Four Corners Communications, Inc. v Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co.
Annotate this CaseDecided on November 10, 2009
Supreme Court, New York County
Four Corners Communications, Inc., Plaintiff,
against
Graphic Arts Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant.
601166/09
Plaintiff: John F. Burleigh, Esq. JACOBS & BURLEIGH LLP, 445 Park Ave. 17th FI., New York, N.Y 10022, (212) 207-8787
Defendant: Eric A. Portuguese, Esq., LESTER SCHWAB KATZ & DWYER, LLP, 120 Broadway, New York, NY 10271-0071, (212) 964-6611
Judith J. Gische, J.
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim. CPLR § 3212. The defendant opposes the motion and cross moves for summary judgment in its favor, dismissing the complaint and declaring that the defendant does not have a duty to defend or indemnify plaintiff with respect to underlying litigation. Issue hasbeen joined, but Note of Issue has not yet been filed. Therefore, the motion can been considered by the court. Brill v. City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 (2004).
In August 2006, Drew Kerr, President and principal of plaintiff, a public relations company, purchased the internet domain name "ronntorossianpr.com." In order to criticize Ronn Torossian, the principal of 5W Public Relations, LLC ("5W"), another public relations company, Mr. Kerr posted a photograph of a "Summer's Eve Douche" package on a website that was reached via use of the domain name www.ronntorossianpr.com. Mr. Kerr explains that by doing so, he was calling Mr. Torossian a "douche" or a "douchebag," and thereby expressing his opinion of Torossian's own behavior "in using internet domain names containing the names of his competitors in the public relations industry to divert traffic from Internet users interested in those competitors to Torossian's own 5W public relations website."
On December 4, 2008, Torossian and 5W filed two complaints against plaintiff and Mr.
Kerr, one in the New York Supreme Court in New York County, [Torossian et al. v. Kerr et
al., Index No. 116167/08 (the "State Action")] and the other in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of NewYork, [Torossian et al. v. Kerr et al., No. 08 Civ. 10519
(NRB)(FM) (the "Federal Action")]. The State Action alleged six causes of action: [1] common
law [*2]trademark infringement; [2] common law unfair
competition; [3] violation of the New York Anti-Dilution Statute; [4] violation of the New York
Right of Privacy Law §§ 50, 51; [5] common law defamation; and [6] common law
tortious interference. The Federal Action contains claims for: [1] trademark infringement; [2]
trademark dilution; [3] cybersquatting; [4] cyberpiracy; and [5] unfair competition and
false designation of origin.
The defendant issued to plaintiff a Businessowners Liability Policy, No.
BOP1963192, for the period March 1, 2006 to July 31, 2007, providing limits of
liability of $1,000,000 per occurrence. The Policy provides in relevant part:
A. Coverages
1. Business Liability
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury," "property damage," "personal injury" or "advertising injury" to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for "bodily injury," "property damage," personal injury," or "advertising injury" to which this insurance does not apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any occurrence" and settle any claim or "suit" that may result ...
b. This insurance applies:
(1) To "bodily injury'' and "property damage" only if:
(a) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" is caused by an "occurrence" that takes place in the "coverage territory;" and
(b) the "bodily injury" or "property damage" occurs during
the policy period.
(2) To:
(a) "Personal injury" caused by an offense arising out of your business, excluding advertising, publishing, broadcasting or
telecasting done by or for you;
(b) "Advertising injury" caused by an offense committed in
the course of advertising your goods, products or services;
But only if the offense was committed in the "coverage territory" during the policy period.
...
[*3]
B. Exclusions
1. Applicable to Business Liability Coverage - This insurance does not apply
to:
...
p. "Personal injury" or "advertising injury"
(1) arising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity;
Upon service of the complaints in the Federal and State Actions, plaintiff
promptly gave notice of the claims to the defendant. The claims asserted against Mr.
Kerr personally were covered under his Great Northern Insurance Company (Chubb)
homeowners' insurance policy. In a letter dated January 7, 2009, the defendant issued
a Disclaimer of Coverage of the claims made against plaintiff. The basis for the
defendant's disclaimer was that the Policy specifically excludes coverage for claims
arising from trademark infringement. Plaintiff challenged the Disclaimer, and
through his
counsel, responded by letter dated January 22, 2009, arguing that there were no
breach of contract or copyright infringement claims in either the State or Federal
Actions, and that the policy otherwise affords coverage to the claims asserted
therein.
The defendant, through its attorney, Eric A. Portuguese, Esq., cited three
exclusions in the policy as grounds for disclaiming coverage: [t]he trademark
infringement exclusion barred coverage for the claims based upon the unauthorized
use of Mr. Torossian's name in plaintiffs domain name; [2] the defamation claim
asserted in the State Action arose outside of the policy term; and [3] that the claims
arising from the "intentional creation of the website and the posting of the allegedly
defamatory material on the website falls entirely within the policy exclusion of
knowingly false statements."
On March 19, 2009, both the Federal and State Actions were settled without any
payment by the defendants therein or admission of any liability. Plaintiff thereafter
commenced this action for breach of the Policy, and seeking reimbursement of its
attorneys fees, costs and disbursements less payments made under Mr. Kerr's
homeowner's insurance policy.
Discussion
On the respective motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, each
proponent bears the initial burden of setting forth evidentiary facts to prove a
prima
facie case that would entitle it to judgment in its favor, without the need
for a trial.
CPLR § 3212; Wineqrad v. NYU Medical Center, 64 NY2d 851
(1985); Zuckerman v.
City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 (1980). Only if this burden is met,
will it then shift
to the party opposing summary judgment, who must then establish the existence of
material issues of fact, through evidentiary proof in admissible form, that would
require
a trial of this action. Zuckermsn v. City of New York, supra. If the
proponent fails to
[*4]
make out its prima facie case for
summary judgment, however, then its motion must be
denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers. Alvarez v. Prospect
Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 (1986); Avotte v. Gervasio, 81 NY2d
1062 (1993). When only
issues of law are raised in connection with a motion for summary judgment, the
court
may and should resolve them without the need for a testimonial hearing. Hindes
v.
yVeisz, 303 AD2d 459 (2d Dept 2003).
It is well settled that an insurer's obligation to defend is determined by a review of
the allegations of the complaint against the insured without regard to the merits of
the
claims, and that an insurer's duty to furnish a defense is broader than its obligation to
indemnify (see Continental Cas. Co. v . Rapid-Am. Corp., 80 NY2d 640
(1993); Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gilletta Co., 64 NY2d 304 [1984]). An insurer must defend
when
the four corners fo the complaint suggest, or the insurer has actual knowledge of
facts
establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage. Continental Cas. Co. v.
Rapid-Am,
Corp., supra.
An insurer may, however, be relieved of its duty to defend if it can establish, as a
matter of law, that there is no possible factual or legal basis upon which it might
eventually be obligated to indemnify its insured under the terms of the policy, or by
proving that the allegations fall within a policy exclusion (Frontier Insulation
Contractors,
Inc, v, Merchants Mut. Ins. Co, 91 NY2d 169 [1997]; see also Sarin
v. CNA Financial
Corp., 873 NYS2d 237 [NY Sup 2008]).
There is no dispute that the defendant was required to defend the State Action
inasmuch as claims for defamation and violation of the right of privacy were alleged
therein. The defendant, however, argues that these claims fall within the policy
exclusion because they are premised upon a statement that had been made with
"knowledge of its falsity." The court rejects this argument because purchasing a
domain
name and creating a website upon which the picture of a product was posted in this
case was not a statement of fact which would otherwise be capable of being proven
false. The cases relied upon by the defendant do not apply. Those cases involve
counterfeiting (Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co, v. Terk Technologies Corp., 309 AD2d
22 [1st
Dept 2003] [the intentional production and marketing of counterfeit products fall
within
the "knowledge of falsity" exclusion in the policy]; and A.J. Sheepskin and
Leather Co.,
Inc, v Colonial Ins. Co., 273 AD2d 107 [1st Dept 2001]).
Moreover, to the extent that a statement that Mr. Torossian is a "douche" or
"douchebag" can be inferred from the plaintiff's actions, this is also not a statement
of
fact, but rather, is one of opinion (see generally Gross v. New York Times
Co., 82 NY2d
146 [1993]). An opinion, which is a person's thought, belief or inference, is not
capable
of being proven false. Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed 2004). The defendant's
arguments about whether the law of defamation should be applied, or not, are
irrelevant.
Based upon the clear language of the policy, the material published by the plaintiff,
i.e.
the website with the posted picture, must have been posted by plaintiff with
knowledge
of its falsity in order for the claimed exception to apply. Since the opinion that
plaintiff
was trying to convey is not capable of being proven false, the claims arising from the
plaintiff's actions were not excluded under the "knowledge of falsity" exception.
[*5]
Inasmuch as some of the claims in the State Action were
covered under the
Policy, the defendant had an obligation to defend plaintiff in the State Action.
Town of
Massena v. Healthcare Underwriters Mut;, Ins. Co., 98 NY2d 435
(2002). Therefore, the
defendant is liable to plaintiff for plaintiff's expenses in defending an action against
him
based upon claims falling both within and without policy coverage. Plaintiff also
argues
that since the Federal Action was related to the State Action, the defendant was also
obligated to defend plaintiff in the Federal Action as well. This argument is
unavailing.
There is no precedent to expand of the general legal concept that coverage of one
claim extends to coverage for the entire action in which the claim is made, to
completely
separate actions in entirely different courts. Moreover, mere speculation that the two
actions may have one day been consolidated into a single action does not compel a
different result. To establish a duty to defend, the inquiry must focus on the actual
claims contained in the pleadings. To the extent that the claims contained in the
pleadings in the Federal Action were not covered under the Policy, the defendant
cannot be found to have a duty to defend the Federal Action.
The issue of what damages plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant,
however, remains to be determined. Plaintiff has submitted invoices from its attorney
in
the State and Federal Actions itemizing the attorneys fees, costs and disbursements
incurred in defending both of those actions. Plaintiff has not delineated the costs and
fees associated with its defense in each of the actions, nor has plaintiff provided the
affidavit of someone with personal knowledge attesting to the reasonableness of
those
fees and costs. The court therefore refers the issue of plaintiff's damages to a Special
Referee to hear and report back to the court the amount of reasonable attorneys fees,
costs and disbursements incurred in connection with plaintiff's defense of the State
Action, only.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied, and plaintiff's motion is granted
only to the extent that the defendant is found to have breached the policy in failing to
defend plaintiff in the State Action. The issue of what damages plaintiff is entitled to
recover is hereby refereed to a Special Referee who will hear and report back to the
court the issue as identified herein.
Conclusion
In accordance herewith, it is hereby:
ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied; and it
is further
ORDERED that the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted only to the
extent that the defendant is found to have breached the policy in failing to defend
plaintiff in the State Action. The issue of what damages plaintiff is entitled to
recover is
hereby refereed to a Special Referee to hear and report back to the court the amount
of
reasonable attorneys fees, costs and disbursements incurred in connection with
plaintiffs defense of the State Action, only; and it is further
ORDERED that the plaintiff is directed to serve a copy of this decision/order on
the Office of the Special Referee within 60 days so that this reference may be
assigned.
Failure to do so within the time provided shall be deemed an abandonment of this
claim
[*6]
and the complaint will be dismissed for
unreasonably failing to prosecute.
Any requested relief not expressly addressed has nonetheless been considered
and is hereby denied.
This shall constitute the decision and order of the Court.
Dated:New York, New York
November 10, 2009
So Ordered:
_______________________
Hon. Judith J. Gische, J.S.C.
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