Granger v Granger
Annotate this CaseDecided on April 12, 2011
Supreme Court, Queens County
Lanaird Granger, Plaintiff,
against
Kellie Granger, Defendant
16928/2006
Plaintiff pro se
For the Defendant: Ewald S. DeFreitas, Esq., 305 Broadway, 14th floor, New York, NY 10007
Charles J. Markey, J.
The Plaintiff has moved to restore this action to the Court's active calendar. The Court denies the motion since the Court's records reflect that this action is still on the active calendar of this Court.
This Court notes that this divorce case bears an index number from 2006, and it appears that the parties, who do not appear to be fighting over equitable distribution, are still unable to disentangle themselves from their bickering in order to end this marriage - - a result that they both allegedly want.
By letter dated January 31, 2011, Ewald S. DeFreitas, Esq., on behalf of the defendant-wife, Kellie Granger, informs the Court that he demanded the service of a verified complaint from the pro se plaintiff in a notice dated October 24, 2007. Mr. DeFreitas, incidentally, in response to the present motion of the pro se plaintiff-husband to restore, could have made a cross motion seeking a verified complaint. At any rate, this Court requires the plaintiff to serve his verified complaint upon Mr. DeFreitas, and file it with the Matrimonial Clerk in Jamaica, on or before June 15, 2011.
Mr. DeFreitas shall then serve the verified answer on or before July 29, 2011. Subsequently, the parties may request for a Preliminary Conference before the contested matrimonial parts of this Court. [*2]
The pro se plaintiff, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law section 170, must, in his verified complaint, adhere to the grounds stated in his summons of cruel and inhuman treatment (Domestic Relations Law section 170[1]) and constructive abandonment (see, Domestic Relations Law section 170[2]).
Of course, the pro se plaintiff, if so advised, is entirely free to discontinue the present action and to commence a new action, utilizing the recently enacted "no fault divorce," found in Domestic Relations Law section 170[7] . That section became effective on October 12, 2010. "The new subsection permits a party to seek a divorce upon a sworn statement by that party that the marital relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months." Heinz v Heinz,Misc 3d, 2011 WL 555683, 2011 NY Slip Op 21049(U), NYLJ, Feb. 25, 2011, at 37, col. 1 [Sup Ct Nassau County 2011] [Palmieri, J]. In Heinz, a well-reasoned decision that is strikingly pertinent to the case at bar, the wife had commenced an action for divorce on October 1, 2010, before the effective date of Domestic Relations Law section 170[7], alleging cruel and inhuman treatment (Domestic Relations Law section 170[1]) and constructive abandonment (see, Domestic Relations Law section 170[2]) - - the same grounds asserted by the plaintiff-husband in the present case. The husband, after the effective date of the new law, then brought a new action for "no fault" divorce.
The court, in Heinz, agreed with the husband that he was not constrained to bring a counterclaim under the first action and that he was free to start a new action. The court, in Heinz, reminded the parties of their obligations to file answers in each of the two actions, but, interestingly, chose not to address whether the two actions would be consolidated for purposes of discovery or joined together for trial.
Should the plaintiff wish to proceed with the grounds asserted in the original summons, commenced in 2006, he is free to do so, but must serve his verified complaint on opposing counsel and file it with the Court by the time deadlines specified above.
The foregoing constitutes the decision, order, and opinion of the Court.
______________________________Hon. Charles J. Markey
Justice, Supreme Court, Queens County
Dated: Long Island City, New York
April 12, 2011
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
