People v Manrique
Annotate this CaseDecided on November 25, 2014
Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County
The People of the State of New York
against
Robinson Manrique, Defendant.
2014NY010447
For the defendant: Robert Rambadadt, Esq.
For the People: Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., New York County District Attorney, by ADA Andrew Stengel
Steven M. Statsinger, J.
Defendant, charged with Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 145.00(1), and Harassment in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law §240.26(1), moves for an order dismissing the Information pursuant to CPL § 30.30. The Court has reviewed the entries and documents in the court file, the parties' motion papers, and the relevant statutes and case law. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that 23 days are chargeable to the People. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Allegations
According to the accusatory instrument, the defendant banged loudly on the door of 215 Audobon Avenue at 4:30 a.m. and stated "open the fucking door." When the complainant, defendant's girlfriend, opened the apartment door, defendant pushed past her and stated "you're gonna pay." Defendant then entered the kitchen, and the complainant heard the sound of breaking glass, and observed several broken dishes on the floor.
B. Legal Proceedings
Defendant was arraigned on February 7, 2014, on a Misdemeanor Complaint charging him with Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 145.00(1), and Harassment in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law §240.26(1). Bail was set, and the case was adjourned to February 11, 2014 for conversion. Subsequent calendar appear[*2]ances took place on April 2, May 12, July 22 and September 30. The defense filed the within motion on July 17. The People responded to the motion on September 30, and the matter has been sub judice since then.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant is charged with "at least one ... misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months." CPL § 30.30(1)(b). Thus, his motion to dismiss must be granted if the People were not ready for trial within 90 chargeable days of the commencement of the action. Id. Here, there were four court dates from the commencement of the action through the filing of the motion to dismiss. Those events spanned 150 calendar days, and 23 of those days are chargeable to the People. The motion to dismiss is accordingly denied.
A. The Speedy Trial Calculations
1. February 7, 2014, to February 11, 2014: 4 Days Chargeable
Criminal Procedure Law § 1.20(17) provides that "a criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court." In this case, that event occurred at defendant's arraignment on February 7, 2014. The speedy trial clock started on the next day. People v. Stiles, 70 NY2d 765, 767 (1987). At the arraignment, the Court adjourned the case to February 11 for conversion. Accordingly, 4 days are chargeable to the People. The People concede these 4 days
2. February 11, 2014, to April 2, 2014: 10 Days Chargeable
The People failed to provide the corroborating affidavit on February 11, 2014, and the Court released the defendant and adjourned the case to April 2 for conversion However, off-calendar on February 21, the People filed with the Court and served on defense counsel by mail a Certificate of Readiness ("COR") and a corroborating affidavit. Accordingly, 10 days are chargeable to the People. The People concede these 10 days.
3. April 2, 2014, to May 12, 2014: 9 Days Chargeable
On April 2, 2014, the defense waived motions, and the case was adjourned to May 12. However, on April 11, off-calendar, the People filed with the Court and served on defense counsel by mail a Certificate of Readiness ("COR"). Accordingly, 9 days are chargeable to the People. The People concede these 9 days.
[*3]4. May 12, 2014, to July 22, 2014: 0 Days Chargeable
On May 12, 2014, defendant did not appear in court. A bench warrant was stayed, and the case was adjourned to July 22. The period is not chargeable to the People because when the court stays execution of a bench warrant, at defense request, it is a period accruing to the defendant's benefit. See People v. Medina, 198 AD2d 146 (1st Dept. 1993); People v. Toro, 151 AD2d 142, 143 (1st Dept. 1989).
5. July 22, 2014, to September 30, 2014: 0 Days Chargeable
On July 22, 2014, the People answered "not ready" for trial; however, on that date it emerged that the defense had filed the instant motion to dismiss on July 17; this had the effect of stopping the speedy trial clock. CPL §30.30(4)(a).
6. September 30, 2014, to November 25, 2014: 0 Days Chargeable
On September 30, the case was adjourned to November 25 for the decision of the Court. For this period, 0 days are chargeable to the People. CPL §30.30 (4)(a) ("reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including ... pre-trial motions" is excludable).
B. Conclusion
As detailed above, 23 days (4 + 10 + 9 = 23) are chargeable to the People. Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30 is accordingly denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since 23 days of speedy trial time are chargeable to the People, defendant's motion
to dismiss is denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated: November 25, 2014_______________________
New York County, New YorkSteven M. Statsinger
Judge of the Criminal Court
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
