Matter of Government Empl. Ins. Co. v Minton

[*1] Matter of Government Empl. Ins. Co. v Minton 2017 NY Slip Op 27407 Decided on December 7, 2017 Supreme Court, Suffolk County Mayer, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 7, 2017
Supreme Court, Suffolk County

In the Matter of the Application of Government Employee Insurance Company to Stay Arbitration, Petitioner,

against

Caitlin Minton, Respondent.



614679-2016



Gail S. Lauzon, Esq.

Attorneys for Petitioner

100 Duffy Avenue, Suite 500

Hicksville, New York 11801

Cerussi & Gunn, P.C.

Attorneys for Respondent

1325 Franklin Avenue

Suite 225

Garden City, New York 11530
Peter H. Mayer, J.

Upon the reading and filing of the following papers in this matter: (1) Notice of Motion by the petitioner, dated September 19, 2016, and supporting papers; (2) Affirmation in Opposition by the respondent, dated October 26, 2016, and supporting papers; (3) Reply [*2]Affirmation by the petitioner, dated November 4, 2016, and supporting papers; and now

UPON DUE DELIBERATION AND CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT of the foregoing papers, the motion is decided as follows: it is

ORDERED that, inasmuch as this matter was not resolved at a Conference held with the Court and counsel for the parties, the application (001) by petitioner, Government Employees Insurance Company ("GEICO") for a stay of arbitration is hereby granted and the respondent, Caitlin Minton, is permanently stayed from proceeding to arbitration with GEICO for the accident of November 26, 2014; and it is further

ORDERED that counsel for GEICO shall promptly serve a copy of this Order via First Class mail upon counsel for the respondent, and shall promptly thereafter file the affidavit of such service with the Suffolk County Clerk.

This action arose from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 26, 2014. When the accident occurred, the respondent, Caitlin Minton, was operating a 2007 Toyota when it was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by Christopher Savage. At the time of the accident, Minton's vehicle was insured by GEICO under a policy with Bodily Injury ("BI") and Supplementary Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist ("SUM") coverage limits of $25,000/$50,000, while Savage's vehicle was insured by National Liability & Fire Insurance Co. with a BI limit of $25,000. Given the minimum limits and offset provisions of Minton's SUM Endorsement, SUM coverage was not available to Minton under her own policy with GEICO. Instead, Minton served GEICO with a Demand for Arbitration under a policy of insurance issued by GEICO to Minton's same-sex partner, Vanessa Guarino, which carried BI and SUM limits of $100,000/$300,000.

Minton's Demand for SUM Arbitration under the Guarino policy is premised upon Minton's allegation that she resided with Guarino on the date of the subject accident. GEICO contends, however, that Minton was not a "resident relative" of Guarino's household on the date of the accident and that, therefore, Minton is not entitled to SUM benefits under Guarino's policy. Consequently, GEICO seeks an order permanently staying Minton from proceeding to SUM arbitration.

In support of its petition GEICO annexes the relevant Declarations Page from the Guarino policy, which shows that while Guarino's address was "29 Hulse Ave., Wading River" on the date of the accident, the relevant police accident report lists Minton's address as "119 Hampton Vista Dr., Manorville." Therefore, GEICO denied Minton's claim for SUM coverage under Guarino's policy on the grounds that Minton was neither a "resident relative" of Guarino, nor a "named insured" under Guarino's policy. Accordingly, GEICO argues that Minton is not entitled to proceed to SUM Arbitration against GEICO under Guarino's policy.

Pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Definitions section of Guarino's GEICO SUM endorsement, "insured" is defined as:

(a) you [Guarino], as the named insured and, while residents of the same household, your spouse and the relatives of either you or your spouse (bold in original);

In opposition to GEICO's petition to stay arbitration, Minton contends that the 119 Hampton Vista Drive, Manorville address listed on the police report was a temporary address, and that since July of 2014 she has continuously resided with Guarino at 29 Hulse Avenue, Wading River. In support of this contention, Minton submits a copy of her November 26, 2014 accident-related hospital registration record, as well as a bank statement, each listing her address [*3]as 29 Hulse Avenue, Wading River. Minton further contends that since July 2014 she and Guarino have "lived together at [that] address ... in a committed relationship as if [they] were in a traditional 'spouse' relationship."

Here, it is undisputed that Minton was not a named insured under Guarino's GEICO policy. It is also beyond dispute that, despite their committed, "as if" spouses, relationship, Minton and Guarino were not legally married on the date of the accident. Therefore, irrespective of the residency issue, Minton did not meet the definition of "insured" under Guarino's GEICO SUM endorsement by virtue of a spousal relationship.

It is the courts' responsibility to determine the rights and obligations of parties under insurance contracts based on the specific language of the policies whose unambiguous provisions must be given their plain and ordinary meaning (see Encompass Indem. Co. v USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 61 AD3d 974, 878 NYS2d 132 [2d Dept 2009]; Labate v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 45 AD3d 811, 847 NYS2d 128 [2d Dept 2007]). While it is true that policies of insurance are to be strictly construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer, where the provisions of the policy are clear and unambiguous they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and courts should refrain from rewriting the agreement (see Maurice Goldman & Sons, Inc. v Hanover Ins. Co., 80 NY2d 986, 592 NYS2d 645 [1992]; GEICO v Kligler, 42 NY2d 863, 397 NYS2d 777 [1977]; Marshall v Tower Ins. Co. of New York, 44 AD3d 1014, 845 NYS2d 90 [2d Dept 2007]).

It is evident from the face of the GEICO policy that there is only one named insured, Guarino, and that the language of the policy does not give rise to any ambiguity (see GEICO v Constantino, 49 AD3d 736, 854 NYS2d 459 [2d Dept 2008]). The plain meaning of a policy's language may not be disregarded in order to find an ambiguity where none exists (see Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v Eveready Ins. Co., 48 AD3d 406, 851 NYS2d 647 [2d Dept 2008]; Bassuk Bros., Inc. v Utica First Ins. Co., 1 AD3d 470, 768 NYS2d 479 [2d Dept 2003]). A court will not strain to create unclarity (see Caporino v Travelers Ins. Co., 62 NY2d 234, 476 NYS2d 519 [1984]). Likewise, equitable considerations will not allow an extension of coverage beyond its fair intent and meaning (see Eisner v Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 141 Misc 2d 744, 534 NYS2d 339 [Sup Ct, New York County 1988]).

In addition to seeking coverage as Guarino's presumed spouse, Minton uses the expansive definition of "family" set forth in Braschi v Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 NY2d 201, 544 NYS2d 784 (1989) to argue that as Guarino's same-sex partner, she is entitled to coverage as Guarino's "relative." Such argument, however, is unavailing. The expansive definition of "family" set forth in Braschi was applied to rent stabilized tenants, in the context of rent stabilization laws being substantially the same as rent control laws, and has no bearing on interpreting different statutes with different statutory purposes (see Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v Pine, 44 AD3d 636, 848 NYS2d 190 [2d Dept 2007]). In fact, unlike Braschi, this case "does not involve the interpretation of a statute at all, but rather a contractual provision, [and] there is no basis for applying the expansive definition of family set forth in Braschi" (Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v Pine, 44 AD3d at 640; see also Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v Pine, 44 AD3d 636, 848 NYS2d 190 [2d Dept 2007]). Likewise, under the facts of this case, there is no basis to broaden the definition of "spouse" or "relative" to include Minton as an insured under the SUM provisions of Guarino's GEICO policy (see Matter of Cooper, 187 AD2d 128, 592 NYS2d 797 [2d Dept 1993]).

Since Minton was neither a married spouse nor a relative of Guarino at the time of her accident, she is not entitled to coverage under the SUM Endorsement issued by GEICO to Guarino (see GEICO v Constantino, 49 AD3d 736, 854 NYS2d 459 [2d Dept 2008]). Therefore, GEICO's petition is granted and Minton is permanently stayed from proceeding to arbitration with GEICO for the accident of November 26, 2014.

This constitutes the Order and Judgment of the Court.

Dated: December 7, 2017

PETER H. MAYER, J.S.C.