Scottsdale Ins. Co. v D D Insulation Inc.

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Scottsdale Ins. Co. v D D Insulation Inc. 2011 NY Slip Op 32729(U) May 2, 2011 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: 117089/2009 Judge: Lucy Billings Republished from New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service. Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for any additional information on this case. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. ANNEDON 1011812011 [* 1] - NEW YORK SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK LUCY BILLINGS COUNTY PART +L J.S.C. Justice c I W ' Index Number : I1708912009 INDEX NO. SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY MOTION DATE VS. MOTION s m . NO. D D INSULATION INC. MOTION CAL. NO. SEQUENCE NUMBER : 001 - DEFAULT JUDGMENT this motion to/for I ' PAPERS NUMBERED hib bits z I 3 Anawering Affidavits - Exhibits Replying Affidavits Cross-Motion: 0 Yes ... No FILED OCT 18 2011 NEW YORK COUNTY CLERKS OFFICE J. . s c, 0 FINAL DISPOSITION NON-FINAL DISPOSITION 0 REFERENCE Check if appropriate: 0 DO NOT POST 0 SETTLE ORDER/ JUDG. 0 SUBMIT ORDER/ JUDG. Check one: [* 2] SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F NEW YORK PART 4 6 COUNTY O F NEW YORK: SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, Index N o . 1 1 7 0 8 9 / 2 0 0 9 Plaintiff - against - DECXSION AND ORDER D D INSULATION I N C . , Defendant -X LUCY B I L L I N G S , J . S . C . : NEW YORK Plaintiff sues to recover the balance of i n s u q g . g W m a H K PFFICE defendant owes for an insurance policy plaintiff provided to defendant at its request. After defendant failed to answer the complaint, plaintiff moved for a default judgment. C . P . L . R . 5 Upon oral argument, for the reasons explained below, 3215(e). the court denies plaintiff'a motion. I. DEFEmANT'S DEFAULT AND EXCUSE FOR DEFAULTING Plaintiff showa it served the aummom and complaint in this action orl defendant by delivery to defendant's managing a g e n t , who identified herself as I1Jasrninet1 llJane,ll or December 18, 2009. C.P.L.R. § 311(a)(1). Service by thia means required defendant to serve an answer or responsive motion within 20 days after December 18, 2009. C.P.L.R. 5 3012(a). See C.P.L.R. § 3012(c). In opposition, defendant'a P r e s i d e n t attests that defendant or never employed a woman or anyone named "Jasmine". "Jane" i n December 2009, never received t h e pleadings, and consequently never responded to them until defendant received and opposed [* 3] plaintiff's motion for a default judgment. Even f this denia of qervice on defendant's managing agent or employee and of defendant's receipt is insufficient to dismiss the complaint, particularly without a motion to dismiss due to deficient service, C . P . L . R . § 3211(a)(8), this explanation at minimum furnishes a reasonable excuse for defendant's failure to answer. Cirillo v. MaCv's, Inc., 61 A.D.3d 5 3 8 , 540 (1st Dep't 2009); ,Jones v. 41 E;quities LLC, 57 A.D.3d 65, 81 (1st Dep't 2008); Obermaier v. Fiy, 25 A.D.3d 327 (1st Dep't 2006); Wilson v. Sherman Terrace Coop,, Inc., 14 A.D.3d 367 (1st Dep't 2005) * 11. APPLICABLE $TANDARDS Although defendant does not expressly move to extend its time to answer, C . P . L . R . § 3012(d), its opposition to plaintiff's motion does request permisaion to answer. Particularly in the context of a motion for a default judgment, the court may extend the time to answer absent a cross-motion for that relief. Vines v. Manhatcan & B r o p x Surface T r . I.. d.; Qneratinq A uth., 162 A.D.2d 229 (let Dep't 1990); Willis v. Citv of New York, 154 A.D.2d 289, 290 (1st Dep't 1989); Mufallj v. Ford Motor C Q , , A.D.2d 642, 643 (1st Dep't 1984). 105 See SBira v. New York City Tr. Auth., 49 A.D.3d 478 (1st Dep't 2008); Tullev v , Straus, 265 A.D.2d 399, 401 (2d Dep't 1999). C.P.L.R. § 3012(d) allows a late answer upon a Ilreasonable excuse for delay or default" and IImch terms as m a y be just." Although the latter provision may include a showing of a meritorious defense, 5 3012(d) does not specifically require a scottsdl.135 2 [* 4] meritorious defense against plaintiff s claims, and such a showing is unnecessary to support acceptance of a late answer. Verizon N , Y . Inc. v. Case Constr. Co. Inc., 63 A.D.3d 521 (1st Dep t 2009) ; Cirillo v. Macy s, Inc., 61 A.D.3d at 540; Jones v. 41 EcruitieB LhC, 57 A.D.3d at 81; Spira v. New YQrk City Tr. Auth., 49 A.D.3d 478. 111. ALLOWING DEFENDA,WI S LATE ANSWER Defendant s explanation for failing to answer timely, absent any discernible prejudice to plaintiff, satisfactorily excuses h i s late answer. Gazes v. Bennett, 70 A.D.3d 2010); Verizon N.Y. Inc. 579 (1st Dep t v, Case Constr. Co. I n c . , 63 A.D.3d 521; Cirillo v . Macy a , I n c , , 61 A.D.3d at 540; Jones v. 41 E itiee m u, 57 A.D.3d at 81. Defendant s f a c t u a l allegationa regarding service of the pleadings, supporting ita excuae f o r answering late, also supports the affirmative defense of deficientsservice, C.P.L.R. §§ 311(a) (1), 3211(a) (8), which is not conclusively refuted by plaintiff s showing for a default judgment. Verizon pJ,Y, Inc. v. Case Conetr. Co, Inc., 6 3 A.D.3d 521; Nason v. Fisher, 309 A.D.3d 526 (lat Dep t 2003). & Jones v. 4L Equities LLC, 57 A.D.3d at 81; Vines v. Manhattan T r , Operatinq Auth., 162 A.D.2d 2 2 9 . & Bronx surface Defendant s excuse for failing to respond to the complaint until after defendant received plaintiff s motion also constitutes grounds to deny a default judgment agaimt defendant. $nira v. New York City T r . Auth., 49 A.D.3d 478; Guzetti v. City ~f New York, 3 2 A.D.3d 234 (1st Dep t 2006); Rodriquez v. Dixie W J , Y . C . , IPC . , 2 6 A.D.3d 199, ecottsdl.135 3 [* 5] 200 (1st Dep't 2 0 0 6 ) ; (1st Dep't 2003). 261 Terwnes v . Morera, 2 9 5 A.D.2d 2 5 4 , 255 See Mayerpon Stutman, LLP v. Most, 30 A.D.3d (1st Dep't 2 0 0 6 ) ; Tulley v. Straus, 265 A.D.2d at 401. Plaintiff's motion, moreover, lacks admissible evidence supporting its claims. C.P.L.R. 5 3215(f). Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie breach of contract claim because the insurance application that plaintiff presents for the truth of its contents is not authenticated by a witness w i t h personal knowledge, nor does plaintiff present any other evidence of a contract to which defendant agreed. Colbourn v. I S S Tntl. Serv. SYS., 304 A.D.2d 369, 370 (1st Dep't 2003); Acevedo v. Audubon Mqt., 2 8 0 A.D.2d 91, 95 (1st Dep't 2 0 0 1 ) ; F i e l d 8 v. s ASSOC., 301 A.D.2d 625 ( 2 d Dep't . & W Realty pank of N e w York v. Dell- 2003); Webster, 23 Misc. 3d 1107 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 2008). Plaintiff's witness, its Manager of Direct Collections, indicates no personal knowledge of defendant's application for insurance and therefore is not in a position to authenticate the application. Plaintiff fails to establish a prima faci e account stated claim because plaintiff fails to produce any admissible evidence t h a t plaintiff transmitted an invoice to defendant or that it made any partial payment of the bill. Risk Mqm't plannins G r o w , Inc. v. Cabrini Medical Ctr,, 6 3 A.D.3d 421 ( 1 B t Dep't 2009); RPI ProfeBsional Alternative@, Inc. v. Citiqroup Global Markets Inc., 61 A.D.3d 6 1 8 , 6 1 9 (lat Dep't 2 0 0 9 ) ; Morrison Cohen Sinser Weinstein, LLP v. Brophy, 19 A.D.3d 161, 162 (1st Dep't Bartninq v. Bartninq, 16 A.D.3d 249, scottsdl.135 4 250 & 2005); ( 1 a t Dep't 2 0 0 5 ) . [* 6] Although plaintiff produces a statement of account a n d the affidavit by plaintiff's Manager of Direct Collection that the statement was "rendered11 to defendant , she nowhere indicates personal knowledge that the statement was mailed or otherwise transmitted to defendant, nor attests to any regular business mailing procedures that plaintiff followed. Aff. of Linda Ryan 6. 7 Neither does the statement itself indicates it w a B mailed or otherwise transmitted to defendant. Morrison Cohen Sinqer & Weinstei n , LLP v. Brophv, 19 A.D.3d at 161-62. Finally, plaintiff's motion nowhere indicates any prejudice from defendant's long delay in answering, nor articulates how plaintiff has changed its position as a result. F,s., DairnlerChrvslPr Is. Co, v. Seck, 82 A.D.3d 581, 582 (1st Dep't 2011). The delay at this juncture, from allowing defendant's answer, is between the denial of plaintiff's pending, inadequately supported motion and its opportunity now, after receiving defendant's answer, to move promptly f o r summary judgment with the necessary support. In sum, little discernible prejudice results from the minimal ensuing delay, DaimlerChrvsler 18. co. v. Sec k, 82 A.D.3d at 582; Mut. Mar, Off., I n c . v. Jov Callst r. Corp., 39 A.D.3d 417, 419 (1st Dep't 2007); Heakel'a W. 38th St, Corp. v. G Qham Conatr. Co. LLC, 14 A.D.3d 306, 307-308 ~ (1st Dep't 2005); Forastieri v, Hasset, 167 A . D . 2 d 125, 126 (1st Dep't 1990), which provides juat terma on which to allow defendant's answer. Forastiexi v. Haeset , 167 A.D.2d at 126. See Parkcheater S. CQdorniniUm Inc. v. Hernandez, 71 A.D.3d at [* 7] 504; Aloizos v. Trinitv Realty Corp . , 171 A . D . 2 d 426, 4 2 7 (1st Dep t 1991). IV. CONCLUSION On the grounds set forth above, the court denies plaintiff s motion for a default judgment and extends defendant s time to serve and file an answer to 20 days after service of this order with notice of entry. C.P.L.R. 5 5 3012(d), 3215. If defendant fails to do so, plaintiff may move again for a default judgment upon admissible evidence supporting plaintiff s claims within 60 days after defendant s time to answer expires. 3215(c) and ( f ) . DATED: C.P.L.R. § This decision constitutes the court s order. May 2 , 2011 LUCY BILLINGS, J.S.C. NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK S OFFICE scottsdl.135 6

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