Matter of Mason v New York Hous. Auth.
Annotate this CaseDecided on March 4, 2011
Supreme Court, New York County
In the Matter of the Application of Chanetta Mason, Petitioner, For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,
against
The New York Housing Authority, Respondent.
109370/10
Petitioner was pro se.
Respondent was represented by:
New York City Housing Authority
Law Department
250 Broadway, 9th Fl.
New York, NY 10007
Joan B. Lobis, J.
Petitioner Chanetta Mason, proceeding pro se, brings this Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the determination of the New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA") not to open a default judgment entered against her, which terminated her tenancy. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is granted and the matter is remanded to NYCHA for a hearing.
Prior to the termination of her tenancy, petitioner was the tenant of record of apartment 5D at 340 Morris Avenue, Bronx, New York, 10451 (the "Apartment") in a building owned and operated by NYCHA. She alleges that she has lived in the building for 59 years. In accordance with NYCHA's rules and regulations and petitioner's lease provisions, petitioner was required to annually verify her family's composition and income. A review of the record submitted by NYCHA indicates that petitioner failed to submit affidavits of income for the Apartment's occupants for the calendar years 2006, 2007, and 2008. On or about February 5, 2009, NYCHA notified petitioner that a hearing would be held on March 3, 2009, to consider charges that she failed to submit affidavits of [*2]income, but only for the 2007 calendar year. The hearing was adjourned three times on notice to petitioner to May 7, 2009. Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing. As a result, on or about May 7, 2009, Hearing Officer Desiree Miller issued a decision and disposition upon petitioner's default. The decision and disposition sustained the charges against petitioner and recommended termination of her tenancy.
A little over a month after Hearing Officer Miller's decision, on June 24, 2009, petitioner applied to NYCHA for a new hearing using a "Request to the Hearing Officer for a New Hearing" form. The form instructed petitioner that in order to be granted a new hearing, petitioner must show "good cause." See also NYCHA Termination of Tenancy Procedures ¶ 8 ("Upon application of the tenant made within a reasonable time after his/her default in appearance, the Hearing Officer may, for good cause shown, open such default and set a new hearing date."). According to the form, to show good cause, petitioner was required to present "a reasonable excuse to explain why [she] missed [her] hearing . . . AND . . . a good defense why [she] think[s] [NYCHA's] charges against [her] are not true, or the problem has been corrected, or otherwise explain why [her] tenancy should not be terminated." (Emphasis in original). On the application, petitioner explained that she had a stomach virus on the day of the hearing. As to her defense of the charges, she set forth that she "lost the documents and [had] replaced some of the items." She further set forth that she did not submit anything to management, because she was told that she had to first reopen her default.
On December 7, 2009, Hearing Officer Miller issued a decision granting petitioner's application to open her default. The same day, NYCHA sent petitioner a letter notifying her that a hearing would be held on February 11, 2010. Attached to the letter was an amended notice of charges that set forth that the hearing would concern petitioner's failure to submit income affidavits for the 2006, 2007, and 2008 calendar years. Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing and a decision and disposition was issued on her default. Hearing Officer Miller sustained the charges and recommended termination. On February 24, 2010, NYCHA approved the decision and disposition and terminated petitioner's tenancy.
On April 24, 2010, petitioner applied to reopen her default. Her excuse for missing the hearing was a "[d]eath in the family." As to her defense to the charges, petitioner explained that she turned in the documents to her housing manager, but they were returned because she "needed guardianship documents for [her] granddaughter." She set forth that had not attempted to resubmit the documents because she was waiting for her next hearing date.
On April 29, 2010, Donna Schletter, a manager of NYCHA's Housing Litigation area, submitted an affidavit in opposition to petitioner's application. Ms. Schletter contended that petitioner's default was not excusable, because she failed to support her excuse with sufficient documentation. Ms. Schletter also pointed out that petitioner could have requested an adjournment or sent a representative to the meeting. Ms. Schletter asserted that petitioner had not provided a meritorious defense because she still had not submitted her past due income affidavits.
On May 4, 2010, Hearing Officer Miller denied petitioner's application to reopen her default. [*3]She set forth that petitioner asserted that "she is awaiting a hearing date before she submits documents to NYCHA management." Hearing Officer Miller maintained that this defense was not credible, since petitioner was given hearing dates and still failed to submit the documents. Hearing Officer Miller also determined that petitioner's default was inexcusable, because she had failed to provide "specifics regarding the family member who passed away including the date of demise[.]"
Petitioner, in seeking to reverse NYCHA's determination to terminate her lease, maintains that she did try to submit her proof of income verification papers, but that the housing manager rejected them on the grounds that petitioner had failed to provide legal documentation regarding her guardianship over her granddaughter. Petitioner maintains that she had tried to explain to the manager that the legal documentation has been in her file for several years. Petitioner believes that the manager's rejection of her paperwork was in retaliation for her complaints during tenant meetings about the poor conditions and maintenance of the building and her Apartment, including mildew in her closet, trash in the hallways, and noise and nuisances in and around the building. She asserts that she is a "good and respected tenant" and that she pays her rent on time. She also contends that she never received a copy of the termination document, although it is unclear which document she is referring to.
Respondent argues that the only issue before the court is whether NYCHA properly refused to reopen petitioner's second default. Respondent contends that NYCHA's decision was rational and supported by the record, because petitioner's excuse was not reasonable nor substantiated. Respondent maintains that petitioner could have sought to adjourn the February 11, 2010 hearing or send a representative in her place. Respondent further contends that petitioner's defense was not meritorious because she basically concedes that she never cured her breach. Respondent argues that petitioner's statements about the conditions in and around the Apartment were not raised during the underlying proceeding, nor do they establish an excuse for her default or her failure to submit the income affidavits for three years.
In an Article 78 proceeding, the court's review of an administrative action is limited to a determination of whether that administrative decision was made in violation of lawful procedures, whether it is arbitrary or capricious, or whether it was affected by an error of law. In re Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, 231 (1974). A determination is considered arbitrary when it is made "without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts." In re Peckham v. Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 (2009), citing Pell, 34 NY2d at 231. If the agency's determination is rationally supported, the court must sustain the determination "even if the court concludes that it would have reached a different result than the one reached by the agency." Peckham, 12 NY3d at 431 (citation omitted). The court cannot "weigh the evidence, choose between conflicting proof, or substitute its assessment of the evidence or witness credibility for that of the administrative factfinder." In re Porter v. New York City Hous. Auth., 42 AD3d 314 (1st Dep't 2007) (citations omitted).
Without investigating petitioner's claim that she had submitted the affidavits to the housing manager but they were rejected for a reason unrelated to income verification, Hearing Officer Miller concluded that petitioner had not attempted to cure her breach. Such determination is unsupported [*4]by the evidence and is arbitrary and capricious. See In re Yarbough v. Franco, 264 AD2d 740, 741 (2d Dep't 1999); contra In re Daniels v. Popolizio, 171 AD2d 596, 597 (1st Dep't 1991) . With regard to petitioner's excuse for missing the hearing, the First Department has held that NYCHA's rule for vacating a default "is similar to the excusable default' requirement for vacating a judicial proceeding." Id. at 597 citing C.P.L.R. Rule 5015 (a)(1). Under that standard, a death in the family has been held to be a reasonable excuse for missing an appearance. See Fine v. Fine, 12 AD3d 399, 400 (2d Dep't 2004); see also Reyes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 236 AD2d 277, 279 (1st Dep't 1997). It was arbitrary and capricious for Hearing Officer Miller to dismiss this excuse out of hand. Although the failure to submit income affidavits is a breach of petitioner's lease obligations, it is a breach that can be rectified very quickly. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition is granted and the May 4, 2010 decision by Hearing Officer Miller not to reopen petitioner's default is hereby annulled and vacated; and it is further
ORDERED that the matter is remanded to NYCHA in order to schedule a hearing for petitioner on the charges brought against her.
Dated: March 4, 2011
______________________________
Joan B. Lobis, J.S.C.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
