People v Paladino

[*1] People v Paladino 2016 NY Slip Op 50797(U) Decided on May 18, 2016 District Court Of Suffolk County, Wilutis, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 18, 2016
District Court of Suffolk County,

The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

against

Lauren M. Paladino, Defendant.



2014SU-000249



Appearances of Counsel:

For the Defendant: Steven M. Politi

Central Islip, NY

For the People: ADA James Petrich

for Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney of the County of Suffolk
Karen M. Wilutis, J.

The defendant is charged with driving while intoxicated (VTL §1192 (3)) and aggravated driving while intoxicated (V & TL §1192(2-a)(a)). Mapp/Dunaway/probable cause and Huntley hearings were held to determine the admissibility at trial of evidence obtained against the defendant.

The People called Suffolk County Police Officer Christopher Sanchez as their witness. Officer Sanchez testified that on December 17, 2013 he was alone and in uniform, working a 9pm to 7am tour in a marked police vehicle in the Shirley/Mastic Beach area of Suffolk County, New York. At approximately 11:30pm he received a radio call regarding a motor vehicle accident with a vehicle into a house at 54 Robinson Drive, Mastic Beach. Upon arrival, Officer Sanchez observed a vehicle into the front of the house. The house had sustained damage and the vehicle had severe front end damage. The Officer observed one person in the vehicle, a female who was lying across the center console with her feet on the driver's side and her head on the passenger side. Officer Sanchez testified that he spoke with the female and noted that she had glassy, bloodshot eyes, slurred and mumbled speech and a strong smell of alcohol on her breath. The female stated that she was driving, that she was alone and that she had been drinking, "but not a lot." The female was identified as the defendant, Lauren Paladino. The defendant was removed from the vehicle by fire and ambulance personnel. Officer Sanchez testified that he did not request that the defendant perform any field sobriety tests due to the nature of the accident and possible physical injury. The defendant was placed in an ambulance and Officer Sanchez informed the defendant that she was being placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated. She was transported to Brookhaven Hospital and Officer Sanchez followed the ambulance to the hospital.

At the hospital Officer Sanchez read the chemical test warnings from the Alcohol/Drug Influence Report and asked the defendant if she would consent to take a chemical test. The defendant consented to do so and a blood test was conducted, the results of which were a .19% BAC. Officer Sanchez testified that he read the Miranda warnings to the defendant at 1:37am

and that the defendant stated that she understood the warnings and was willing to talk to the Officer. The defendant again admitted that she had been driving and had been drinking alcoholic beverages.

The defense called Police Officer Joseph Riviello, who was also present at the accident scene. Officer Riviello testified that he received a dispatch regarding the incident on Robinson Drive and arrived at the scene of the accident shortly before Officer Sanchez. After checking the vehicle and speaking briefly with the defendant, Officer Riviello spoke with the homeowner who had made the 911 call regarding the accident. The Officer acknowledged that the call was dispatched as a "10-21", which code corresponds to "leaving the scene of an accident." However, after Officer Riviello observed the scene and spoke with the defendant and the 911 caller, he concluded that the initial "leaving the scene" report was incorrect and that the defendant was the driver and the only person in the vehicle.

Pursuant to the provisions of CPL 140.10(1)(b), a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant for "[a] crime when he has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such crime, whether in his presence or otherwise." The Criminal Procedure Law provides that " [r]easonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense' exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it." (CPL 70.10(2)).

It is the finding of this Court that the evidence obtained as a result of the arrest should not be suppressed for lack of probable cause. As a result of the hearings held herein, this Court finds that the facts known to Officer Sanchez at the time of arrest - the defendant's presence alone in a crashed vehicle, visible damage to the vehicle and a house, the defendant's physical condition, the odor of alcohol, the defendant's admission as to having consumed alcohol, and her statement that she was driving - were collectively of such weight to render it reasonably likely that the defendant had committed the offense of driving while intoxicated and therefore gave the officer probable cause to arrest the defendant. (People v. Kowalski, 291 AD2d 669 (3rd Dept 2002); People v. Lamb, 235 AD2d 829, 830-831 (3d Dept 1997); People v. Kalwiss, 6 Misc 3rd 129 (A), 2005 NY Slip Op 50057 (U) (App Term 2nd Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2005); People v. McClaney, 135 AD2d 901 (3rd Dept 1987); CPL 140.10).

Although the defendant argued that the nature of the original 911 dispatch raised an issue as to the element of operation, it must be noted that the proof required to establish probable cause

to justify an arrest is not that which is required for conviction (see People v. Miner, 42 NY2d 937 [1977]) and that the test for probable cause does not require "certitude" that a crime was committed by the person arrested (see Veras v. Truth Verification Corp., 87 AD2d 381 [1st Dept 1982], affd 57 NY2d 947 [1982]; People v. Cunningham, 71 AD2d 559 [1st Dept 1979], affd 52 NY2d 927 [1981]). The Court of Appeals has provided a probable cause standard in alcohol-[*2]related driving offenses as one in which, when "viewing the facts and circumstances as they appeared at the time of arrest, a reasonable person in the position of the officer could have concluded that the motorist had operated the vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor" (People v. Farrell , 89 AD2d 987 [2nd Dept 1982]), requiring "merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed" (People v. Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417 [1985]). A determination as to probable cause is to be made only after a consideration of all facts and circumstances and, even though when "[v]iewed singly, these may not be persuasive, yet when viewed together the puzzle may fit and probable cause found." (People v. Bigelow, supra). Furthermore, it has been held that the element of operation may be proven by circumstantial evidence and that there is no absolute requirement that there be direct eyewitness testimony as to the defendant's operation of the vehicle. (See People v. Booden, 69 NY2d 185 [1987]). The facts and circumstances of the case at bar permitted the arresting officer to make a reasonable inference that the defendant had recently moved the vehicle in an intoxicated condition; namely, "that it had been driven by the intoxicated defendant before it came to rest" where the vehicle was found. (See People v. Saplin, 122 AD2d 498 [3rd Dept 1986], lv app den 68 NY2d 817 [1986]; People v. Kahn, 182 Misc 2d 83 [App Term, 2nd Dept, 2nd & 11th Jud Dists] 1997).

Regarding the defendant's request for suppression of her statement(s), such relief is also denied. A defendant temporarily detained at a roadside investigation, including a suspected DWI offense, is not considered to be in custody and the limited questioning appropriate to such an investigation and the administration of performance tests do not require Miranda warnings.(People v. Mackenzie, 9 Misc 3rd 129 (A), 2005 NY Slip Op 51535(U) [App Term 2nd Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2005], lv app den 5 NY3d 807 [2005]). Said statements were made during the course of the Officer's permissible investigation, were not the product of custodial interrogation and were not obtained by any unfairness or coercion. Accordingly, the Court finds that these

statements are voluntary and admissible at trial. (People v. Mathis, 136 AD2d 746 [2nd Dept 1988], lv app den 71 NY2d 899 [1988]; see also People v. Swan, 277 AD2d 1033 [4th Dept 2000], lv app den 96 NY2d 788 [2001]; People v. Kearney, 288 AD2d 398 [2nd Dept 2001]; People v. Noonan, 220 AD2d 811 [3rd Dept 1995]).

When a statement is made during a custodial interrogation, the People must establish that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived her Miranda rights. The voluntariness of a statement is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. (See People v. Anderson, 42 NY2d 35 [1977]). The People have the burden of proving, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that a statement was voluntarily made. (See People v. Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]). In the matter sub judice the Court finds, after hearing the credible testimony of Officer Puzelli together with the facts and totality of the circumstances presented, that the defendant understood his rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived same. As such, the defendant's statement "No, I can't take the test" made at the precinct is also admissible.

Accordingly, after hearing and evaluating all of the testimony presented herein, this Court finds that probable cause existed for the defendant's arrest and the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of same is denied. The defendant's motion to suppress her statements is also denied.

New Court Date:

Dated:

J.D.C.