Matter of Martin v Clarkstown

[*1] Matter of Martin v Clarkstown 2012 NY Slip Op 51482(U) Decided on July 31, 2012 Supreme Court, Rockland County Jamieson, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on July 31, 2012
Supreme Court, Rockland County

In the Mater of the Application of POLICE OFFICER Daniel Martin, Petitioner,

against

Town of Clarkstown and the TOWN BOARD OF THE TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN, SITTING AS THE POLICE COMMISSION, Respondents.



571/2012



Counsel: Counsel for Petitioner, Bunyan & Baumgartner LLP; Counsel for Clarkstown, Richard A. Glickel, Deputy Town Attorney.

Linda S. Jamieson, J.

The following papers numbered 1 to 5 [FN1] were read on this petition:

PaperNumber

Notice of Petition and Exhibits [FN2]1

Verified Answer, Affidavits and Exhbits2

Respondents' Memorandum of Law3

Affirmation in Reply4

Memorandum of Law in Reply5

The relevant facts in this case are not much in dispute. Petitioner, Clarkstown Police Officer Daniel Martin, was injured in the line of duty in September 2010 (the "first injury"). Petitioner suffered injuries to his neck, lower back and right knee during the pursuit of a stolen vehicle. Petitioner was out of work because of the first injury for several months. During [*2]that time, he received certain benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law Section 207-c. This section provides, in relevant part, that

Any . . . member of a police force of any county, city of less than one million population, town or village . . . who is injured in the performance of his duties or who is taken sick as a result of the performance of his duties so as to necessitate medical or other lawful remedial treatment shall be paid by the municipality by which he is employed the full amount of his regular salary or wages until his disability arising therefrom has ceased, and, in addition such municipality shall be liable for all medical treatment and hospital care necessitated by reason of such injury or illness. . . .

(Emphasis added). Petitioner returned to work from the first injury in January 2011. Petitioner worked full-time, plus overtime, after he returned to work from the first injury.

Thereafter, petitioner was again injured, on December 19, 2011, while working around his home (the "second injury"). There is no dispute that petitioner was not working as a police officer at the time of the second injury. Petitioner was out of work for 10 days as a result of the second injury. He was charged 10 days' sick time, and did not receive Section 207-c benefits for the second injury, despite his request. There is no dispute that petitioner filled out all of the appropriate paperwork as required.

Petitioner argues that he injured himself at home in December 2011 solely because of the first injury. He submits to the Court various documents from doctors which all state that the second injury was related to the first injury. He further argues that because the second injury was related to the first injury, he should have received benefits pursuant to Section 207-c. Respondents disagree, stating that Section 207-c "does not encompass those injuries suffered by an off-duty police officer who was not acting in the performance of his duties at the time of his injury."

A review of the statutory language shows this provision only applies to a person who is "injured in the performance of his duties or who is taken sick as a result of the performance of his duties." Clearly, the first section of that sentence does not apply here, because petitioner was plainly not injured in the performance of his duties on December 19, 2011 while he was at home. The only way that petitioner can obtain benefits, then, is if the second injury is one that arose "as a result of the performance of his duties."

Petitioner argues that the second injury was a "reoccurence of his acknowledged GML § 207-c injury." It is well-settled that "to demonstrate entitlement to those benefits, petitioner must [*3] prove a direct causal relationship between job duties and the resulting illness or injury.'" Brunner v. Bertoni, 91 AD3d 1100, 936 N.Y.S.2d 731 (3d Dept. 2012) (denying benefits because job duties were not a direct cause of injury). Police Chief Michael Sullivan found no such causal link, determining that the second injury did not arise as a result of the performance of petitioner's duties. He stated in his affidavit submitted to the Court that petitioner was not entitled to benefits because the second injury was not as a "result [of] the actual performance of police duty" since it happened at home. Chief Sullivan characterized the claim as seeking a " recommencement' of previously ended 207-c benefits following [his] recovery and return to full police duty." In his Affidavit, Chief Sullivan states that his decision as to petitioner "denying P.O. Martin's claim was not arbitrary and capricious," but was consistent with the past determinations made by the police department.

The standard for review is whether the denial of benefits is arbitrary and capricious. Zembiec v. County of Monroe, 87 AD3d 1358, 930 N.Y.S.2d 698 (4th Dept. 2011). "A determination denying General Municipal Law § 207—c benefits is not arbitrary and capricious if it has a rational basis." Tancredi v. Town of Harrison/Village of Harrison Police Dept., 72 AD3d 832, 898 N.Y.S.2d 631 (2d Dept. 2010).

Having reviewed all of the documents submitted to the Court, the Court finds that Police Chief Sullivan's determination that petitioner was not entitled to benefits for the second injury did have a rational basis, and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Although both parties seek to convince the Court that their position about the causal link is correct, whether the Court disagrees with the determination or not is not the appropriate analysis under the applicable law. If there was a rational and not arbitrary basis for the determination — which there plainly was — the Court cannot overturn it. The petition is thus dismissed.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated:New City, New York

July , 2012

____________________________

Hon. Linda S. Jamieson

Justice of the Supreme Court Footnotes

Footnote 1:The Court does not accept sur-replies that are not previously authorized. Counsel is directed to review the Part Rules.

Footnote 2:Exhibits must be tabbed. Counsel is directed to review the Part Rules.