People v Summers

[*1] People v Summers 2017 NY Slip Op 50659(U) Decided on April 24, 2017 Supreme Court, Kings County Shillingford, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on April 24, 2017
Supreme Court, Kings County

The People of the State of New York

against

Ramel Summers, Defendant.



7173/2015



District Attorney Eric Gonzalez

By: Maria Schiavone, Esquire

Glenn Singer, Esquire

350 Jay Street

Brooklyn, New York 11201

For Defendant:

By: Frank Paone, Esquire

26 Court Street — Suite 1406

Brooklyn, New York 11242
Ruth E. Shillingford, J.

Defendant is charged with, inter alia, Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). This Court conducted a combined Mapp/Huntley/Dunaway [FN1] hearing, followed by the parties' written submissions. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion to suppress is granted to the extent that other than pedigree information about his name and age, his statements at the precinct are suppressed, and the motion is otherwise denied.[FN2]

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

The People called three witnesses, namely, Sergeant John Pietanza and Detectives Miguel Nunez and Brian Flynn, all of whom the Court finds credible. The defense presented no [*2]witnesses. Sergeant Pietanza is a ten-year veteran of the New York Police Department ("NYPD"), and is currently assigned to the 66th Precinct. Prior to this assignment, he served as a Detective Investigator in the 60th Precinct Detective Squad for over a year, then was assigned to the 78th Precinct as a Sergeant. Detective Nunez has been a member of NYPD for twenty years, and has been assigned to the Regional Fugitive Task Force for the past five years. Previously, he was assigned for ten years to the Brooklyn North Warrant Squad. Four years ago, Detective Nunez became a deputized United States Marshal, which allows him to make arrests outside of the country. Detective Flynn has worked for NYPD for over nine years, the last three years as a detective assigned to the 60th Precinct Detective Squad.

At approximately 1:00 p.m. on January 20, 2015, while still a member of the 60th Detective Squad, Sergeant Pietanza responded to a shooting incident on West 24th Street and Mermaid Avenue in Brooklyn. During the course of his investigation, he reviewed several surveillance videos of the incident, one of which depicted an individual loading and firing a gun from inside of a building on 24th Street. Sergeant Pietanza captured a still photograph of that individual from the surveillance video. His colleague, Detective Mohassib, recognized the person in the photograph as defendant. At that point, Sergeant Pietanza issued an "investigation card for suspect only," also called an "I card," in defendant's name, which indicated that he had developed defendant as a suspect in that shooting (H: 10). An "I card" is "disseminated throughout the NYPD personnel" stating that "a person is wanted for a specific crime that occurred on a specific date," and designates what police action should be taken, should law enforcement encounter the person (H: 11).

Meanwhile, that same day, Sergeant Pietanza responded to Lutheran Medical Center to interview the alleged complainant in the shooting, Quyimain Townsend. Mr. Townsend said that as he was walking home, he heard a "pop" and felt something hit him (H: 18). He returned fire and ran down West 24th Street toward Surf Avenue, where EMS responded. He could not identify the person who shot him because the incident "happened too fast" (id.). Sergeant Pietanza placed Mr. Townsend under arrest, and he remained in police custody throughout his treatment at Lutheran Medical Center, and upon his discharge.

At about 7:10 p.m. on January 22, 2015, at the 60th Precinct, while placing Mr. Townsend under arrest "in connection with three separate incidents" (H: 27), Sergeant Pietanza again questioned him about the events of January 20, 2015. He was taken out of the cell and seated on a chair in the cell area. Although initially "uncooperative" with Sergeant Pietanza (H: 30-31), Mr. Townsend again recounted the incident. Sergeant Pietanza asked him if he knew someone by the name "Ra" and he confirmed that "Ra" was Ramel Summers. Mr. Townsend then inquired about the shooting and "what would happen with the individual" (H: 31). He now stated that while walking down 24th Street toward Mermaid Avenue, he exchanged words with a man named "Ra." Mr. Townsend ran, and after being shot twice, drew his own weapon and fired back. He also provided a description of "Ra," but did not give a description of his clothing. After he finished questioning Mr. Townsend, Sergeant Pietanza showed him a photo that he had obtained "[f]rom photo manager" (H: 33-34). Mr. Townsend identified the person depicted in the photo as "Ra." He also identified defendant from a photo array "soon thereafter" (H: 11). Sergeant Pietanza then changed the "I card" to "probable cause to arrest" (H: 11).

On September 8, 2015, Detective Miguel Nunez was part of a field team responding to [*3]2864 West 16th Street in Brooklyn, a small, single-floor residential house with a driveway and a rear door. The team, comprised of six to eight officers, was "looking for [defendant] on a wanted I card" still active as of that date. Their previous investigations led the team to believe that defendant could be found at that address (H: 49). The team members were dressed in casual clothing with their shields displayed, and they wore vests marked "Police."

Upon arrival, Detective Nunez and two or three officers went to the rear of the house, while the rest of the team positioned itself at the front. Detective Nunez knocked on a window. He noticed someone inside move the blinds to look out the window, so he knocked on the rear door. An Hispanic male, later identified as Hector Figueroa, opened the door, and simultaneously, Detective Nunez "heard over the radio" a member of his team say "[w]e have Ramel in front" (H: 47-48, 57, 60). He "asked [Mr. Figueroa] can we come inside the location and he allowed [them] in the residence" (H: 48). Once inside, he walked toward the front of the house and saw defendant outside on the sidewalk, handcuffed, in the custody of the rest of the field team. Detective Nunez then exited the residence through the front door. Defendant was dressed in a tank top and boxer shorts, so he directed the team "to bring him back inside so we can get him properly dressed" (H: 49). Detective Nunez "brought [defendant] back in the front room. I asked him where is his clothing" (H: 50). Defendant "pointed to the front room. He said his clothing was in a book bag in the front room" (H: 50). No one on the team had their weapon drawn during this time nor made any threats or promises to defendant.

Detective Nunez proceeded to the front room and saw a black book bag on the floor next to the bed. When he picked up the bag, he saw a black and silver firearm in plain view "underneath the bag" (H: 51, 68). He recovered the firearm and subsequently vouchered it. Detective Nunez then brought defendant to the 60th Precinct Detective Squad. He subsequently learned that the home was leased to Hector Figueroa, the same person who opened the rear door for him.

Detective Flynn met with defendant at about 11:53 a.m. on September 8, 2015. He brought defendant to the video interrogation room at the 60th Precinct, where he conducted a video interview of defendant. Detective Flynn was seated across from defendant at a small interview table. As the recording began, defendant entered the room carrying a bottle of water. Detective Flynn asked him to "have a seat on the right." The following colloquy then ensued:

DETECTIVE FLYNN: What's going on? This is the first time we're actually sitting down here. I'm Officer Flynn from the Detective Squad. Uh, I know you're actually familiar with other detectives up here and stuff like that, so I really personally don't know you. DEFENDANT: Um hum.DETECTIVE FLYNN: You know what I mean? Uh, your first name is Ramel, right? R-A-M-E-L?DEFENDANT: Yeah.DETECTIVE FLYNN: What's your last name?DEFENDANT: Summers. S-U-M-M-E-R-S.DETECTIVE FLYNN: E-R-S? What's your date of birth?DEFENDANT: 12/5/80.DETECTIVE FLYNN: 12/5/80.DEFENDANT: Um hmm.DETECTIVE FLYNN: You mentioned earlier that you're, uh, homeless right now?DEFENDANT: Uh, yeah.DETECTIVE FLYNN: Where have you been staying?DEFENDANT: Well I been back and forth. I been at friend's houses - -DETECTIVE FLYNN: What kind of friends - -DEFENDANT: You know, different friends, different female friends, different friends.DETECTIVE FLYNN: You're not working?DEFENDANT: Nah, not now, I was working.DETECTIVE FLYNN: You were working?DEFENDANT: Yeah, when I was across town, I was at, um, forgot the projects over there. I was doing a little construction over there.DETECTIVE FLYNN: In Brooklyn?DEFENDANT: Yeah, in Brooklyn.DETECTIVE FLYNN: Like, what area, kinda? Flatbush, or - -DEFENDANT: No, um, East New York.DETECTIVE FLYNN: East New York, by the (unintelligible) Houses, or —DEFENDANT: No, um, what's the name of them projects? Um, Brooklawn?DETECTIVE FLYNN: Brooklawn Houses?DEFENDANT: Yeah, Brooklawn Houses.DETECTIVE FLYNN: You don't know the address there, you were saying?DEFENDANT: No.DETECTIVE FLYNN: What was your friend's name you were staying with?DEFENDANT: I was staying at a cousin's house over there.DETECTIVE FLYNN: Oh, you were staying at your cousin's house? What's your cousin's name?DEFENDANT: Vanessa. I been there.DETECTIVE FLYNN: You were doing a little construction stuff over there?DEFENDANT: Yeah, I was doing, yeah.DETECTIVE FLYNN: All right. What made you go homeless? Like, you said you were staying out here, right?DEFENDANT: Well, well, you know, I had probation and whatever. And I didn't report to my probation, so they started coming to my house. So I, you know - -DETECTIVE FLYNN: Where, on West 2-4th Street?DEFENDANT: Yeah.DETECTIVE FLYNN: And what was the address over there?DEFENDANT: 2850 West 24th.DETECTIVE FLYNN: So probation started coming over there, so probation's looking for you.DEFENDANT: Yeah.DETECTIVE FLYNN: You're violating probation?DEFENDANT: Yeah.DETECTIVE FLYNN: What are you on probation for?DEFENDANT: It's a misdemeanor probation.DETECTIVE FLYNN: All right, no worries, no big deal. Um, whose house were you at today?DEFENDANT: That was, that was my girlfriend's uncle's house.DETECTIVE FLYNN: All right. So you were just hanging out with your girlfriend?DEFENDANT: Yeah, yeah.DETECTIVE FLYNN: Are you getting any work around here, anything like that?DEFENDANT: No. I just wanna get this over with, so I can (start over?). I just want to do whatever I gotta do, the time I gotta do, to get back home to my family.DETECTIVE FLYNN: Listen, you're being straight up with me. DEFENDANT: That's it, man.DETECTIVE FLYNN: What I'm gonna do, 'cause you're here, you're already here, I'm going to read your Miranda rights.DEFENDANT: What's that, what?DETECTIVE FLYNN: Your Miranda. I'll explain everything to you.

At this point, about the three-minute mark of the video, Detective Flynn administered Miranda warnings to defendant. There was a stack of papers on the table, in front of Detective Flynn, and he appeared to be reading the warnings from a piece of paper. Detective Flynn asked the following questions:

"You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer any questions, do you understand . . .Anything you say may be used against you, do you understand . . .You have the right to consult an attorney before speaking to the public, um, to the police and to have an attorney present before any questioning, now and in the future, do you understand . . .

If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided without cost, do you understand . . .

If you do not have an attorney available, you have the right to remain silent until you get the opportunity to consult with one, do you understand . . ."

After Detective Flynn asked each of these first five questions, defendant verbally answered in the affirmative, without hesitation. The following colloquy then ensued:

DETECTIVE FLYNN: Now that I have advised you of your rights, are you willing to answer questions?DEFENDANT: (pause) Hmm?DETECTIVE FLYNN: Are you willing to answer questions?DEFENDANT: Pertaining to what though?DETECTIVE FLYNN: Why you're here?DEFENDANT: Yeah, why am I here?DETECTIVE FLYNN: Well, I'm just saying - -DEFENDANT: Yeah - -DETECTIVE FLYNN: - - if you don't - -DEFENDANT: Yeah, I want to know why I'm here.

Detective Flynn then questioned defendant for about 45 minutes. At certain points, he left the room, then returned a few minutes later. Another officer, Detective Riordan, questioned defendant for about ten minutes, with Detective Flynn also present. Defendant was not [*4]handcuffed; he brought a bottle of water into the interview room and was allowed to smoke a cigarette during the questioning.

During the course of the interrogation, defendant stated, inter alia, that he is currently homeless, "on the run from probation" and that he sleeps with different friends and relatives. The house where he was arrested is his girlfriend's uncle's house. Neither defendant nor his girlfriend lives there, but they planned to stay there over the weekend. The only items defendant kept there were some clothing and some marijuana. Defendant denied ownership of the gun, or knowing the gun was in the room. He knows his girlfriend does not have a gun, but does not know whether her uncle owns one. Defendant remembered hearing gunshots on January 20, 2015, but all he did was run. He did not shoot at anyone and denied knowing or shooting Mr. Townsend. At the conclusion of the video, defendant asked whether he could use the bathroom, and Detective Flynn confirmed that he could do so.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendant argues that Detective Nunez's seizure of the weapon from the room was unreasonable; that his statements were the product of custodial interrogation; and that he did not unequivocally waive his Miranda rights.

The People counter that the police officers testified credibly; that there was ample probable cause to arrest defendant; that he lacks standing to challenge the legality of the seizure of the firearm; that his statement at the scene of his arrest was not the product of custodial interrogation; and that his video statement was voluntarily made and preceded by valid Miranda warnings.

A. Dunaway

In this case, there was ample probable cause for defendant's arrest. On January 22, 2015, Mr. Townsend, the complainant in a shooting case, twice identified defendant as the person who shot him, first as a single photo confirmatory identification and later in a photo array. Consequently, Sergeant Pietanza changed the "I card" designation from "suspect" to "probable cause to arrest," which was still active as of September 8, 2015. As such, defendant's arrest was lawful (see People v Diaz, 83 AD3d 958, 958 [2d Dept], lv denied 17 NY3d 805 [2011]; People v Warren, 12 AD3d 708, 709 [2d Dept 2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 804 [2005]).

B. Mapp

1. Standing

Citing Minnesota v Olson (495 US 91 [1990]), defendant asserts that his standing to challenge the legality of the search stems from his legitimate expectation of privacy as an overnight guest. Initially, at a suppression hearing, the People have the burden "of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct" (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971] [citations omitted]). In order to invoke the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, however, a defendant must carry his burden of proving "standing — that is, a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises" (People v Wesley,

73 NY2d 351, 359 [1989]).

An overnight guest may possess a legitimate expectation of privacy which society is prepared to accept as reasonable (see People v Ortiz, 83 NY2d 840, 842 [1994], citing Minnesota v Olson, supra; People v Murray, 169 AD2d 843, 844 [2d Dept 1991], lv denied, 82 NY2d 757 [1993]). "The number of times a person stays in a particular place, the length and nature of the [*5]stay, the indicia of connectedness and privacy, like change of clothes or sharing expenses or household burdens, are all factors which may alone or in combination with other factors support a reasonable expectation of privacy which is protected by the Fourth Amendment" (People v Rodriguez, 69 NY2d 159, 163 [1987]).

Here, defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing standing to challenge the legality of the seizure. The evidence adduced at the hearing showed that he was arrested outside 2864 West 16th Street, the home of his girlfriend's uncle, in a tank top and boxer shorts, and that his clothes were in a book bag in the front room of the premises. There was no evidence, for example, that defendant contributed financially to the household, or received mail at the address or that he ever had a key to the home. Consequently, the testimony at the hearing reflects that defendant's status was more akin to a "casual visitor" (see People v Ortiz, 83 NY2d at 843) than a "frequent guest" (see People v Edwards, 124 AD3d 988, 989 [3d Dept], lv denied 25 NY3d 1201 [2015]). Finally, defendant denied that the gun belonged to him, and denied knowing that it was in the room, thereby failing to "assert a privacy interest in the place or item searched" (People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 108 [1996], citing People v Rodriguez, 69 NY2d at 163).

2. Seizure

Even if defendant had met his burden with regard to standing, the firearm would be admissible pursuant to the plain view doctrine. It is well settled that while the defendant "bears the ultimate burden of proving that the evidence should not be used against him," it is the People who bear the initial "burden of going forward to demonstrate the legality of the police conduct" (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367-68 [1971]). "[L]aw enforcement officers may properly seize an item in 'plain view' if (i) they are lawfully in a position to observe the item; (ii) they have lawful access to the item itself when they see it; and (iii) the incriminating character of the item is immediately apparent" (People v Brown, 96 NY2d 80, 88-89 [2001], citing People v Diaz, 81 NY2d 106, 110 [1993]; see People v Sanders, 26 NY3d 773, 777 [2016]).

In this case, Detective Nunez was lawfully in position to view the weapon because Mr. Figueroa allowed him to enter his residence. Once he lifted the book bag, he had lawful access to the gun. And the incriminating nature of a firearm in such proximity to the book bag of a shooting suspect was apparent. Furthermore, Detective Nunez did not conduct a formal search of the front room; he merely lifted the book bag and saw the firearm laying underneath. The only reason he entered the room was to retrieve defendant's clothing so that he could be transported to the precinct fully dressed. Accordingly, since the People have met their burden of proving the legality of the seizure and defendant has not demonstrated that the evidence should not be used against him, defendant's motion to suppress the firearm is denied.

C. Huntley

The People seek to admit two statements: defendant's statement to Detective Nunez at 2864 West 16th Street: that his clothing was in a book bag in the front room; and his approximately 48-minute video statement to Detective Flynn at the 60th Precinct Detective Squad.

Statements that are the product of custodial interrogation must be preceded by Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). "For a statement to be admissible, the People must prove a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the privilege against self-[*6]incrimination" (People v Aveni, 100 AD3d 228, 236 [2d Dept 2012], app dismissed 22 NY3d 1114 [2014] [citations omitted]). Interrogation refers to "express questioning, . . . words or actions on the part of the police . . . that [they] should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" (People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 [1980]).

1. Defendant's Statement at the Scene

Defendant's statement to Detective Nunez was not the product of interrogation. At the time of his arrest, defendant was dressed in a tank top and boxer shorts, so Detective Nunez asked him about the location of his clothing. As the People properly concede, defendant was in custody throughout his encounter with Detective Nunez. However, his question to defendant was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. While defendant's answer led to the recovery of the firearm, Detective Nunez posed the question simply to ensure that defendant was properly attired when he was transported to the precinct. No guns were drawn, and no threats or promises had been made to defendant prior to his statement. Accordingly, defendant's motion is denied as to this statement (see People v Garrett, 177 AD2d 705 [2d Dept 1992], app denied 79 NY2d 947 [1992]).

2. Pre-Miranda portion of video statement

The People argue that the entire pre-Miranda portion of the video statement constitutes pedigree information. Relying on People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289 (1995), they aver that Detective Flynn's questions to defendant regarding his employment, living situation and various addresses were "non-investigative inquiries" posed for the "sole purpose of obtaining the administrative information necessary for processing the defendant's arrest" (Schiavone 3/20/17 Submission at 4). Defendant contends that Detective Flynn's pre-Miranda questioning "[went] far beyond the standard and minimally necessary pedigree information" (Paone 3/21/17 Submission at 2).

Although "routine booking questions constitute custodial interrogation . . . answers given in response to such questions fall outside the protection of Miranda if they are reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns" (People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 292 [1995], citing Pennsylvania v Muniz, 496 US 582, 601-602 [1990] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The relevant inquiry "is not whether the information is inculpatory, but whether the police were trying to inculpate defendant or merely processing him" (People v Hester, 161 AD2d 665, 666 [2d Dept], lv denied 76 NY2d 858 [1990] [internal citations omitted]).

During the pre-Miranda portion of the video, Detective Flynn posed several investigative questions. For example, he asked defendant directly: "whose house were you at today?" At the time, Detective Flynn was aware that police had recovered a firearm not on defendant's person, but from that location, and he knew that defendant did not reside there, since he had no permanent home. Therefore, any information regarding defendant's potential ties to that residence was relevant to his knowledge of the gun's presence and could be useful to establish constructive possession, as well as a lack of standing to challenge the admissibility of the weapon. Detective Flynn also questioned defendant extensively regarding his former addresses and current living situation, including specifically asking: "What made you go homeless?" These questions tracked Detective Flynn's post-Miranda line of inquiry concerning whether defendant was evading his probation officer, or was "on the run because he had beef on West 2-4," thereby [*7]investigating a possible motive for the shooting. Furthermore, Detective Flynn asked several questions about defendant's probation status, including: "so probation's looking for you . . . You're violating probation?" These investigatory questions served very little administrative value, but rather, sought to incriminate defendant as a probation violator. Under these circumstances, "the inquiry was investigative in nature and the pedigree exception to the Miranda rule is inapplicable" (People v Dawson, 130 AD3d 750, 752 [2d Dept], lv denied

26 NY3d 1039 [2015]).

Finally, the cases upon which the People rely are distinguishable. In People v Nelson, 147 AD2d 774 (3d Dept), app denied 74 NY2d 794 (1989), the police officer "was unfamiliar with the underlying drug investigation and asked his questions based upon a history card used by the Kingston Police Department in the regular course of business" (id. at 775). In People v Rodney, supra, the officer was asking pedigree questions while completing an online booking sheet. Here, Detective Flynn was posing questions during a video statement — the entire purpose of which was to gain incriminating information which could possibly be used against defendant at trial. Rather than for the purpose of "merely processing" defendant, Detective Flynn's questions "went to the very heart of the crimes charged" (People v Antonio, 86 AD2d 614, 615 [2d Dept 1982]). Accordingly, with the exception of questions about his name and date of birth, the remaining statements are suppressed.

3. Post-Miranda portion of video statement

In this case, suppression is warranted because the post-Miranda portion of defendant's video statement was tainted by the previous unwarned portion of the statement. "Where an improper, unwarned statement gives rise to a subsequent Mirandized statement as part of a 'single continuous chain of events,' there is inadequate assurance that the Miranda warnings were effective in protecting a defendant's rights, and the warned statement must also be suppressed" (People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130 [2005], quoting People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 114 [1975]; see People v Ghee, 148 AD3d 721 [2d Dept 2017]).

Factors the court must consider in determining whether there is a single, continuous chain of events include:

the time differential between the Miranda violation and the subsequent admission; whether the same police personnel were present and involved in eliciting each statement; whether there was a change in the location or nature of the interrogation; the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation, such as the extent of the improper questioning; and whether, prior to the Miranda violation, defendant had indicated a willingness to speak to police. No one factor is determinative and each case must be viewed on its unique facts.

(People v Paulman, 5 NY3d at 130-31).

In People v Ghee, supra, after administering Miranda warnings, the detective took defendant's written statement while he was in custody. He thereafter admitted that, ten minutes prior to taking the written statement, he questioned defendant without administering Miranda warnings. The written statement referred to incriminating statements made by defendant during pre-Miranda questioning. The Second Department suppressed both statements, holding that "the improper unwarned statements made by the defendant gave rise to a subsequent Mirandized written statement as part of a single continuous chain of events" (id.).

Applying the Paulman factors to this case, the first, unwarned statements "gave rise" to the post-Miranda statements. There was no time differential between the pre- and post-Miranda portions of the video statement. Detective Flynn, though joined by a second detective at one point of the post-Miranda portion, was largely involved in eliciting both statements. And although the improper questioning was of short duration and defendant was willing to speak to police, there was no change in the location or nature of the interrogation.

Moreover, as in People v Ghee, the post-Miranda portion of defendant's statement makes several references to his previous, unwarned statement. For example, Detective Flynn asked defendant the following questions post-Miranda: "You said you kept missing probation, right? What were you on probation for? . . . So why'd you miss probation? . . . Is that the only reason you ran? You have no beef over on West 2-4?" Defendant answered that he was on probation for tampering with a witness, that he believed his probation officer would violate him for failing to attend anger management classes and that he had no "beef" on West 24th Street. This inquiry refers to statements elicited prior to Miranda warnings being administered, that defendant ceased reporting to his probation officer and that probation was "looking for" him.

Similarly, post-Miranda, Detective Flynn asked defendant about the home where he was arrested: "Do you know what was in the apartment, right? If there was anything in the apartment that was yours? You were just visiting?" These questions are directly related to defendant's pre-Miranda statement that he was arrested at the home of his girlfriend's uncle and that he was "just hanging out with [his] girlfriend." Accordingly, since "the improper unwarned statements made by defendant gave rise to a subsequent Mirandized written statement as part of a single continuous chain of events," the post Miranda statements are suppressed (People v Ghee, supra; People v. Chapple, 38 NY2d at 115).

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, defendant's motion to suppress is granted to the extent that his statements at the precinct are suppressed, except as to pedigree information about his name and date of birth, and the motion is otherwise denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.

Dated: April 24, 2017

Brooklyn, New York

Hon. Ruth Shillingford

A.J.S.C. Footnotes

Footnote 1: Although the People did not consent, following an offer of proof indicating a colorable basis for standing, this Court ordered a Mapp hearing (see People v Wiggins, 126 AD3d 1229, 1232 [3d Dept 2015] [holding that a court may conduct a suppression hearing if "the accused alleges facts that, if true, demonstrate standing to challenge the search or seizure"], quoting People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 587 [2006]).

Footnote 2:Numbers preceded by "H" refer to the minutes of the hearing.