People v Exantus

[*1] People v Exantus 2016 NY Slip Op 51178(U) Decided on June 30, 2016 City Court Of Ithaca, Tompkins County Miller, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on June 30, 2016
City Court of Ithaca, Tompkins County

The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

against

Camille Exantus, Defendant.



2015-88887



ADA Brad Rudin

Tompkins County District Attorney's Office

320 N. Tioga Street

Ithaca, NY 14850

Seth Peacock, Esq.

308 North Tioga Street

Ithaca, NY 14850
Scott A. Miller, J.

The Defendant, Camille Exantus, is charged with common law Driving While Intoxicated, Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192(3), a misdemeanor. The Defense moves to suppress all evidence obtained, alleging lack of probable cause for the stop of her vehicle. The Court held a suppression hearing on this matter on April 4, 2016. Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds and concludes as follows.

On October 1, 2015 at approximately 1:00 a.m., two New York State troopers were driving a marked vehicle traveling southbound on Meadow Street in the City of Ithaca. The troopers observed Defendant's vehicle signal and make an extremely wide left turn onto Old Elmira Road, weave several times within it's lane, and then stop for about 30 seconds at a yield sign at the entrance to a traffic circle, although there was no traffic within the circle, or even nearby. The troopers pulled directly behind Defendant's stopped vehicle and activated their emergency lights. Initially, Defendant remained stopped at the traffic circle, did not immediately respond to the emergency lights, and, consequently, impeded the movement of the troopers' vehicle. Approximately 10 seconds after the troopers had activated their emergency lights, Defendant drove into the traffic circle, exited onto Spencer Street and pulled over in response to the troopers' request. After admitting to consuming some wine and failing the HGN, walk and turn, and one legged stand field sobriety tests, Defendant was placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Defendant was never issued any traffic violations, and the troopers stated that the wide turn and weaving within lane did not warrant the issuance of traffic tickets. However, the troopers stated that Defendant's driving, in combination with the prolonged and unnecessary stop at the yield sign, prompted them to initiate a traffic stop to investigate whether there was a medical emergency or other significant problem. Neither trooper testified that the stop was initiated because they believed the Defendant may be impaired or intoxicated.

In 2001, the Court of Appeals held that the police may lawfully stop a vehicle based on probable cause that there has been a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation. People v. Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 353-354 (2001). The Third Department, in People v. Portelli, 116 AD3d 1163, 1163-4 (3rd Dept. 2014), clearly articulated the correct legal standard for permissible vehicular stops and explained:

Police may legally stop a vehicle if they have "reasonable suspicion that [a] defendant has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime" (People v. Coffey, 107 AD3d 1047, 1049, 966 N.Y.S.2d 277 [2013], lv. denied 21 NY3d 1041, 972 N.Y.S.2d 538, 995 N.E.2d 854 [2013]; see People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 [1976]; People v. Houghtalen, 89 AD3d 1163, 1164, 931 N.Y.S.2d 922 [2011] ). Further, probable cause exists for a traffic stop if an officer observes a defendant committing a traffic violation.

Portelli is an important reminder that while the police must possess "probable cause" to initiate a vehicular stop based upon a mere traffic infraction, officers require only the lesser standard of "reasonable suspicion" that an occupant of a vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime in order to lawfully effectuate a stop of an automobile. See also, People v. Marshall, 46 Misc 3d 1207 (Ithaca City Ct 2015).

The People's reliance upon People v. Blalark, 126 AD3d 1124 (3d Dept. 2015) in support of their argument that the proper standard for a traffic violation stop is "reasonable suspicion" is incorrect. In Blalark, the Third Department upheld the validity of the stop because the officer "possessed reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving with a suspended license." Id. at 756. Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree [VTL §511(1)(a)], is a crime, not a mere violation, and of course any stop must be analyzed under the lesser "reasonable suspicion" standard that applies to a crime. However, when the police are only investigating a non-criminal traffic violation, in order to effectuate a traffic stop, they must possess "probable cause" that the driver has committed a traffic violation. Robinson, supra. See also, Marshall, supra.

However, it is immaterial that Defendant Exantus was never issued a ticket. An "otherwise lawful traffic stop [is] not rendered illegal merely because the officer [does] not ultimately issue Defendant any traffic tickets." People v. Weishaupt, 118 AD3d 1100, 1102 (3rd Dept 2014). The failure of both troopers to articulate a specific Vehicle and Traffic Law section as the basis of the stop of Defendant's vehicle does not mandate suppression. The officers' subjective motivations for stopping Defendant's vehicle does not end the inquiry for determining whether "probable cause" existed to stop Defendant for a traffic violation. Rather, the test is an objective one. The Court of Appeals, in Robinson, supra., at 348-349, quoting the United States Supreme Court in Whren, infra.:

The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment had not been violated because "[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred" (Whren, supra, 517 U.S., at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769). The stop of the truck was based upon probable cause that the petitioners had violated provisions of the District of Columbia traffic code. The Court rejected any effort to tie the legality of the *** officers' conduct to their primary motivation or purpose in making the stop, deeming irrelevant whether a reasonable traffic police officer would have made the stop. According to the Court, "Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis" (id., at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769). Thus, [*2]the "Fourth Amendment's concern with reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent" (id., at 814, 116 S.CT. 1769).

In short, the troopers' subjective motivations for stopping Defendant Exantus are irrelevant. The suppression court must employ an objective test and determine from the record whether there existed "probable cause" that Defendant committed a traffic violation which, accordingly, would justify the stop of her vehicle. Robinson, supra.

Although Defendant offered the explanation that she remained stationary at the yield sign in order to change her "Pandora" smart phone music station, such testimony is irrelevant when assessing whether there existed an objective probable cause basis that Defendant had committed a traffic violation justifying the stop of her vehicle. The Second Department's holding in People v. Dennis, 144 AD2d 381 (2d Dept. 1988) is remarkably on point. The Dennis court, in upholding the trial court's denial of suppression explained that "although nothing prevented the vehicle from proceeding, it remained standing at the intersection for approximately 20 seconds, blocking both the intersection and the unmarked police car. This failure to move offered reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1201, and 1202 and justified the police stop of the Defendant's vehicle." Id. at 381.

Defendant Exantus' prolonged stop at the yield sign provided objective probable cause of a violation of both VTL §§1201 and 1202, and, consequently, the stop of her vehicle was justified.

The temporary detention of Defendant after the initial stop was reasonable under the circumstances. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996).

Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby denies the motion to suppress in its entirety and schedules the matter for a pre-trial conference on Thursday, August 4, 2016 at 1:30pm.

This constitutes the Decision of the Court entered upon notice to both parties. A notice of appeal, if applicable, must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of this decision.

DATED: June 30, 2016

s/

Scott A. Miller

Ithaca City Court Judge