Strong v City of New York

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Strong v City of New York 2012 NY Slip Op 30280(U) February 2, 2012 Sup Ct, NY County Docket Number: 110470/09 Judge: Cynthia S. Kern Republished from New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service. Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for any additional information on this case. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. lNED ON 21712012 [* 1] SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK - NEW YORK COUNTY PART PRESENT: Justice INDEX NO. Index Number : 110470/2009 STRONG, KEVIN MOTION DATE MOTION SEQ. NO. REARGUMENT/RECONSIDERATlON MOTION CAL. NO. The following papers, numbered 1 to were read on thls motion to/for PAPERS NUtiW ¬RED Notlce of Motlord Ordefr to Show Cause - Affldavtts - Exhlbits ... Answarlng Affidavits - Exhibits Replying Affidavlts Chs-Motion: 0 No Yes a Upon the foregoing papers, it la ordered that this motion FILED MOTIONSUPPORTOFFICE NYS SUPREME COURT - CIVIL FEEI 87 2012 , Dated: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE =b7'i ,$ NON-FINAL DISPOSITION Check one: E FINAL DISPOSITION 1 Check if appropriate: r] DO NOT POST 0 SUBMIT ORDER/JUDG. 0 REFERENCE SETTLE ORDER /JUDG. [* 2] Index No. 1 10470/09 Plaintiff, -against- FILED # THE CITY OF NEW YORK,MATTHEW PEACOCK and GERALD0 FALCON, r Defendants. 1. HON. CYNTHIA KERN, J.S.C. NEW YOAK COUNTy CLERK S OFFICE Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers consluered in the review of this motion for : Papers Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed.................................... Answering Affidavits and Cross Motion...................................... Replying Afftdavits...................................................................... Exhibits...................................................................................... Numbered 1 2 3 4 Plaintiff Kevin Strong commenced this action for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when a police car driven by defendant police officer Matthew Peacock ( Officer Peacock ) mounted the sidewalk and struck plaintiff and other pedestrians. Defendants the City of New York and Officer Peacock (hereinafter defendants ) now move to reargue certain portions of plaintiffs prior motion which, among other things, sought to strike defendants affirmative defenses founded upon culpable conduct, assumption of the risk and Vehicular and Traffic Law ( VT ) 1103 and 1 104 and to compel defendants to provide certain discovery. Plaintiff ## cross-moves to reargue that portion of its prior motion seeking to strike defendants affirmative defense founded upon VTL $9 1103 and 1104 and to strike said affirmative defense based on [* 3] additional grounds. For the reasons set forth below, defendants motion to reargue is granted in part and denied in part and plaintiffs cross-motion is denied in its entirety. The relevant facts are as follows. On June 30,2009, Offcer Peacock alleges that he and his partner were parked on the northeast corner of Avenue D and East Houston Street, New York, New York when he heard a transmission come over his portable radio which sounded like a dispute was taking place at a pool post nearby. Officer Peacock further alleges that moments later, the voice of Deputy Inspector Dennis Dequatro, the Commanding Oficer of the 9* Precinct nt came over the portable radio and ordered u i s to the pool. Officer Peacock alleges it was at that point that he engaged his vehicle s emergency lights, used the manual siren and headed toward the Dy Dock Pool. While en route to the pool, Officer Peacock s police vehicle came into r contact wt a vehicle driven by Mr. Falcon, Officer Peacock s police vehicle then mounted the ih sidewalk and struck several pedestrians including plaintiff Kevin Strong, Miguel Carasquillo and r De Fa Chen. Mr. Strong, h4r. Carasquillo and M .Chen each commenced separate actions. The Carasquillo, Strong and De Fa Chcn actions have all been ordered consolidated for trial. In or around May 201 1, plaintiff moved to preclude defendants f o offering any rm particulars at trial in support of their affirmative defenses of culpable conduct, assumption of the risk and VTL $6 1103 and 1104. In its decision dated September 16,201 1, this court held that defendants were precluded from offering particulars at trial in support of their affirmative defenses of culpable conduct and assumption of the risk. However, this court declined to strike defendants affirmative defense founded upon VTL §§ 1103 and 1104 and instead precluded defendants f o introducing testimony as to what was on the radio run audio recording as that rm recording was destroyed by the City. Defendants now seek to reargue that portion of plaintiffs 2 [* 4] prior motion which sought to preclude defendants from offering particulars at the trial in support of their a m a t i v e defenses of culpable conduct and assumption of the risk. Defendants are also challenging that portion of this court s decision which precluded them from introducing testimony as to what was on the radio run audio recording at trial. Finally, plaintiff cross-moves for leave to reargue his prior application seeking an order striking defendants affirmative defense founded upon VTL 4tj 1 103 and 1104 based on defendants alleged spoliation of evidence. Additionally, plaintiff seeks to strike defendants affirmative defense founded upon VTL $8 1 103 and 1 104 on the grounds that the City failed to comply w t this court s decision and order of September 16,20 11 and that Officer Peacock was ih not engaged in an emergency operation as a matter of law, On a motion for leave to reargue, the movant must allege that the court overlooked or misapprehended matters of fact or law. CPLR 222 1(d)(2). Here, defendants argue that this court iy misapprehended certain facts when it precluded the Ct from introducing testimony as to what was on the radio run audio recording at trial. In its September 16,201 1 decision, this court imposed spoliation sanctions against the City for its destruction of the radio run audio recording. That portion of this court s decision was based on the court s understanding that there had been a previous Order to Show Cause ordering the City to preserve the audio recordings with which the City failed to comply. However, the court has now been made aware that the Order to Show Cause is invalid as it was withdrawn by the movant. In plaintiffs prior motion, plaintiff moved to compel defendants to produce the radio run audio recordings showing evidence of the emergency operation in question. In their response to plaintiffs motion, defendants stated that a the audio recording at issue w s destroyed as it was requested by plaintiff over 180 days after the 3 I [* 5] accident and it is defendants policy to destroy this evidence if not requested within 180 days of an incident. In plaintiffs reply in further support of his motion, plaintiff alleged that his predecessor attorney served an Order to Show Cause on the New York City Police Department ( NYPD) preserve audio recordings related to this case within 180 days of the date of the to accident. However, defendants were not given the opportunity to properly respond to plaintiffs spoliation argument and thus the court w s not aware that the Order to Show Cause was not, in a fact, valid. Therefore, reargument of that issue is granted. Upon reargument of that issue, the court reverses its decision and finds that the spoliation ~anctions imposed upon defendants are lifted. Plaintiff provided no proof wt his motion papers ih that the Order to Show Cause was ever served on the NYPD. There is no affmation of service attached as part of the Order to Show Cause and thus, plaintiff failed to show that the NYPD was on notice that such audio recording may be relevant to a forthcoming lawsuit. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to prove that a judicial determination ever resulted from his predecessor attorney s Order to Show Cause. It appears that the Order to Show Cause was withdrawn by the movant prior to a required hearing. Therefore, plaintiffs Order to Show Cause was an improper basis for this court s finding of spoliation of the radio run audio recording. Thus, upon reargument of that issue, the spoliation sanctions imposed upon defendants are hereby lifted. Additionally, the City alleges that this court misapprehended certain facts when it precluded the City f o offering evidence in support of its affirmative defenses of culpable rm conduct and assumption of the risk at trial. Specifically, this court s September 16,201 1 decision stated that defendant City has conceded that its affirmative defenses of culpable conduct and assumption of the risk art not at issue. Accordingly, the City is hereby precluded 4 [* 6] fromoffering any evidence as to these affirmative defenses. The City asserts that it never intended to withdraw those affirmative defenses as they were present in the City s Answers and in the City s Response to Plaintiffs Demand for a Bill of Particulars as to Affirmative Defenses. However, the City s argument is without merit. In both the City s opposition papers and at oral argument, the City failed to oppose that portion of plaintiffs motion to preclude these affirmative ih defenses at trial. The City has not shown that the court misapprehended the facts wt regard to this issue. Therefore, the City s motion for leave to reargue that portion of this court s decision is denied. The court now turns to plaintiffs cross-motion for leave to reargue his prior application to strike defendants affirmative defense founded upon VTL $6 1103 and 1 104 due to defendants spoliation of evidence and to strike said affirmative defense on other grounds. On a motion for leave to reargue, the movant must allege that the court overlooked or misapprehended m t e s of fact or law. CPLR 2221(d)(2). Plaintiff argues that this court misapprehended certain atr facts when it failed to strike defendants affirmative defense grounded in VTL $5 1103 and 1 104 based on the spoliation of the radio run audio recording and instead merely precluded the City f o presenting evidence of said audio recording at trial. However, the cross-motion for rm reargument is denied a this court has already found in this decision that there was no spoliation s of the radio run audio recording by the City as there was no valid Order to Show Cause requiring the City to presewe said recording. Additionally, plaintiff cross-moves to strike defendants afirmative defense founded upon VTL $6 1103 and 1104 on the ground that defendants Wilfully and contumaciously failed to comply wt this court s September 16,2011 order which compelled them to provide certain ih 5 [* 7] discovery regarding the emergency to which Officer Peacock was allegedly responding. T i hs court, however, declines to strike defendants affirmative defense founded upon VTL $9 1103 and 1 104 on that ground. In its decision, this court ordered that defendants were to produce to the extent they exist, unredacted memoranda, records and reports regarding the emergency Peacock w s allegedly responding to at the time of the accident, including unredacted department a incident reports within 30 days of the date of [the] Order. If such items cannot be found or do not exist, the City is ordered to submit an affidavit describing the search undertaken for such items and the results (emphasis added). In response to this court s order, defendants allege they undertook an intensive investigation to determine the facts leading up to the accident and sent their response on October 3,201 1. Defendants included an affidavit from Police Officer Joanna Lopez in which Officer Lopez averred that no emergency took place at her pool post, the location where Officer Peacock was headed at the time of the accident. Defendants also included an affidavit f o Officer Peacock who averred that shortly before the accident, Deputy Dequatro rm issued a 10-85 (officer needs assistance) radio call. Officer Peacock asserted that the 10-85 radio call w s made because an anonymous radio transmission came over their portable radios that a fie sounded like a dispute at O f c r Lopez s solo pool post. Although it was believed by Officer Peacock that there was an emergency at the pool, there w s no emergency. Therefore, defendants a cannot be compelled to provide an incident report or conduct a search for records related to that emergency. Thus, the court finds that defendants have fully complied with this court s September 16,201 1 order and their aflirmative defense grounded in VTL $6 1103 and 1104 will not be stricken on that ground. Finally, plaintiff cross-moves to strike defendants afiirmative defense founded upon 6 [* 8] VTL $5 1103 and 1104 on the ground that Officer Peacock was not engaged in an emergency operation as a matter of law. This court, however, declines to strike defendants affirmative defense founded upon VTL, $6 1103 and 1 104 on that ground. VTL 6 1 14-b provides that an emergency operation of a police vehicle includes [tlhe operation, or parking, of an authorized emergency vehicle, when such vehicle is engaged in.. .pursuing an actual or suspected violator of the law, or responding to, or working or assisting at the scene of the accident, disaster, police call, alarm of fire, actual or potential release of hazardous materials or other emergency. In the instant case, Officer Peacock was responding to what he thought w s an emergency based on the a 10-85 radio call from Deputy Dequatro over his portable radio. This situation fits squarely within the meaning of VTL 8 1 14-b. See also Crfscione v. C @ oflvew York, 97 N.Y.2d 152 i (2001) ([t]he reckless disregard standard of liability applied to NYPD police officers conduct because they were involved in an emergency operation when responding to a 10-52 radio call f o a dispatcher ); see also McCurthy v. City ofNew York, 250 A.D.2d 654 (2d Dept 1998) rm (Police Officerresponding to radio call from driver of another police vehicle was engaged in emergency operation as defined by VTL 0 1 14-b). Plaintiffs reliance on Rusho v. Stafe ofNew York, 76 A.D.3d 783 (4 Dept 2010) is misplaced as that case involved a parole officer colliding wt the plaintiffs vehicle while the parole officer w s engaged in an investigatory role and was ih a not in pursuit of an actual or suspected absconder. Thus, this court declines to strike defendants affirmative defense founded upon VTL 1103 and 1104 on that ground. Accordingly, the City s motion to reargue is granted in part and denied in part. Upon reargument, the court s imposition of spoliation sanctions against the City is reversed but the court adheres to that portion of its decision that precluded the City from offering any evidence as 7 [* 9] to its affirmative defenses of culpable conduct and assumption of the risk at trial. Plaintiffs cross-motion is denied i its entirety. This constitutes the decision and order of the court. n \I Dated: 3. 3. 13- Enter: Ib JXC. 07 2012 NEW YORK COUNJy CtERkS OFFICE

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