Hartshorne v Pengat Tech. Inspections, Inc.

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Hartshorne v Pengat Tech. Inspections, Inc. 2012 NY Slip Op 32126(U) July 20, 2012 Supreme Court, Suffolk County Docket Number: 07-29473 Judge: Joseph Farneti Republished from New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service. Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for any additional information on this case. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] SIl(WT I:ORM Of{[)I,R INDEX No. CALNo 07-29473 11-0223701' SUPREME COURT - STATE OF NEW YORK IAS PART 37 - SUFFOLK COUNTY PRESENT: Hon. JOSEPH FARNETI Acting Justice Supreme Court ---------------------------------------------------------------)( JASON HARTSHORNE, Plaintiff, MOTION DATE 4-4-12 (#005) MOTION DATE 4-5-12 (#006 & #007) ADJ. DATE __ 4-_5_-1_2~~~~_ Mot. Seq. # 005 - MG # 006 - MG # 007 - MolD HALLOCK & MALERBA Attorney for Plaintiff 334 Deer Park Avenue Babylon Village, New York 11702 MILBER, MAKRIS, PLOUSADIS & SElDEN LLP Attorney for Pen gat Technical Inspections 3 Barker Avenue, 6th Floor White Plains, New York 10601 L'ABBATE, BALKAN, COLA VITA & CONTINJ Attorney for H2M Construction Management & Holzmacher, McLendon & Murrell, P.c. 1001 Franklin Avenue Garden City, New York 11530 - against - PENGAT TECHNICAL INSPECTIONS, INC., H2M CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT, INC., INTERCOUNTY PA VING ASSOCIATES OF NEW YORK, LLC, INTERCOUNTY PAVING ASSOCIATES, LLC, HOLZMACHER, McLENDON & MURRELL, P.C., TOWN OF HUNTINGTON and COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------X CARROLL, McNULTY & KULL, LLC. Attorney for Intercounty Paving ASSoClatesof NY, LLC, Intercounty Paving Associates LLC & Town of Huntington 570 Lexington Avenue, 8lh Floor New York, New York 10022 CHRISTINE MALAFI, ESQ., Suffolk Cty Attorney Attorney for County of Suffolk H. Lee Dennison Building 100 Veterans Memorial Highway P.O. Box 6100 Hauppauge, New York J J 788-0099 Upon the following papers numbered [to 59 read on this motion to amend pleadings; and these motions for sunmlarv judgment; Notice of Motion/ Order to Show Cause and supporting papers 1-21: 22-40; 41-59 , Notice of Cross Motion and supporting papers _, Answering Affidavits and supporting papers _; Replying Affidavits and supporting papers _; Other _ plaintiffs memorandum of law; it is, [* 2] lartshornc v h:ngat Tcch. Index No. 07-2947] Page No.2 j ORDERED that the motion (#007) by defendant Pengat Technical Inspections, Inc., the motion (#006) by defendants H2M Construction Management Inc. and Holzmacher, McLendon and Murrell, PC, and the motion (N·OOS) by deCendants Intercounty Paving Associates orNew York, LLc' Intercounty Paving Associates, LLC, and the Town of Huntington, arc consolJdatcd ['orthe purposes O(thl5 deterIlllllalion, and 1l is ORDERED that the unopposed motion by defendants H2M Construction Management Inc. and J-lolzmacher, McLendon and Murrell, PC, for summary judgment dIsmissing the complaint and all crossclaims agall1st them is granted; and it is ORDERED that the unopposed motion by defendants Intercounty Paving Associates of New York, LLC, Intercounty Paving ASSOCiates,LLC, and the Town of Huntington for summary Judgment dismissing the complamt and all cross-chums against them is granted; and it IS ORDERED that the unopposed motion by defendant Pengat TechnIcal Inspections, fnc. for summary Judgment dismissmg the complaint and all cross-claims against it is granted to the extcnt that the cross-claims against it are dismissed, and is otherwise denied. Plaintiff Jason Hartshorne commenced this action to recover damages for personal inj uries he allegedly sustained on September 25,2007, while working at a sewer improvement project located near the intersection of Route 110 and Pnme Avenue in Huntington, Ne\v York. The sewer system allegedly was owned by defendants Town of Huntington ("the Town") and the County of Suffolk ("the County"). Plaintiff, who was directing traffic, allegedly was injured when a motor vehicle hit a hose placed in the roadway, causing it to strike plaintiffs feet and knock him to the ground. The fire hose allegedly was placed in the roadway by defendant Pengat TeclmicaJ Inspections, Inc. ("Pengat"), a subcontractor hired to perfonn digital inspections and to vacuum the sewer lines. Defendant H2M Construction Managemcnt Inc. was hired by the Town to prepare design speclfications for sewer improvement, and to provide administrative services for the project. Defendant Holzmacher, McLendon and Murrell, PC, which is a part of an organization known as the H2M Group, was hired by the Town to provide engineer consulting services for the project. Defendants Intercounty Paving Associates of New York, LLC and Intercounty Pavlllg ASSOCiates,LLC, (collectively referred to as "Intercounty") allegedly were hired as the general contractors for the project. At the time of the accident, plaintiff allegedly worked for nonpal1y New Pipc Liners. By \vay of his complaint, plaintiff alleges causes of action against defendants for common law negligence, premises lJabihty, and violations of Labor Law 99 200, 240 (1), and 241 (6). Pengatjoined issue on November 29. 2007, and asserted a cross-claim for contribution and common law indemnification against H2M Construction. Intercounty and the Town joined issue on September 29,2008. and asscI1ed a cross-claim for contribution against Holzmacher, McLendon and Murrell. I-12MConstruction joined lssue on June 19, 2008, and asserted cross-claims agamst Pcngat and Intercounty for contractual and common law indemnification. contribution, and breach of contract based on thelr alleged failure to obtain insurancc naming it as an addItional insured. Intercounty now moves, pursuant to CPLR 3025, for an Order granting leave to amend its answer nunc pro tUIIC to 1l1cludea defense based on Worker's Compensation Law 9§ 11 and 29 (6). Intercounty also seeks an Order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, dismissing the complaint on the ground the Town did not [* 3] Ilunshorn ¢..v )lengat Tech, Index No. 07-29473 l'age No.3 own the subject roadway and mcrely provided general supervisory authority over the project. Intercounty further asserts that, as the parent company of plainti frs employer, it is entitled to the protections of the Workers' Compensation Law since plaintiff applied for and received workers' compensation benefits as a result OrhlS accident. H2M Construction and Ilolzmacher, McLendon and Murrell (hereinafter collectively rcfencd to as "H2M") also move for summary judgment in their favor dismissing the complall1t and all cross-claims against them on the grounds that they were not a statutory agent for the Town or the general contractor at the worksite, that they did not control, direct or supervise pJaintifrs work, and that they \vere not responsible for worksite safety. H2M further argues that as the engineer and administrative manager for the project, its role was limited to providing administrative services and inspecting the project and, therefore, it neither owed nor breached any duty to plaintiff Pcngat seeks summary judgment on similar grounds, argulIlg that it was not the owner, general contractor, or statutory agent for the project, that it lacked thc authority to control worksite safety or plaintiffs work, and that it was abscnt ii'OI11 the worksite on the day of the alleged accident. In the alternative, Pengat argues that plainti ff failed to state a claim under Labor Law § 240, as the alleged accident occurred as a result of a ground level tripping hazard. It further asserts that plaintiff failed to set forth the violation of any speci fic section of the Industrial Code in relation to Its Labor Law § 241 (6) claim, and that the subject accident was caused by plaintiffs own negligence and the negligence of the operator of the motor vehicle that struck the hose. Initially, the Court notes that Labor Law § 240 (1) is inapplicable under the circumstances of this case, as it is undisputed that the subject accident, which occuned as a result ofa ground level tripping hazard, is not among the type of perils Labor Law § 240 (l) was designed to prevent (see Spence v Islalld E.\·lalesal Mt. Sinai JI, LLC, 79 AD3d 936, 914 NYS2d 203 [2d Dept 2010]; Favreau v Bamet/ & Bamet/, LLC, 47 AD3d 996,849 NYS2d 691 [3d Dept 2008]). Therefore, plaintiffs claims under Labor Law § 240 (1) are dismissed. Additionally, where, as here, plaintiff failed to identi fy a speci fie violation of the Industrial Code in relation to his claims under Labor Law § 241 (6), and did not seek to correct such defect by way of an amended pleading or in opposition the motion, the claims under Labor Law § 241 (6) arc defiCIent and must be dismissed (see Harl v Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 AD3d 1117,927 NYS2d III [2d Dept 20 II J; Owen v Commercial Sites, 284 AD2d 315, 725 NYS2d 574 [2d Dept 2001], Smith v Hercules Constr. Corp., 274 AD2d 467, 468, 711 NYS2d 453 [2d Dept2000]). Based upon the foregoing, the cross-claims by defendants for contribution or indemnification predicated upon alleged violations of Labor Law §§ 240 (I) and 241 (6) are dismissed. Plaintiffs remaining claIms against defendants based upon common law negligence and Labor Law § 200 shall be determined herein. As for the branch of Intercounty's motion seeking leave to amend its answer to inelude a defense bascd on Worker's Compensation Law, pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), a party may amend its pleading at any time by leave of the court, which shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just. It is within the court's discretion as to whether a party may amend its pleadings (Murray v City of New York, 43 NY2d 400, 404~405, 401 NYS2d 773 [1977J; Lallpollt v SalVas Cab Corp., Ille., 244 AD2d 208, 209, 664 NYS2d 285 [1st Dcpt 1997]). The factors the court must consider In making this detenninatioll are \\'hcther the proposed amendment would "surprise or prejudice" the opposmg party (Murray v City of New York, supra at 405; Lanpont v Sawas Cab Corp., I"c., supra at 209; Norwood l' City of New York, 203 AD2d 147, 148, 610 NYS2d 249 [151Dept 1994], Iv demed 84 NY2d 849, 617 NYS2d 139), and whether such amendment is meritorious (Tltommi Crimmins Coutr. Co., Iuc. v City of New York, 74 NY2c1 166, 170,544 NYS2d 580 [1989]; Allerum v St. Bamabas Hasp., 301 AD2c1474, 475, 755 [* 4] Ilartshomc v Pcngat Tech. Index No. 07-29473 Page No_-l. NYS2d 28 [1st Dept 2003]). Prejudice to the defendant is shown by proof that it "has been hindered in the preparation of his case or has been prevented frolll taking some measure in suppon of his position" (Loomis l' Civella Coritmo Coltstr. Corp., 54 NY2d 18,23,444 NYS2d 571 [1981.1). The protection against lawsuits brought by injured workers which is afforded to employers by Workers' CompensatIOn Law ~§11 and 29 (6) also extends to entities which are alter egos of the entity which employs the plainti ff (see Cappella I' 8uresky at lIatjield Lalle, LLC, 55 AD3d 522, 522-523 [2<1 Dept 2008]; Hageman vB & G Bldg. Servs., LLC, 33 AD3d 860, 861 [200G]). A defendant may establish itself as the alter ego of a plaintiff's employer by demonstrating that onc of the entities controls the other or that the two operate as a single integrated entity (see Cappella v Suresky at Hatjield Lalle, LLC, supra at 523; Ortega v Noxxell Realty Corp., 26 AD3d 361, 809 NYS2d 546[2d Depl 2006]; Crespo v Pucciarelli, 21 AD3d 1048,803 NYS2d 586 [2d Dept 2005]). Separate corporate entities can be shown to be a part of a single integrated entity through proof that they operated under the control of the same parent corporation (see Puu/illo v Lifeeare Trollsp .. 57 AD3d 319, 869 NYS2d 439 [1st Dept 20081). Indicia of such a relationship ineludes the sharing of corporate officers and board members (see Hemalldez ,'Sanchez. 40 AD3d 446. 447. 836 NYS2d 557 (1st Dcpt 2007]), a common payroll department and human resource department, and workers covered under the same general liability and Workers Compensation insurance policies (see Paulino v Lifecare Transp., supra at 319; Allduaga v AHRC NYC New Projects, IIlC., 57 A03d 925, 869 NYS2d 801 [2d Oept 2008]; Ortega v Noxxell Realf)' Corp., supra; Crespo v Pucciarelli, supra). Here, Intercounty has demonstrated that the proposed amendment is meritorious through the affidavit of its chief financial officer, Thomas Parrinello, which states, illter alia, that New Pipe Liners and Intercounty Paving Associates of New York are wholly owned subsidiaries of Intercounty Paving Associates that they operate as a single integrated entity with shared offices and corporate structures, that they are held out to the public as one single integrated entity, and that their employees arc all insured under the same general liability and Workers' Compensation policies, for which onc premium is paid to insure all of the entities. The affidavit further states that Intercounty Paving Associates of New York did not enter into any agreement with the Town of Huntington or perform any work in rclation the sewer project. and that plainti ff applied for and received Workers' Compensation benefits. [ntercountyalso submitted copies of the General Liability and Workers' Compensation Insurance policies naming all three entities as beneficiaries of common policies. In light of such evidence, plaintiff can hardly claim surprise or prejudice from the proposed amendment, as his employer shares the same offices and corporate structure as Intercounty. Thus, the unopposed branch of lntercounty's motion for leave to amend thelT answer flunc pro tullC to include an affirmative defense based on the exclusivity o[the Workers' Compensation Law is granted (see Alatore v Hee Ju Cllllll, 44 AD3d 596, 848 NYS2d 174 [2d Dept 1007]; Crespo l' Pucciarelli, supra; Nastasi vSpau IIIC., 8 AD3d 1011,778 NYS2d 795 [4th Oept 2004)). FU11her,Intercounty has established its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs remaining claims against it under the common law and Labor Law § 100, as it undisputed that plaintiff dId not suffer a grave injury and that he recclved Workers' Compensation benefits from his employer (see COOl~ihell(lrryv Altolle Elec., LLC, 94 AD3d 1306, 942 NYS2d 681 [3d Dept 2012]; Leu v State of New [* 5] lI<lr1shomc v Pengat Tech. hH.lex No. 07-29473 PU!!'-' No . .5 York. 74 AD3d 1597,906 NYS2d 622 [3d Ocpt 201 OJ; Almore v Hee Ju Cllllll, supra; Cre~po v Pucciarelli, slfpm; Nastasi v Span Inc., supra). Therefore, the unopposed hranch of Intercounty's Illotion seeking dismissal of those claims is granted. With respect to the branch of Intercounty's motion for summary judgment dismissing the crossclaims against it for contribution and common law ancl contractual indemnification, Workers' Compensation Law ~ 11 bars claims for contribution or indemnification against an employer whose employee is l11Jurcdlt1a work-related accident, except lor where the mjured worker has suffered a "grave injury" Of thc cmployer has entered into a written contract agreeing to provide such indemillfication (see Flores v Lower E. Side Servo Ctr., fIlC., 4 NY3d 363, 365, 795 NYS2d 491 [2005]; Rodrigues v N & S Bldg. ContI's. ¢ 11Ic., 5 NY3d 427, 429-430, 805 NYS2d 299 [2005]; Aucltampallglt v Syracuse Ulliv., 67 AD3d 1164, 1164, 889 NYS2d 706 [3d Dcpt 2009]). As it IS undisputed that plaintiff did not sutfer a grave injury and Intercounty did not enter any agreement with H2M obligating it to provide indemmfication for mjuries to its own employees, H2M's cross-claim for such relief is barred, as a matter of law. Therefore, the unopposed branch of Intercounty's motion seeking dismissal of the cross-claims against it [or contTibution, and common law and contractual indemnification is granted. As to the branch of Intercounty's motion seeking dismissal of the complaint as agamst the Town, "[g)cneral supen'lsory authority at a work site for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient to impose liability for common-law negligence and under Labor Law § 200" (Dos Salltos v STV Ellgrs., IIlC., 8 AD3d 223, 224, 778 NYS2d 48 [2d Dept 2004], Iv denied 4 NY3d 702, 790 NYS2d 648 [2004]; see McKee v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 73 AD3d 872, 905 NYS2d 60] [2d Dept 201 0]; Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 866 NYS2d 323 [2d Dept 2008]). Moreover, the authority to review safety at the site is insufficient if there is no evidence that the defendant actually controJJed the manner in which the work was perfonned (see Loiacollo v Lehrer McGovern Bovis, 270 AD2d 464, 465, 704 NYS2d 658 [2d Dcpt 2000]). Here, Intercounty dcrnonstrated,primajacie, the Town's entitlement Lasummary judgment dismissing the complaint by submitting evidence that it did not own Lhesubject roadway and merely exercised genera] supervisory authority over the project (see Dos Samos v STV Ellgrs., IIlC., supra; McKee I' Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., supra). Specifically, the Town's Deputy Director ofEnvlronrnenlal Waste Management testified that the subject roadway was owned by the State of New York, and that the l"own was not contractually responsible for safety at the worksite. He further testified that the Town did not direct or control the method or manner of plaintiffs work, that none of the its employees were present at the worksite on the day of the accident, and that the Town relied on H2M to oversee the progress of the work. Plaintiff, who did not oppose the motion. failed to raise any triable issue warranting delllal of the motion (see Alvarez v Prospect I/osp., 68 NY2d 320, 508 NYS2d 923 [1986]; Friends of Animals 11 Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065,416 NYS2d 790 [1979]). Accordingly, the unopposed branch of Intercounty's 1110lionfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against the Town of Huntington is granted. As to the motion by H2M for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross~claims against It. having determined that Labor Law §* 240 (]) and 241 (6) are inapplicable under the [* 6] Ilartshomc v Pcngat Tech. Index No. 07-2947] Page No.6 circumstances of this case. the branches of the mOlion seeking dismIssal of plaintiffs claim and the cross~ claims predicated upon \·iolations ofihose sections oflhc Labor Law arc granted. It IS noted thai H2M submitted an aflidavlt by its Executive Vice President which states, among other things. that the Town did not enter any contract with H2M Constmction Management in relation to the subject property. Further. a review of the agreement for consulting and engmeering services entered by the Town and Holmacher, McLendon and Murrell did not name J-J.2M Construction Management as a party, and was limited to design. observation and administrative services. Thus, plaintiff erroneously named H2M Construction Management as a party to the instant action. The claims amI cross-claims against it, therefore, arc dismissed. H2M also establIshed its prima filcie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing plainti iTs common law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims by demonstrating that its task as the project's engineer was merely to assure compliance with construction plans and specifications, that it had no contractual authority to direct or control the manner in which plaintiff perfomled his duties, and that It did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition, or the alleged unsafe manner in which the \\'ork was being performed (see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877, 609 NYS2d 168 [1993J; Lombardi v StOllt, 80 NY2d 290, 295, 590 NYS2d 55 [1992]; Tumer vSallo-Rubin COllstr. Co., 6 AD3d 910, 911, 775 NYS2d 417 [3d Dept 2004]; Biunce v Columbia Washington Ventures, LLC, 12 AD3d 926, 927, 785 NYS2d 144 [3d Oept 2004]). In this regard, H2M submitted the affidavit of its Executive Vice President, which states that H2M did not pCrfOnll any construction work or manage, operate, maintain or control the work site, that H2M did not hire or engage any general or subcontractor to perfoml work at said worksite, that it had no involvement with the placement of the hose across the subject roadway, and that the contractors at the worksite, including plamtiff's employer, were responsible for the safety of their own employees. Thus, the uIlopposed branch ofH2M's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claims under common law negligence and Labor Law § 200 is granted. Furtheonore, H2M demonstrated that it was not actively at fault, played no part in causing or augmenting plaintiffs alleged injuries, and lacked the authority to control the method ofplamtifrs work or the safety of the worksitc. Therefore, the unopposed branch of H2M's motion for summary judgment dIsmissing the cross-claims against it for contribution and common law indemnification is granted (see McCarthy v Turner COllstr., IIlC., 17 NY3d 369, 929 NYS2d 556 [201 1]; Calm v Ward Truckillg. IIIC., 95 AD3d 466, 944 NYS2d 501 [1st Oept 2012]; Delahaye v Saillt AIIIISSchool, 40 A03d 679, 836 NYS2d 233 [2d Depl2007J; Landgaffv 1579 Bronx Riv. Ave., LLC, 18 AD3d 385, 796 NYS2d 58 [Is! Depl2005]). As to Pengat's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims against it, having detemlincd that Labor Law §§ 240 (I) and 241 (6) are inapplicable in this case, the unopposed branches of its motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff's claims and the cross-claims against it predicated upon alleged violations of those sections of the Labor Law are granted. With respect to plaintiffs remaining claims against Pengat based upon alleged violations of common law negligence and Labor Law ~ 200, Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or [* 7] Ilartshornc v Pen gat Tech. Index No. 07-29473 Page No.7 general contractor to provide construction site workers wIth a sal'Cplace to work (see Comes J! New York State Elec. & Gus Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 609 NYS2d 168 [j 993J; Haider)' Dm'is, 35 AD3d 3()3, 827 NYS2d 179 r2d Dcpt 2006]). It applies to owners, contractors, or their agents (Russill )' Louis N. Picciallo & SOli, 54 NY2d 31 !, 445 NYS2d 127 [1981 ]). "Where a plaintiff's In.lunes stem not from the manner in which the work \vas being performed, but, rather, tram a dangerous condItIOn on the premIses, an owner or contractor may be held hable 111 common-law negligence and under Labor Law ~ 200 if they had control over the work sIte and either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notlce orthe dangerous condition that caused the accident" (Azad)' 270 Realty Corp., 46 AD3d 728, 730, 848 NYS2d 688 [.ld Dept 2007J; see Russill v LOllis IV.Pieeado & ~\'Oll,54 NY2d 311, 445 NYS2d 127 [1981]; Ortega v Pllccia, supra; Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 128,867 NYS2d 123 [2d Dept 2008]; Kehoe v Segal, 272 AD2d 583, 709 NYS2d 817 [2d Dopt 2000]), Here, Pengat failed to establish. as a matter af1aw, its entitlement to summary judgment disfmssmg plaintIff's claims pursuant to common law negligence and Labor Law § 200 (see Alvarez v Prospect flmp .. 68 NY2d 320, 508 NYS2d 923 [I 986];Winegrad v. N. Y. U"iv. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 A87 NYS2d 316 [1985J). Sigmficantly, plaintiff testified that the hose was laid across the roadway by one of Pcngat's employees, and that said Pengat employee failed to place a ramp over the hose in order to shIeld it from the wheels of oncoming vehicles. Although Pcngat submitted deposition testimony by plaintiffs supervIsor that he gave the instructions for the hose to be laid across the roadway, such conflicting testimony merely raises a triable lssue as to whether Pengat created the alleged dangerous condition (see Willegrad v. N.Y. Ulliv. Med. Or., supra; Nasuro v PI Assoc., LLe, 49 AD3d 829. 831, 858 NYS2d 175 [2d Dept 2008]; Valt Sahsbllry I'. Elliott-Lewis, 55 AD3d 725, 867 NYS2d 454 [2d Dept 2008]; Leimer v. Dormitory Aut"., 22 J AD2d 958, 633 NYS2d 911 [4th Dept 1995]). Therefore, the unopposed branch of Pen gat's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it is denied. Inasmuch as plaintiffs claims against H2M and Intercounty have been dismissed, the unopposed branch of Pen gat's motion seeking dismissal of their cross-claims against it for contribution and common law mdemnification is denied, as academic. Nevertheless, Pcngat is granted summary judgment dismissing H2M's cross-claims for breach of contract and contractual indemnification, as no evidence has been adduced that Pengat entered any agreement obligating it to indemnify or obtam such insurance on behalf of 112M. /1 ( Vi A I' /' /\!,!~'\ Dated July 20,2012 1'!6n. }~§'ej5f,Farnet; f\c9,ng Justice Supreme Court L/' FINAL DISPOSITION _X_ ' "'--71;X , NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

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