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) (2009). In determining whether a juvenile is dependent, the court must consider both: (1) the parent s ability to provide care or supervision, and (2) the availability arrangement. to the parent of alternative child care In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 427, 610 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2005). In the termination order entered in the instant case, the trial court found: 19. The recommendations of the Capacity to Parent Assessment were not favorable. The Respondent Father was unable to apply what was learned in Love and Logic parenting classes to the child. It did not appear likely that that [sic] taking another class was going to remedy this situation. Dr. Cummings did not hear voiced and did not see reflected in demeanor or behavior, a motivation to figure out what to do if Plan A did not work. In the real life observation session, when Plan A did not work, Plan A was implemented repeatedly. This is a set up for disaster should the child return home. [The father s] skills for managing a child known to have serious behavior and learning problems are quite limited and the potential for further abuse and mistreatment is high. . . . . 24. The Respondent Father has a diagnosis -7of Depression. He was hospitalized in the Behavioral Health Unit at least three times during the pendency of this case and hospitalized on one occasion while in the State of Virginia. He is incapable of providing care for [the] child and unable to think of new ways to deal with the juvenile s discipline issues. 25. The minor child is a difficult child to parent and discipline due to Mosaic Turner Syndrome, severe Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Attachment Disorder, and a lot of behavioral issues. Parenting of and discipline for [the juvenile] requires effort and a lot of structure. 26. The Respondent Father named his Brother in the State of Tennessee for the Department to consider for potential placement. His Brother was denied as an alternative childcare arrangement for placement through an ICPC Home Study. The Respondent Father named no one else as a potential placement for the child. Contrary to the father s argument on appeal, we hold that these findings are supported by competent evidence. 19 is essentially Evaluation. a summary of the Finding of fact Capacity to Parent In the evaluation, Dr. Jeanne Devany Cummings ( Dr. Cummings ) noted that the father showed significant evidence of depression behavior. and a high score in the area of aggressive Dr. Cummings also noted that the match between the child and the parental skills set is poor. -8Respondent contends, and we agree, that he did make some progress in the parenting class. Respondent was proud of the skills learned in parenting class, including offering choices to Kate. However, Dr. Cummings also noted that respondent relied exclusively on the talking to her. restriction, or ideas of time-out, giving choices and He did not discus[s] the use of privilege incentives of any kind, or environmental modification as ways of addressing behavior problems. Neither respondent nor Kate s stepmother considered that their strategies to discipline Kate might fail and neither of them had an alternative plan. While Dr. Cummings recognized that the family appeared sincere in their desire to have Kate return home, ultimately she concluded that their skills for dealing with a child like Kate were limited and the potential for further abuse and mistreatment [wa]s high. In addition, Ms. Krejci testified that respondent s depression makes it difficult for him to find ways to deal with Kate s unique issues and needs. She also stated his diagnosis made her feel respondent was incapable of caring for Kate. The trial and court s findings convincing evidence. were supported by clear, cogent -9As to the second consideration, whether the parent had any appropriate alternative child care arrangements, respondent failed to show that there were any appropriate alternatives. Ms. Krejci testified that the father s brother had been rejected as a possible alternative placement for the juvenile, and that the father had not offered any further alternatives. As a result, we find that the trial court s findings of fact are supported by sufficient evidence and, in turn, support the conclusion that the juvenile was dependent. III. Best Interests of the Child Respondent concluded that next it argues was in that the terminate his parental rights. the trial juvenile s court best improperly interests to We disagree. After the trial court determines that at least one ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the disposition stage to determine whether termination is in the best interests of the juvenile. court s N.C. decision discretion. 599, 602 Gen. at Stat. this § stage 7B-1110(a) is (2009). reviewed for The an trial abuse of In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d (2002). In determining the best interests of the juvenile, the trial court shall consider the following factors: (1) The age of the juvenile. -10(2) The likelihood juvenile. of adoption of the (3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile. (4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. (5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement. (6) Any relevant consideration. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2009). [F]indings of fact made by the trial court . . . are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them. In re H.S.F., 182 N.C. App. 739, 742, (2007) 645 S.E.2d 383, 384 (internal quotations citation omitted). In the instant case, the trial court found: 36. The Court has considered the six factors enumerated in N.C.G.S. 7B-1110(a). 37. The minor child is currently 11 years of age. The likelihood of adoption is good. Although currently placed in a psychiatric residential treatment facility, she continues to make progress. It is hopeful that the minor child can begin bonding with a family for permanency once she is stepped down from the therapeutic setting. 38. Termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan of adoption for the minor child. and -1139. From September 2010, when he moved to the State of Virginia, until approximately two weeks ago, the Respondent Father had not exercised visitation with the minor child. They have had some telephone conversations on a sporadic basis. The juvenile cares about her Father, but knows she is not safe in his home. . . . . 41. The conduct of the Respondent Father has been such as to demonstrate that he will not promote the healthy and orderly physical and emotional wellbeing of the juvenile. 42. The juvenile is in need of a Permanent Plan of Care at the earliest age possible that can be obtained only by the severing of the relationship between the juvenile and the Respondent Father by termination of his parental rights. 43. It is in the best interests of [the juvenile] that the Respondent Father s parental rights be terminated. Respondent primarily contends that it is unlikely that Kate will be adopted, given her special needs. Respondent further argues that the trial court s findings concerning the likelihood of adoption are not supported by the evidence, and that the evidence does not support the conclusion that termination of respondent s parental rights was in Kate s best interests. We note first that the trial court s findings directly address the factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). As -12to the issue of the likelihood of adoption, Ms. Krejci testified that given Kate s age, she was very likely to find a permanent home. Ms. Krejci further testified that a family would soon begin mentoring Kate and working through her progress at the Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facility which could open avenues for future adoption. Ms. Krejci also prepared DSS s juvenile court similarly prospects for summary which adoption, and characterized recommended that Kate s terminating respondent s parental rights would aid in making progress toward achieving the goal of adoption. DSS s summary also indicated that Kate was making progress in her current placement and the staff was hopeful that she would be ready to bond with a family and succeed in a foster setting. While respondent correctly contends that at one point, Kate did express mother, this that she wanted statement was to made live with almost a respondent year prior or her to the termination hearing. At the hearing, Ms. Krejci testified about the bond between respondent and Kate. She stated that Kate cares about her father but she knows also that she s not safe at home. Accordingly, concerning we adoption find that accurately the trial court s characterize the findings evidence -13presented and support its conclusion that terminating respondent s parental rights was in Kate s best interests. result, we affirm the trial court s order As a terminating respondent s parental rights. IV. Conclusion The trial court did not err in terminating respondent s parental rights or in determining it was interests to terminate his parental rights. in Kate s best The trial court made the required findings of fact in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1111(a)(6); 7B-1110(a) (2009). We affirm. Affirmed. Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McGEE concur. Report per Rule 30(e).

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