Matter of Retired Pub. Empl. Assoc., Inc. v Cuomo

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Matter of Retired Pub. Empl. Assoc., Inc. v Cuomo 2012 NY Slip Op 32979(U) December 17, 2012 Sup Ct, Albany County Docket Number: 7586-11 Judge: George B. Ceresia Jr Republished from New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service. Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for any additional information on this case. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY In the Matter of the Application of FEMRED PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCLATION, INC,; STANLEY WINTER as an Individual and President, Retired Public Employees Association, Inc.; ALAN D O N , as an Individual and Executive Directox, Retired Public Employees Association, Inc.; HON. JULES L. SPODEK; HON. D A W R.TOWNSEND; HELEN M.BULSON; VICTOR L. COSTELLO; JOY GODIN; F W C I S HAMBLIN; A. JOANNE LANTZ; WILLIAM C . MOORE; JOEIN B. N A t DAVID B. SMINGLER; KATHLEJ2N E FY STALLMER and FROSINE STOLIS, Plaintiffs-Petitioners, For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civii Practice Law and Rules, -againstHON. ANDREW CUOMO, Governor, State of New Yo&; NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF C M L SERVICE; NEW YORK STATE C M L SERVICE COMMTSSION; PATRICIA HITE, Acting President, New York State Civil Service Commission; NEW YORK S T A E HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM; STATE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET; DIRECTOR OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, GOVERNOR S OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS; and NEW YOFK STATE COMPTROLLER as a Necessary Party, Defendants-Respondznts. Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term Hon. George B. Ceresia, Sr., Supreme COW Justice Presiding RJINo. 01-11-ST3216 IndexNo. 7586-11 Appearances: Oliver Law Office Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Petitioners 156 Madison Avenue Albany, New York 12202 (Lewis B.Oliver, Jr., Esq., Of Counsel) [* 2] Hon, Eric T. Schneiderman Attorney General State of New York Attorney for Defendants-Respondents (Charles J. Quackenbush, Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel) Department of Law The Capitol Albany, New York 12224 DECISTON/OIU)ER/JUDGMENT George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice Respmdents-Defendants ( respondents ) move pursuant to CPLR 32 11(a)(7) to dismiss petitioners-plaintiffs ( petitimer5 ) hybrid M c1e 78ldeclaratory judgment i proceedinglactionon the ground that petitioners petitiodcomp faint ( petition ) fails to state a oause of action. Petitioners are retired public employees who seek a declaration that respondents implementation of the 2011 amendment of Civil Service Law $ 167(8) is invalid, an injunction against implementing Civil Service Law 3 167(8), and return of monies paid by public retirees as a result of respondents implementation of Civil Service Law 5 167(8). New York State ( State ) makes subsidized health insurance available to current and retired public employees through various providers including respondent New York State Health Insurance Program ( NYSHIP ). Until 1983, the State paid 100 % of the health insurance premiums for retirees. The State then determined to continue paying 100 YOof the health premiums for those retirees who retired prior to January 1, I983 and only 90 % (or 75 % of their dependants coverage) for employees who retired thereafter. 2 [* 3] Civil Service Law 6 167( l)(a),which w s enacted in 1983, provides that: a The full cost of premium or subscriptioncharges for the coverage of retired state employees who atre enrdled in the statewide and the supplementary health benefit plans established pursuant to this articIe and who retired prior to January f t nineteen hundred eighty-three shall be paid by the state. m, Nine-tenths of the cost of premium or subscription charges for the coverage of state employees and retired state employees retiring on o after January first, r nineteen hundred eighty-three who are enrolled in the statewide and supplementary health benefit plans shall be paid by the state. Three-quarters of the cost of premium or subscription charges for the coverage of dependents of such state employees and retired state employees shall be paid by the state. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subdivision, the state shall contribute toward the premium or subscription charges for the coverage of each state employee or retired state employee who i entolled i an optional s n benefit plan and for the dependents of such state employee or retired state employee the same dollar amount which would be paid by the state for the premium or subscription charges for the coverage of such state employee or retired state employee and his or her dependents if he or she were enrolled i n the statewide and the supplementary health benefit p l m , but not i excess of n the premium or subscription charges for the coverage of such state employee or retired state employee and his or her dependentsunder such optional benefit plan. For purposes of this subdivision, employees of the state colleges of agriculture, home economics, industrial labor relations, and veterinary medicine, the state agriculhraI experiment station at Geneva, and any other institution or agency under the management and control of Cornel1university as the representative of the board of trustees of the state university of New York, and employees of the state college of ceramics under the management and control of AIfied university as the representative of the board of trustees of the state university of New York, shdl be deemed to be state employees whose salaries or compensation are paid directly by the state. In 2011 when faced with severe fiscal challenges, the Executive and Legklahrre sought to reduce the State s costs for subsidizing health care costs for those who participate in N Y S H I P by M e r reducing the State s percentage of contribution. To this end, Civil Service Law 5 167(8) w s amended to permit further reductions in the State s contributions a on behalf of employees i the event that the State and unions agreed to such reductions. The n 3 [* 4] statute also specifically authorizes the President of the Civil Service Commission to implement the same reductions in contributions on behalf of retirees and employees who are not subject to the negotiated agreements. Civil Service Law 5 167(8) states that: Notwithstanding anv inconsistent provision of Iww, where and to the extent that an agreement between the state and an employee organidon entered into pursuant to article fourteen of this chapter so provides, the state cost of premium or subscription charges for eligible employees covered by such agreement may be modified pursuant to the terms of such agreement. The president. with the mproval of the director of the budpet, may extend the modified state cost of premium or subscription charges for employees or retirees not subiect to an agreement referenced above and shall promulgate the necessary rules or regulations to implement this provision (emphasis added). The State and Civil Service Employee Association ( CSEA )agreedto a 2 % increase in employee contsibutions to health care. After the State and a union agreed to the changes, the President of the Civil Service Commission applied the same contribution formula to retirees, who retired after 1983 pursuant to Civil Service Law 8 167(8). Petitioners challenge the 2 % increase i the retirees contributionto retirees hedth n care premiums on three grounds. Petitioners urge that respondents action must be invalidated because it (1) violates Civil Service Law 0 167(l)(a) and is therefore ultra vires; (2) violates the Contract Clauses contained i the United States Constitution, Article 1, n Section 10(1) and the New York State Constitution, Article I, Section6;and ( 3 ) violates the New York State Constitution, Article 3 , Section 1 because the legidative power of the State is vested in the Legislature and the Legislature has not delegated authority to respondents to increase contributions by retirees. 4 [* 5] CPLR 32 1I(a)(7) provides that [a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that: ... the pleading fails to state a cause of action. On a CPLR 321 ¬(a)(7) motion, the Court s role is Iimited to deciding whether the facts as alleged in the petition fit within a cognizable legal theory (Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 8 7 , 9 1 [ 19991; Cron v Hargso Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362,366 [1998]). When doing so, the Court must afford the petition a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, and accord the proponent ofthe cause of action the benefit of every favorable inference and cognizable legal theory (Hurrell-HarrinPv State of New York, 15 NY3d 8,20 [ZOlO]; EBC I, Inc. v Goldman. Sack & Co., 5 NY3d 1I, 19 [2005]; SUS, Inc. v St. Paul Travelers Group, 75 AD3d 740, 741-742 [3d Dept., 20101; Shebar v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,25 AJl3d 858,859 [3d Dept., 20061; Skibinsky v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 AD3d 975,976 [3d Dept.?20041; 1455 Washineon Ave. Assoc. v Rose & Kiernan, Inc., 260 AD2d 770,771 [3d Dept., 19991). Further, whatever can reasonably be implied from alIegations i the pleadings and n petitioners supporting affidavits must be deemed to be true (Cron v Harm0 Fabrics, 91 W 2 d 362, 366 [1998]; Korenman v Zavdelman, 237 AD2d 711, 713 [3d Dept., 19971). UnIike motions for summaxy judgment, the Court s sole inquiry on this motion to dismiss is whether the facts alleged i the petition fit within a cognizable legal theory. n With respect to the first cause of action, the petitioners, i advancing the argument n that the 2% increase i retirees contribution to their health m e premiums violates Civil n Service Law 4 167 (1) (a), ignore the 2011 amendment to said section which added subdivision (8). In this respect, they fail to address the statutory basis of respondents 5 [* 6] challenged actions and fail to address the question of whether respondents complied with Civil Service Law $ 167(8). Even assuming for the purposes of the argument that the petitioners had acknowledged Civil Service Law Q 167(8) s existence, petitioners assumption that Civil Service Law 0 16718) has no effect must be rejected. It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting statutes, should attempt to effectuate the Legislature s intent (Matter of Maiewski v Broadatbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 9 1 W Z d 577, 583 [19981; Patrolmen s Benevolent Assn. v C i q of New York, 41 NY2d 205,208 [19761; McKinney s Cons Laws of NY,Book 1 Statutes 6 92, pp 176-177). Legislation should be interpreted so as to give effect to every provision. A construction that would render a provision superfluous is to be avoided (Amorosi v South Colonie IndependentCent. School Dist., 9 NY3d 367,373 [2007]; MatterofMajewski vBroadalbin-Perth Cent. SchoolDist., 91 NY2d577,587 [1998]; Matter of OnBank & Trust Co., 90 NY2d 725, 731 119973; Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v &b&m, 9 NY2d 293,305-306 119611; Statutes $98[a]). The Court also rejectspetitioners assumption that until Civil ServiceLaw 6 l67( Q(a) is repealed it imposes an unalterabIe obligation on the State to make health care contributions at the prior rate for public retirees. Since the Legislature clearly did not express an intent to invalidate Civil Service Law 3 167(8) with Civil Service Law 8 1 7 l ( ) (see Matter of 6()a Dutchess County Dept.. of Social Sews. [Dav] v Day, 96 NY2d 149, 153 [ZOOl]; see also McKhey s Cons Law of NY, Book I , Statutes $221>,Civil Service Law 4 167(l)(a) and Civil Service Law 6 167(8) should be construed in a way that renders them internally compatible (Matter of Dutchess County Dept.. of Social.Servs. [Day] v Day, 96NY2d 149, 6 [* 7] 153 [2001]; Troy Police Benevolent and Protective Ass nhc. v Citv Of Troy, 299 AD2d 710 [3d Dept., 20021)- Read in conjunction with Civil Service Law 6 167(8), Civil Service Law 5 167(1)(a) only governs the State s level of contribution until such time as the State and a union agree to changes in the contribution levels and the President of the Civil Service Commission acts pursuant Civil Service Law 6 167(8) to apply the changed contributions to retirees. Petitioners argument that Civil Service Law 0 167(1)(a) is not affected by Civil Service Law $ 167(8) is at odds with the statutory language. Civil Sewice Law 5 167(8) begins with the phrase [n]otwitXlstanding any inconsistent provision of law. Phrases such as notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary or notwithstanding any law to the contrary, are verbal formulations frequently employed by the Legislature where it intends to preempt any other potentially conflicting statute, wherever found j the State s laws n (People v Mitchell, 15 NY3d 93,97 [20 IO]; Niagara County v. Power Authority of State, 82 AD3d 1597, 160 1 [4th Dept., 2011 I). Thus, where implementation of Civil Service Law 5 167(8) s provisions results in different levels of contribution from those that would result from applying other laws such as Civil Service Law 6 167(1)(a), Civil Service Law 6 167(8) s provisions takes precedence. Petitioners failure to support their condusory allegations that respondents determination to apply the formula to retirees is arbitrary and capricious,without authority and ultra vires also requires that their first cause of action be dismissed. To meet their burden, petitioners needto supporttheir conclusionsby providing specific facts and analysis. Petitioners unsupported conclusory statements are insufficient by themselves to state a cause 7 [* 8] of action (Matter of Federation of Mental Health Centers. hc. v De Buono, 275 AD2d 557, 561 [3d Dept., ZOOO]; Matter of Kirk v Bahou, 73 AD2d 770,77 1 [3d Dept., 19791; Matter of Gamonv Board of Educ. of Manhasset Union Free School Dist., 119 AD2d 674,675 [2d Dept., 19861; Matter of Reisman v Codd, 54 AJ32d 878 [lst Dept., 1 7 1 . 96) The Court disagrees with petitioners s p e n t that [tlhere is nothing i the language n or structure of the statute [or legislative history of the statute] which indicates that the Legislature intended to affect any change i the percentage of contribution to be paid by the n State for medical coverage of State retirees. As noted previously, Civil Service Law 5 167(8) specifically states that: %e president, with the approval ofthe director of the budget, may extend the modified state cost of premium or subscription c h g e s for empIoyees or retirees not subject to an agreement referenced above and shall promulgate the necessary rules or regulations to implement tlus provision. (emphasis added) ... The starting point i construing statutes is the statutory text, the clearest indicator of n legislative intent. The Court fmt determines whether there is a vlain meaning. Words of ordinary import in a statute are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning, unless it is clear from the statutory language that a different meaning was intended (Matter ofDrew v Schenectady County, 88 W 2 d 242,246 [ 9 6 ) Ifthe words employed by the 19]. legislature have a defmite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction,then there is no room for construction and COWS no right to add to or take away from that meaning have (Matter of Ma-iewskiv Broadalbin-PerthCent, School Dist., 9 1NY2d 577 [ 19981;Tornpkins v Hunter, 149 NY 117, 122-123 [1896]; Statutes 5 92, p 182). When the Legislature specifically authorized modification of the State s premium subscription contributions on 8 [* 9] behalf of ?retirees, the Legislature cfemly intended to authurize changes in the percentage of contribution to be paid by the State for medical coverage of State retirees. The Court also rejects petitioners belated alternate argument that the Court should chmonize Civil Service Law 5 147(8) and Civil Service Law $ 167(l)(a) by inserting a new provision that protects retirees who retired before October I, 2012 and ordering respondents not to apply the 2 % increase to those retirees. Pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, courts may not legislate, rewrite, or extend IegisIation (In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568,570 [1975]). Courts are not permitted to substitute their judgment for that of a Iegislative body a to the wisdom and expediency of the legislation (& s re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568,570 [ 19751). Nor may the Court force respondents to apply Civil Service Law 5 167(8) as though an Unwritten statutory provision existed. Mandamus is avaiIable only to enforce a clear legal right where the public officiaI has failed to perform a duty enjoined by law (CPLR 0 7803 [ 11; New York Civil Liberties Union v State, 4 NY3d 175,183-1 84 120051; Matter of Lead Aid i C o u n t v . 5 3 S c k e i n m a n , 2 d 1 16, 2 [1981]). Thus,maxldamusdoes not lie to enforce the perfomance of a duty that is discretionary, as opposed to ministerial (see Matter of Brusco v Braun, 84 WY2d 674,679 [1994]). A discretionq act hvolve[s] the exerciseof reasonedjudgment which could typically produce different acceptable results whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result (Tango v Tulevech, 6 1 NY2d 34,41 [ 19831). Neither Civil Service Law 8 167(8) nor Civil Sewice Law 0 1671])(a) distinguishes between formerpublic employees who retired prior to October 1,20 11 and those who retired 9 [* 10] afterward. Although Civil Service Law 5 167(8) leaves the President of the Civil Service Commission administrative discretion in determining whether and how to apply changes to unrepresented employees and retirees, the statute does not preclude the President of the Civil Service Commission from appIying those changes to retirees who retired before October 1, 2011. Were the Court to grant petitioners request, the Court would either be rewriting the statute by adding new statutory language or substituting the Court s judgment for the discretionaryjudgment of tRe President of the Civil Service Commission. The Court is not permitted to do either. The Court next rejects petitioners claim that respondents have applied Civil Service Law 8 167(8) retroactively by applying the new contribution rates to retirees who retired prior to October 1,201 1. There has been no retroactive application of Civil Service Law 6 167@). The respondents have not proposed to apply the changes so as to affect the State s level of contributions prior to October 1 20 11. Prospective application ofthe changes i the n level of contributions made on behalf of retirees who retired prior to October 1,2011 does not constitute retroactive application of Civil Service Law Q 167(S. ) I the Court s view, respondents determination to apply the terms of the coIIective n bargaining agreement between the State and CSEA to retirees had a rational basis by *e of the enactment of Civil Service Law 3 167 ( ) In addition, the Court rejects petitioners 8. suggestion that the Legislature acted irrationally in determining &at changes i the n contribution formula for employees that were agreedto by unions could be applied to retirees as well. 10 [* 11] As noted previously, the doctrine of separationof powers bars courts from legislating, rewriting, or extending legislation (xn re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568,570 [19751). Courts are not permitted to substitute theirjudgment for that of a legislative body as to the wisdom and expediency of the legislation (In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568, 570 [1975]). There is a further presumption that the legislative body has investigated and found facts necessary to support the legislation, as well as the existence of a situation showing or indicating its need or desirability. Thus, if any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court's power of inquiry ends (In re Adoption of Mdpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568,571 [1975]). Viewed fiom this perspective, the Court must sustain the chalknged legislation if it could be said to be '"reasonably related to some manifest eviI which, however, need onIy be reasonably apprehended" (Town of Huntheton v Park Shore Country Day Camp of Dix Hills. Inc., 47 NY2d 61,6546119791; LiAthouse Shores v Town of Islip, 4 1 NY2d 7,11- 22 [1976]; Matter of Electrical Inspectors v Village of Lvnbrook, 293 AD2d 537,538 [2d Dept., 20021). Thus,if on any interpretation of the facts known or reasonably to be perceived, the statute falls within the embrace of the respondents' authority it is invulnerable to petitioners' attack (Town of Huntington v Park Shore Country Dav Camp of Dix Hills. Inc., 47 NY2d 61,65[1979]). The burden of proof is upon the party challenging legislation and even the presence of empirical evidence that casts doubt upon the basis for legislation is not conclusive proof of irrationality. So long as there is evidence that the question is at least debatable, the legislative judgment is not irrational and the Court may not countermand the fegidature (Tom of North Hempstead v Exxon Cop., 53 NY2d 747,749 [ 19813). 11 [* 12] The Court finds that the Legislature s determination to permit respondents to apply the same terms as are agreed to by the State and a union to unrepresented employees and retirees is not irrational on its face. Petitiuners have failed to support their suggestion that Civil Service Law 3 167(8) is irrational with specific allegations demonstrating that the interests of public employees i continued state contributions to their health care are so n different fiom the interests of retirees in the contributions as to render Civil Service Law 5 167(8) s grant of discretion to the President of the Civil Service Commission irrational. The Court now t u m s to petitioners second cause of action, which respondents implementation of Civil Service Law asserts that 5 167(8) violates the Contract Clause. The Court approaches the constitutional testing of Civil Service Law 0 167(8) with certain well-established principles in mind: that the courts are not permitted to substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom and expediency of the legislation; that a legislative enactment carries with it an exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality; that, while this presumption is rebuttable, unconstitutionality must be demonstratedbeyond a reasonable doubt; that every intendment is in favor of the statute s validity; that the party alleging unconstitutionalityhas a heavy burden;and that only as a last resort will courts stdse down 1egisIative enactments on the ground of unconstitutionality (In re AdODtion of Malpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568,570 119751). Legislative enactments are invested with an exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality (Town of Huntington v Park Shore Country Day Camp of Dix Hills, 47 NY2d 61, 65 [19791; Marcus Assoc. v Town of Huntindon, 45 NY2d 50 1, 505 11978J; M M 97 AD3d 817,817 [2dDept., 20121). To succeed 12 [* 13] i challenging a piece of legislation on constitutional grounds, petitioners must shoulder the n very heavy burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates the Constitution (Schulz v State of New York, 84 NY2d 23 1,241 [1994]; Wiggins v Town of Somers, 4 NY2d 215,218 [1958]). The operative question here is whether amending Civil Service Law 5 167(8) has operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship (General Motors COT. v Rome& 503 US 18 1,186 [1992];Allied Structural Steel Co. v Smnnaus, 438 US.234,244, [19781). Three components must be considered: whether there is a contractualreIationship, whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship, and whether the impairment is substantial (General Motors Corp. v Romein, 503 US 181, 186 [ 19921). There is no need to reach the second and third components. In the Court s view, petitioners Contract Clause argument must be rejected-by reason that there is no %ontract that entitles petitioners to continued State contributions to public retirees health care at the same levels as they received prior to enactment of Civil Service Law 5 167(8). Petitioners second cause of action depends on petitioners argument that Civil Service Law $l67( Z)(a) continues to impose an unalterable obligation on the State to make health care contributions for public retirees at the same rate. As noted previously, Civil Service Law 6 167(8) provides for changing the Ievel of the State contributions set forth in Civil Service Law 8 1 6 7 1>(a). Petitioners have failed to allege the existence of an actual contract during the period of their employment which provided that the State is obliged to continue contributing to public retirees health care at the level applicable at the time of retirement. Thus, petitioners I3 [* 14] positkin is dearly distinguishable from that of retirees whose future health care coverage was assured i collective basgaining agreements that unambiguously provided for continued n coverage at a fixed rate for retirees at all times subsequent to their retirement (Hudock v Village ofEndicott, 28 AD3d 923,924 /3d Dept.,20061; Della R o w v City of Schenectady, 252 ADZd 82,84 [3d Dept., 19981; Myers v Citv of Schenectadv, 244 AD2d 845 [3d Dept., 19971; DiBattista v County of Westchester, 35 Misc3d 1205(A), 2008 W L 8783343 [Westchester Co., ZOOS]). The Court further disagrees with the contentionthat retirees health insurancebenefits enjoy the same level of protection as pension benefits and the State is therefore obliged to continue d i n g contributionsto retirees health care at the same level. Public retirees health insurance benefits do not enjoy the same protection as is afforded pension benefits and retirees health insurance benefits are therefore subject to reductions i the contribution to n health insurance premiums F a t t e r of Limman v Board of Fxluc.of Sewanhaka Cent. High % j ^I School Dist., 66 NY2d 3 13,3 15,3 17 [19851). A petitioners have no statutory, contractual, s or otherprotected right to continued State contributionsto their health care at the same levels as they were meivhg, Civil Service Law 6 167(8) and respondents implementation of that amendment are dearly not unconstitutionaI violations of the Contract Clause. Turning to petitioner s third cause of action, the petitioners allege that respondents implementation of Civil Service Law 8 16718) violates the New Yorlc State Constitution, Article 3, Section I because the legislative power of the State is vested i the Legislature and n the Legislature has not delegated authority to respondents to increase contributiom by retirees. The Court finds that the Legislature properly authorized an adjustment in the 14 [* 15] contributions for heakh care premiums of retirees through enactment of Civil Service Law 6 167(8). The Court also rejects a argument, not found in the petition, that the Legislature's n delegation of authority to modify the rates to the President of the Civil Service Conmission violated the State Constitution because the Legislature did not provide adequate standards and guidelines for exercising the authority to imptement Civil Service Law 5 167(8). The petitioners fail to support their argument with any specific factual altegations and fail to meet their burden of establishing a constitutional violation. As stated i Dalton v Pataki (5 WY3d n 243 [20051) "thereneed not be a specific and detailed legislative expression authorizing a particular executive act as long as 'the basic policy decisions underlying the regulations have been made and articulated by the Legislature' " (id..at 262-263,quoting Bourquin v Cuomo, 85 NY2d 781,785 [1995]). As noted previously, legislative enactments are invested with an exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality (Town of Huntington v Park Shore Countsv Day CamD of Dix Wills, 47 NY2d 6 1,65 [ 19791; Marcus Assoc. v Town of Huntington, 45 NY2d 50 1,505 [ 19781; 4 97 AD3d 817,817 [Zd Dept., 20123). To succeed in challenging a piece of legislation on constitutional grounds, petitioners must shoulder the very heavy burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates the Constitution (Schulz v State of New York, 84 W 2 d 23 I, 24 1 [ 19941; Wingins v Town of Somers, 4 NY2d 215,218 [1958]). Petitioners' conchsoy statements of law in their memorandum of law do not meet that burden. The petitioners have failed to present specific allegations that would support 15 [* 16] their conclusion that the Legislature ceded any fundamental poky responsibility to make social and politicalpolicy to the President of the Civil Sewice Commission. Petitionershave failed to present specific allegations that would support a conclusion that the Legislature failed to set forth reasonable standarb for respondents. Petitioners have failed to present specific allegations that would support a conclusion that respondents have promulgated regulations that are outside of the scope of the legislative delegation or conhdict Civil Service Law 3 167(8). Affording the petition here a liberal construction, accepting the dlegations containedtherein as true, and according petitioners the benefit of every favorable inference, petitioners have failed to state any valid cause of action. The Court notes a significant difference between declaratory judgment actions (see CPLR 8 3001) and other kinds of actions. The general rule is that on a motion to dismiss the complaint i a declaratory n judgment action for failure to state a cause of action, the cnly question is whether a proper case is presented for invoking the jurisdiction of the court to make a declaratoryjudgment, and not whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration favorable to him or her (Washindon 1[3d Dept., 19821). Thus, where no 177 AD2d 204,206 issue of factneeding resolution is raised by the preadings, as is the case here, judgment may be rendered on the merits i the defendant s favor on tke defendant s motion to dismiss the n complaint (Village of Woodbury v Brach, 99 AD3d 697,699 [2d Dept., 20121; Spillca v Town ofIdet, 8 AD3d 812,813 [3d Dept., 20041; Washindon County Sewer Dist. No. 2 v White, supra, at 206). The approvedprocedure for accomplishg this purpose is to deny the motion to dismiss the complaint (thereby retainingjurisdiction of the controversy) and then 16 [* 17] to declare the rights of the parties (St. Lawrence Univ. v Trustees of Theol. School of St. Lawrence Univ., 20 NY2d 3 17,325 [ 19671; Washington County Sewer Dist. No. 2 v Mite, sum.,at 206) Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that respondents motion to dismiss the petition is granted and the petition and all relief requested in the petitiodcomplaintare denied; and it is M e r ORDERED, that respondents motion to dismiss the declaratoryjudgment action is denied; and it is further ADJUDGED and DECLARF,D, that the administrative impZementation of an increase i the percentages of contributions for medical benefits under N Y S H T P payable by n State retirees andor their dependents participating in NYSHIP i excess of that set forth i n n Civil Service Law 5 167(1)(a) effective October 1,201 1 is valid; and it is further ADJUDGED and DECLARED,that the emergency regulation filed on September 27,201 1 and to take effect on October 1, 20 11, and published i the State Register i an n n issue dated October 12, 201 1 promulgated by the New York State Department of Civil Service implementing the increase in the percentages of contributions for NYSJiUP by retirees participating in NYSHIP is valid. This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original decisionlorderljudgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this decisiodorderljudgment and deIivery of this decisiodorderljudgment does not constitute 17 [* 18] entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved fiom the applicable provisions of that d e respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original decisionlorderljudgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents, All other papers are being delivered by the COW to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this decision/orderijudgment and delivery of this decisiodorderljudgment does not constitute entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved fkom the applicable provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. ENTER Dated: m, December 2012 Troy, New York Y - orge B. Ceresia, Jr. Supreme Court Justice Papers Considered: 1. 2. 3, 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Notice of Petition dated December 7,20 11; Complaint-Petitiondated November 30,20 11, with exhibits annexed; Afidwit of Harvey Randall dated December 7,20 1 1; Memorandum of Law dated January 20,2012, with exhibits annexed; Notice of Motion dated Februarry 24,2012; Affirmation of Charles J. Quackenbush dated February 24,2012, with exhibits annexed; Memorandum of Law dated February 24,2022; Memorandum of Law dated April 9,2012; Memorandum of Law dated April 19,2012. 18

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