Williams v New York City Tr. Auth.
Annotate this CaseDecided on May 31, 2012
Ct Cl
Aldena Williams, et. al., Plaintiff(s),
against
New York City Transit Authority, Defendant(s).
34808/05
Plaintiffs were represented by Angelina Adam, Esq., Gregory J. Cannata & Associates, New York NY; Defendant, the New York City Transit Authority, was represented by Lisa E. Hodes-Urbont, Esq., Wallace D. Gossett, Brooklyn, NY.
Richard Velasquez, J.
Defendant, the New York City Transit Authority ("Transit"), moves pursuant to CPLR §3211 and §3212, for an order dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs oppose and cross-move for an order deeming their notice of claim to have been sufficient to give Transit notice of their allegations. For the reasons set forth below, Transit's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and Plaintiffs' cross-motion is GRANTED.
Background
On June 7, 2005, at about 10:45 p.m., Plaintiffs' decedent, Ronald Williams, was found lying dead on the train tracks just south of the southbound Utica Avenue station. It is undisputed that Mr. Williams was visibly intoxicated when he entered the Franklin Avenue subway station.
According to the deposition testimony of Kim Harris, the Transit agent working the token booth at the Franklin Avenue station on the night of the accident, Mr. Williams attempted to buy a Metrocard from him, however, Mr. Harris refused to sell the fare because of Mr. Williams' obvious state of intoxication. Mr. Harris described Mr. Williams as appearing "somewhat off balance" and "almost erratic." Mr. Harris advised Mr. Williams to "sit down on a bench for a little while and get it together" and that he would likely be able to sell him a Metrocard later. Mr. Harris thereafter witnessed Mr. Williams attempt to use the Metrocard machine to purchase a fare, but saw that he couldn't "focus enough to get a sale." After five to ten minutes of lingering in the Metrocard machine area, Mr. Williams "went over to the turnstiles and went into the kneeling position with some difficulty." Mr. Williams "attempted to crawl underneath the turnstile area" on his hands and knees but only "got halfway through." Mr. Harris stated that it looked as if Mr. Williams got so tired [*2]from the effort that he "just rolled over on his side and laid down for another five minutes or so in a fetal position." After laying on the ground, underneath the turnstile, for five to ten minutes, at the sound of an oncoming train, Mr. Williams managed to crawl under the turnstile and "wobbled down" the staircase leading to the southbound train.
Mr. Williams boarded the #4 southbound train to Utica Avenue, the final stop on that line. It is Plaintiffs' position that, while Transit's rules require the train to be free of passengers after it has reached the final stop, Mr. Williams was left onboard the train as it was operated into relay. According to Plaintiffs, during the relay process, the train is taken into the tunnel to switch tracks so that it can be operated back into the station for travel in the opposite direction. Plaintiffs contend that, during the relay process, Mr. Williams walked through the train cars in search of train personnel, fell in between two cars, and was killed after being run over by a train car.
As a result of the accident, Superintendent Alexis Colon, from Transit, conducted an investigation. In her memorandum, Superintendent Colon concluded that Mr. Williams had been left on the train by its conductor, Christopher Chase. She further concluded that Mr. Williams was walking between cars 7741 and 7742, the rear section of the train, as the train proceeded southbound into the relay position and that he ended up underneath car 7741 and was thereafter run over by the train. Superintendent Colon recommended that Conductor Chase be disciplined for failing to properly discharge the train at the terminal. Conductor Chase ultimately stipulated to a five-day suspension.
Plaintiffs' theory of negligence against Transit is based on (1) its agent's failure to summon aid for the decedent who was in the Franklin Avenue subway station in a staggering, intoxicated state, and (2) failing to ensure that the decedent was discharged from the train before going into relay.
While Transit does not dispute that Mr. Williams died as a result of being run over by a train car, in moving for summary judgment, Transit argues that there is no evidence that Mr. Williams was left on the train. Transit submits that it is equally likely that Mr. Williams disembarked at the last stop and then re-boarded the train, or, that he boarded between the train cars from which he ultimately fell. Transit further submits that Plaintiffs' claim that Transit "failed to protect or take care of intoxicated plaintiff" has no merit in law because no such duty exists, and that, in addition, such a claim must fail because it was never asserted in their notice of claim. Finally, Transit argues that, even assuming it was negligent in some manner, Plaintiffs cannot establish that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Discussion
"[A] common carrier is subject to the same duty of care as any other potential tortfeasor"reasonable care under all of the circumstances of the particular case" (Bethel v New York City Transit Auth., 92 NY2d 348, 356 [Ct App 1998]. Applying the foregoing, the Court finds that Transit has failed to establish, prima facie, its entitlement to summary judgment. [*3]
The record fails to establish that Transit was not negligent as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [Ct App 1986]). While Transit does not owe a "special duty" to the decedent absent a special relationship (see Weiner v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 NY2d 175 [Ct App 1984]), here, a jury could reasonably find that the failure to summon aid for the decedent constituted a breach of ordinary care (see Crosland v New York City Transit Authority, 68 NY2d 165, 169-70 [Ct App 1986]). Based on Mr. Harris's testimony, Mr. Williams' appeared to be visibly and severely intoxicated. Mr. Williams was unsteady, staggering, and in such a compromised state that he could not complete a purchase on the Metrocard machine nor successfully crawl underneath a turnstile. Thereafter, Mr. Harris observed the decedent lie on the floor in the fetal position, halfway through the turnstile, for five to ten minutes, in an unresponsive state. Based on the foregoing, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that Defendant was under no duty to summon aid.
Whether Transit was also negligent in failing to discharge Mr. Williams after the last stop is similarly an issue for the jury. There is an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Williams was, in fact, discharged from the train before going into relay, and whether such alleged failure was negligent and the proximate cause of his death. Transit's own investigation concluded that Mr. Williams was left onboard the train after the last stop. Thus, this allegation by Plaintiffs is far from speculative. Moreover, Transit's assertion that Mr. Williams could have disembarked from the train and then re-boarded is unsupported by any evidence.
As for the issue of proximate cause, generally, proximate cause is a jury question (see Nowlin v City of New York, 81 NY2d 81, 89 [Ct App 1993]. There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident (see Jahangir v Logan Bus Co., Inc., 89 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2d Dept 2011]). In such cases, the issue of comparative negligence is generally a question for the jury to decide (Id.). Here, a jury could reasonably conclude that the actions by one or both of the Transit employees"Mr. Harris and Conductor Chase"was a proximate cause of Mr. Williams' death.
Finally, with regards to Plaintiffs' motion seeking leave to amend their notice of claim to include allegations related to the events that took place in the Franklin Avenue station, the Court finds that the proposed amendment does not substantially alter the theory of liability alleged in the complaint, nor would Transit suffer any prejudice by allowing the amendment(see Dowd v City of New York, 40 AD3d 908, 912 [2d Dept 2007]; Matter of Puzio v City of New York, 24 AD3d 679, 679 [2d Dept 2005]). This is evident by the fact that the original notice of claim was sufficient to permit Transit to investigate Plaintiffs' claims regarding what occurred at the Franklin Avenue station.
Accordingly it is hereby
ORDERED that Transit's motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against it is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their notice of claim is granted. [*4]
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court. Courtesy copies of this decision and order have been sent to counsel for the parties.
Dated: May 31, 2012
______________________________
Richard Velasquez, J.S.C.
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