Serafin v Dickerson
Annotate this CaseDecided on October 8, 2009
Supreme Court, Bronx County
Emma Serafin, Plaintiff(s),
against
Percy Dickerson, Defendant(s).
260125-2008
Plaintiff:
Carpriano Litchman & Flach, LLP
By: Eleanor Flach
80 Wall Street, Suite 910
New York, NY 10005
(212) 269-3444
Defendant:
Robert A. Laureano, Esq.
910 Grand Concourse
Bronx, NY 10451
(718) 588-8017
Edgar G. Walker, J.
Motion and Cross-motion are resolved as follows:
FACTS: In 1965, Plaintiff's husband, Savlatore Serafin, acquired
commercial property at 4160-4168 White Plains Road in Bronx, New York, ("Subject Property")
by deed of sale.[FN1] Over
the course of more than forty-two years of ownership, Salvatore Serafin visited the premises
approximately once per month.[FN2] Plaintiff accompanied her husband "twice or
three times" on these visits.[FN3] She did not visit the property after his death in
2007.[FN4] Before this
proceeding, Plaintiff had never seen the encroaching structures at issue, nor had she heard
Salvatore or her [*2]tenants mention any encroaching
structures.[FN5][FN6]
On October 21, 1971, Defendants purchased residential property adjacent to the
Subject Property ("Adjacent Property").[FN7] The Adjacent Property included a residential
lot and a two-family residence. Defendants attest that the encroaching structure at issue, a
concrete strip running north-south along the eastern edge of the Adjacent Property, was present
when they took possession in 1971.[FN8] Defendants have utilized and continue to use
this strip as a means of egress from the Property's first-floor apartment unit and for garbage bin
storage.
[*3]
Defendants attest that they personally performed
and contracted third parties for repairs on the encroaching structure over the course of their
ownership and that their use of the concrete strip was continuous, open and notorious, and
exclusive for more than thirty-seven years.[FN9] [FN10]
On September 10, 1997, Defendants hired a contractor to remove and replace the
concrete strip.[FN11]
In 2000, Defendants contracted to install a chain-link fence enclosing the concrete
walkway.[FN12]
Pursuant to the Last Will and Testament of Salvatore Serafin,[FN13] title to the Subject Property
was transferred to Plaintiff via executor's deed recorded November 27, 2007 [FN14].
On February 26, 2008, Plaintiff employed a surveyor to prepare a survey of the
Subject Property.[FN15]
The survey showed that a rectangular portion of Defendants' concrete walkway encroached an
average depth of approximately 3.2 feet onto the Subject Property, and the chain-link fence
surrounding the concrete strip encroached an average of approximately 3.3 feet.[FN16]
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Plaintiff commenced a special proceeding
(later converted into an action) by filing a Notice of Petition dated April 29, 2008, alleging
Defendants' concrete strip and chain-link fence encroach upon the Subject Property, that the
encroachment diminished Plaintiff's full use and enjoyment of the premises, and that the
encroachment decreased the value [*4]of the Subject
Property.[FN17]
Defendants counter-claimed for title to the disputed area through adverse possession.
Both Plaintiff and Defendants filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to CLPR 3212.
Plaintiff alleges an encroachment and prays for injunctive and monetary relief. Defendants allege
adverse possession.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED: This case presents the question of whether
Plaintiff has established a prima facie case that she is entitled to relief in equity or damages
because Defendants' concrete strip and chain-link fence encroach upon her property and, if so,
whether Defendants have presented evidence raising a material issue of fact sufficient to deny
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Additionally, this court is called upon to determine
whether Defendants have established a prima facie case that they have acquired title through
adverse possession and whether material questions of fact exist as to whether the elements of
adverse possession have been satisfied.
LEGAL STANDARDS: A motion for summary judgment must be granted
if "upon all papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established
sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party"
and no issue of fact material to the judgment remains outstanding. CLPR 3212(a) (McKinney
2009). Once the moving party makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment
the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidence sufficient to raise a question of
material fact. Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324, 508 NYS2d 923, 925
(1986).
All elements adverse possession must be proven by clear and convincing evidence,
Walling v. Przybylo, 7 NY3d
228, 232, 851 NE2d 1167, 1169 (2006), with the burden for proving all elements resting
upon the adverse claimant, Joseph v. Whitcombe, 279 AD2d 122, 125, 719 NYS2d 44,
47 (1 Dept. 2001).
Adverse possession is defined as follows: "Where there has been an actual continued
occupation of premises under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon
a written instrument or a judgment or decree, the premises so actually occupied, and no others,
are deemed to have been held adversely." NY Real Prop. Acts. Law § 521 (McKinney
2009). To establish adverse possession not under written instrument, the adverse possessor's
occupation must be (1) hostile and under claim of right; (2) actual; (3) open and notorious; (4)
exclusive; and (5) continuous for the required statutory period. Walling, 7 NY3d at 232,
851 NE2d at 1167, 1169. In addition, adverse possession requires that the land has been "usually
cultivated or improved" or "protected by a substantial enclosure" for the statutory period. NY
Real Prop. Acts. Law §§ 522(1)-(2).
In order to recover possession of real property against an adverse claimant, the
record owner of the property must commence an action within ten years of the beginning of the
adverse claim. See CLPR 212(a).
DETERMINATION: Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be
denied because Defendants have raised an issue of fact as to whether they have obtained title to
the premises [*5]through adverse possession. Defendants meet
their burden on all elements of adverse possession concerning the disputed concrete strip, to
which Plaintiff has not raised any material issues of fact. Therefore, this court must grant
Defendants' motion for summary judgment and hold in favor of their adverse possession claim.
THE CONCRETE STRIP: Plaintiff has established a prima facie case that
she is the record owner of the property where the disputed concrete strip is set.[FN18] In order to defeat Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, Defendants must bring evidence sufficient to establish a prima
facie case for adverse possession or prevail upon one of their other affirmative defenses.
Hostile and Under Claim of Title:[FN19] "Claim of [title] may arise when the adverse
possessor is title owner of the adjacent parcel, whose original boundaries extended to the
disputed parcel or whose use of the disputed structure derived from prior ownership."
Joseph, 279 AD2d at 126, 719 NYS2d at 47. Defendants' claim of title over the disputed
concrete strip is predicated on a condition that existed at the time of their initial occupancy.
Specifically, Defendants' aver that the encroaching strip existed when they originally took
possession of the Adjacent Parcel in 1971.[FN20] [FN21]
[*6]
In opposition, Plaintiff offers evidence
suggesting that Defendants' cultivation of the property was actually permissive use. In 2001,
Plaintiff paid Defendant Percy Dickerson to clean the and trim weeds behind the Subject
Property.[FN22] Mr.
Dickerson performed these tasks on the back lot area between Plaintiff's building and the
disputed concrete strip, not on the strip itself. When this event took place Plaintiff was unaware
of Defendants' encroachment and, therefore, could not have given permissive use regarding
it.[FN23] Therefore,
Plaintiff's hiring of Mr. Dickerson to maintain her property is immaterial to Defendants' adverse
possession claim and does not raise a material issue of fact.
Additionally, the element of "[h]ostility can be inferred simply from the existence of
the remaining four elements, thus shifting the burden to the record owner ." United Pickle Prod. Corp. v. Prayer
Temple Cmty. Church, 43 AD3d 307, 309, 843 NYS2d 1, 2 (1 Dept. 2007).
Actual Possession:Defendants' evidence is sufficient to satisfy their prima
facie burden to show the concrete strip actually existed for the statutory period.
Defendants offer three affidavits asserting that the concrete strip was present in
1971,[FN24] in which
case the statutory period would have run by 1981. Plaintiff offers no evidence to dispute the
accuracy of Defendants' claims, arguing only that they are insufficient to meet the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard required for satisfaction of the elements of adverse possession.
Assuming, arguendo, that these affidavits alone fail to provide clear and convincing
evidence of the actual existence of the concrete strip since 1971, Defendants' provide a 1986
construction [*7]invoice which they claim refers to the concrete
strip. Using this evidence as a baseline, the statutory period would have run by 1996.
However, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' 1986 construction invoice does not refer
to the concrete strip.[FN25] [FN26] Even assuming that Plaintiff is correct,
Defendants provide an additional construction invoice from 1997 describing the complete
removal and replacement of the concrete strip.[FN27] Plaintiff does not dispute that this document
refers directly to the encroachment at issue. The invoice establishes the existence of the walkway
prior to September 10, 1997, over ten years before Plaintiff's claim was filed with this Court.
Plaintiff offers no other evidence or argument to dispute information contained in the 1997
invoice.
Open and Notorious: The "open and notorious possession" element of
adverse possession ensures that the record owner of real property will have knowledge of the
adverse possessor's hostile claim. Seward Park Hous. Corp. v. Cohen, 287 AD2d 157,
163, 734 NYS2d 42, 48 (1 Dept. 2001). Plaintiff denies any knowledge that she, her husband, or
her tenants knew of the concrete strip prior to 2007, when title to the Subject Property was
transferred from Salvadore to herself. However, Plaintiff admits that her husband visited the
Subject Property once per month [*8]during more than forty-two
years of ownership: approximately 500 occasions.[FN28] It is likely that during one of these visits
Salvadore saw the portion of the property upon which the concrete strip rests.
However, even assuming that Mr. Serafin never saw the encroaching structure at
issue, "[w]here there has been no actual knowledge, it can be shown that the possession or use
was so open, notorious, and visible as to support an inference that the owner must or should have
known about it." Id. at 164, 734 NYS2d at 48. Defendants openly maintained the
encroaching concrete strip within twelve feet of the commercial building occupying the Subject
Parcel.[FN29] The
disputed concrete strip is part of a solid slab of concrete, much of which is set on property of
which Defendants are record owners.[FN30] Defendants' possession is "real, and not
constructive, so that it shall be visible" and "indicate[s] exclusive ownership of the property."
Ramapo Mfg. v. Mapes, 216 NY 362, 372, 110 N.E. 772, 776 (1915). Plaintiff cannot
rebut the inference that she or her predecessor knew or should have known of Defendants'
adverse claim by declaring that they did not know about the encroachment.
Exclusive and Continuous: Defendants' affidavits state they possessed the
"steps and walkway exclusively, continuously and openly, with no one else having access to
these areas."[FN31]
Plaintiff presents no evidence to contradict this assertion. Photographic evidence suggests that
neither Plaintiff nor her lessees made use of the concrete strip.[FN32] No other party asserts a claim of title over
the disputed concrete strip.
Cultivation or Improvement:[FN33] Adverse possession may be established by
tacking together successive possessions of persons in an unbroken chain of privity. See
Belotti v. Bickhardt, 288 NY 296, 306, 127 N.E. 239, 242-43 (1920). Defendants' provide
affidavits claiming their predecessors placed the concrete strip.[FN34] In addition, Defendants claim they
personally [*9]cultivated the concrete strip and provide invoices
showing that on at least three occasions they hired contractors to maintain, replace, or attach
additional improvements to the disputed land.[FN35]
"The requisite character of the acts of [cultivation or] improvement sufficient to
supply the record owner with notice of an adverse claim will vary with the nature and situation
of the property and the uses to which it can be applied.'" See generally Ray v. Beacon
Hudson Mtn. Corp., 88 NY2d 154, 160, 643 NYS2d 939, 942 (1996) (citation omitted);
Ramapo Mfg., 216 NY at 372, 110 N.E. at 776; Blumenfeld v. DeLuca, 24 AD3d 405, 405, 807 NYS2d 99, 100 (2
Dept. 2005); Gaglioti v. Schneider, 272 AD2d 436, 437, 707 NYS2d 239, 241 (2 Dept.
2000); Groman v. Botar, 228 AD2d 412,412-13, 644 NYS2d 58, 59 (2 Dept. 1996).
Defendants use the disputed property as a means of egress from the ground-floor unit of their
two-family residence and utilize part of the space for garbage bin storage.[FN36] The concrete strip enables
these uses, and Defendants' preservation measures prevented the decay of the concrete strip
perpetuated its usefulness.
These acts by Defendants and their predecessors sufficed to give Plaintiff and her
predecessor notice of Defendants' adverse claim. Cf. Hall v. Sinclaire, 35 AD3d 660, 826 NYS2d 706 (2 Dept.
2006) (finding that the adverse possessor's consistent plowing and resurfacing of disputed
portion of a shared driveway over the statutory period sufficed to show usually cultivation or
improvement); Goss v. Trombly, 39
AD3d 1128, 1130, 835 NYS2d 493, 495 (3 Dept. 2007) ("Plaintiff plowed the driveway and
scraped ice from it in winter, mowed grass alongside it, trimmed overhanging trees and had
truckloads of gravel hauled in twice to fill in ruts. These maintenance activities are similar to
those conducted by most owners of driveways and are consistent with the nature of the use of
this property as a driveway."); Moore v. City of Saratoga Springs, 296 AD2d 707, 708,
745 NYS2d 238, 239 (3 Dept. 2002) ("Plaintiff testified to his maintenance of the parking lot by
plowing it every winter and by removing occasional debris. He further detailed his cultivation of
the remainder of the area by the planting of a lawn on the vacant portion, which was mowed
continuously once the grass was established. Finally, Plaintiff testified that he paid for repairs to
the sidewalk on the gore strip when three slabs of concrete had to be replaced."). As such,
Defendants' meet their prima facie burden of having usually cultivated or improved the concrete
strip over the statutory period.
Plaintiff makes two legal arguments why "[Defendants] cannot show the property
was usually cultivated or improved' within the meaning of [NY Real Prop. Acts. Law] §
522(1)": (1) that the "encroachment is not the walkway, but is a piece of concrete where
Defendants keep their trash,"[FN37] and (2) that Defendants fail to meet the
evidentiary standards set in Gaglioti.[FN38]
As to Plaintiff's first argument that the encroachment is not a walkway: The
cultivation or improvement element examines whether the adverse possessor's actions are "usual
in the ordinary cultivation and improvement of similar lands by thrifty owners.'" Ray, 88
NY2d at 160, 643 NYS2d at 942. Plaintiff argues that, categorically, Defendants' use of the
concrete strip to store garbage bins prevents satisfaction of the cultivation or improvement
requirement. This argument does not rebut Defendants' prima facie showing that they usually
cultivated or improved the land, and Plaintiff cites no law consistent with the proposition that
garbage bin storage is an atypical use or that an improvement in [*10]the form of a concrete strip is inconsistent with that use. In any
event the record clearly established that the concrete strip was used primarily as a walkway.
As to Plaintiff's second argument: Plaintiff incorrectly analogizes the facts of
Gaglioti to the instant case. In Gaglioti, the adverse possessor laid sod and
planted bushes on the front portion of a disputed strip of land between neighboring properties.
On the back portion of the disputed strip the adverse possessor constructed a concrete walkway.
The trial court determined that the adverse possessor had satisfied the elements of adverse
possession for the front portion, but not the back portion, of the disputed strip. The Appellate
Division, Second Department, reversed in part, holding that the adverse possessor's cultivation
and improvement of the back portion"consisting of a walkway inlaid with decorative
bricks and additional shrubs lining its edges"were "consistent with the property's
character, location, condition, and potential uses." Gaglioti, 272 AD2d at 437, 707
NYS2d at 241.
Inasmuch as Gaglioti informs the instant case, it does so in favor of
Defendants. The cultivation or improvement requirement necessitates that the adverse
possessor's actions are "usual in the ordinary cultivation and improvement of similar lands by
thrifty owners." Ray, 88 NY2d at 160, 643 NYS2d at 942. Although the adverse
possessor's actions in Gaglioti met this requirement, they do not constitute a minimal
showing of usual or ordinary cultivation or improvement. The concrete strip, as well as
Defendants' continuous upkeep and periodic maintenance, are consistent with the character,
location, condition, and potential uses of the disputed land.
THE CHAIN-LINK FENCE: In order to compel injunctive or monetary
relief from a de minimis encroachment, a claiming party must show that the benefit of removing
the encroachment would outweigh the harm caused to the opposing party or that the
encroachment resulted in a diminution in property value. Generalow v. Steinberger, 131
AD2d 634, 635, 517 NYS2d 22, 24 (2 Dept. 1987); see Wing Ming Properties, Ltd. v. Mott
Operating Corp., 79 NY2d 1021, 1022, 584 NYS2d 427, 427 (1992); Hoffmann Invs. Corp. v. Yuval, 33
AD3d 511, 512, 823 NYS2d 51, 52 (1 Dept. 2006).
Defendant's chain-link fence, built in 2000, has not existed the requisite ten years to
satisfy their claim for adverse possession over the fence.[FN39] To the degree that it extends beyond the
concrete strip and is not de minimis, the chain-link fence encroaches onto the Subject Property
and must be removed.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants' have presented
affidavits attesting that "[t]he fence posts are annexed to and placed in the side of the concrete
walkway,"[FN40]
photographs which show the chain-link fence closely follows the outline of the concrete
strip,[FN41] and a survey,
in which the solid line indicating the concrete strip is identical in length to the broken line
indicating dimensions of the chain-link fence [FN42]. This evidence is sufficient to satisfy
Defendants' prima facie burden of showing the chain-link fence encroachment is de minimis.
See generally Wing Ming Properties, Ltd., 79 NY2d 1021, 584 NYS2d 427 (finding that
the extent to which the defendants' rooftop air conditioning unit and newly constructed parapet
extended into the plaintiff's airspace was de minimis); Hoffmann Invs. Corp., 33 AD3d
511, 823 NYS2d 51 (finding that the defendant's wall encroachment of one-and-one-half to
three-and-three-quarter inches was de minimis); Matter of Zhuang Li Cai v. Uddin, 58 AD3d 746, 871 NYS2d 675
(2 Dept. 2009) (holding that an encroachment consisting of fenceposts intruding approximately
two inches onto appellant's property was de minimis and did not compel removal); [*11]Generalow, 131 AD2d 634, 517 NYS2d 22 (finding that the
defendants' driveway and retaining wall encroachments measuring approximately two feet were
de minimis).
The burden having shifted, Plaintiff's evidence fails to raise an issue of material fact
as to whether the fence encroachment is de minimis. Plaintiff provides conflicting evidence
regarding the dimensions of the chain-link fence surrounding the concrete strip. Affidavit in
Support of Petition by Plaintiff's surveyor ("Surveyor's Affidavit") avers that the chain-link fence
measures approximately forty-seven feet in length, exceeding the length of the concrete strip by
approximately five feet:
As measured from the Subject Properties' eastern boundary (parallel to White Plains
Road) the encroachment measures as follows:
Concrete Strip:
Width: 3.7 ft. on the southern end
2.7 ft. on the northern end
Length 42' ñ
Chain link Fence
Width: 3.3 ft. on the southern end
3.2 ft. on the northern end
Length 47' ñ[FN43]
This evidence would suggest that Defendants' fence encloses approximately
seventeen square feet of the Subject Property beyond the northern or southern edges of the
concrete strip"land not included in Defendants' claim of adverse possession over the
concrete strip.
This assertion, however, is unsupported by any fact of record and is contradicted by
the survey upon which Surveyor's Affidavit is based. In addition, Plaintiff also presents a 2000
invoice from the fence construction company indicating that a forty-four foot fence"not a
forty-seven foot fence"was built.[FN44] Further conflicting with Surveyor's
Affidavit, Defendant's photographic evidence shows that the dimensions of the chain-link fence
are nearly identical to those of the concrete strip.[FN45]
This court must dismiss Plaintiff's claims for injunctive or monetary relief arising
from the de minimis encroachment of Defendants' chain-link fence. Plaintiff does not argue that
her benefit stemming from the removal of the chain-link fence would outweigh Defendants'
burden associated with the removal of the structure, nor has Plaintiff brought evidence which
shows the Subject Property lost value as a result of the encroachment.
[*12]CONCLUSION: "The ultimate
element in adverse possession is the acquiescence of the real owner in the exercise of an obvious
adverse ownership through the statutory period." Walling, 7 NY3d at 232, 851 NE2d at
1169. Plaintiff and her predecessor in interest owned the Subject Property for approximately
forty-two years. The record contains no evidence they took any action to assert a claim over the
disputed property. Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot meet their burden to satisfy
the adverse possession elements by the clear and convincing weight of the evidence. An analysis
of the record shows otherwise. Inasmuch as Plaintiff and Defendants' evidence conflict, the
issues raised are immaterial to this decision.
All elements of adverse possession have been established by clear and convincing
evidence, accordingly, Defendants' cross- motion for summary judgment is granted. Settle
Judgment.
Dated: September ___, 2009_____________________________________
Hon. Edgar G Walker, J.S.C.
Footnotes
Footnote 1:
Pet. Ex. "B."
Footnote 2:
Serafin EBT 10,
Jan. 14, 2009.
Footnote 3:
Id.
Footnote 4:
Id. at 16.
Footnote 5:
Id. at 16-18.
Footnote 6:
Q:When you went
to the property, what did you do when you went to this property?
A:I spoke with my tenants.
Q:Did you ever walk around the property to go on East 232nd Street to the back of
the property?
A:No, I didn't.
Q:So when you spoke with your tenants, you always primarily stayed on White
Plains Road?
A:Right.
Q:Did there come a time that you deviated in that you went around to any other area
besides the front of the property?
A:No, I didn't.
.
Q:Did you ever recall in your visits to the property ever seeing this concrete
platform?
A:No, sir.
.
Q: .Did you ever have any conversations with your husband regarding this concrete
platform in the rear of the property?
A:No, sir.
Q:Did you ever have any conversations with your husband regarding this staircase I
mentioned, this northerly staircase.
A:No.
Footnote 7:
Dickerson EBT 9,
Jan. 14, 2009; Dorothy Dickerson Aff. ¶ 4; Anna Dickerson Aff. ¶ 4; Merced
Dickerson Aff. ¶ 4.
Footnote 8:
Affirm. Ex. "7."
Footnote 9:
Dorothy Dickerson
Aff. ¶ 5; Anna Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; Merced Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; see
Dickerson EBT 8-12.
Footnote 10:
Q:How long
have you lived at [the adjacent property]?
A:For 38 years.
.
Q:Did there come a time when you added a second stairway to the building that you
lived in at that address?
A:Added?
Q:Yes.
A:We improved, but we didn't add. Everything was there already.
Footnote 11:
Dorothy
Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; Anna Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; Merced Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5;
Affirm. Ex. "5."
Footnote 12:
Id.
Footnote 13:
Pet. Ex. "A"
Footnote 14:
Pet. ¶ 5 &
Ex. "C"
Footnote 15:
Nicoletti Aff. in
Supp. of Pet. ¶ 4.
Footnote 16:
Id. at
¶¶ 8-9; Affirm. Ex. "7."
Footnote 17:
Pet.
¶¶ 9-13.
Footnote 18:
Affirm. Ex. "7";
Pet. Ex. "A"-"C."
Footnote 19:
Effective Jul. 7,
2008"subsequent to the date upon which Plaintiff brought this action"N.Y.
R.P.A.P.L. § 521, "Adverse possession not under written instrument or judgment," was
amended and retitled so that it refers to a "claim of right" rather than a "claim of title." "Claim of
right" is defined as "a reasonable basis for the belief that the property belongs to the adverse
possessor or property owner, as the case may be." NY R.P.A.P.L. § 501 (McKinney 2009).
Footnote 20:
Dorothy
Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; Anna Dickerson Aff. ¶| 5; Merced Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5;
see Dickerson EBT 12-14.
Footnote 21:
Q:Okay.
Marked Plaintiff's A for identification, look first at the top photo. Can you identify what is
depicted in the top photo?
A:My apartment.
Q:When you say your apartment, you're talking about the ground floor apartment?
A:Yes.
Q:There's a stairway on the left-hand side of this photograph?
A:The left?
Q:Yes, the left-hand side of the photograph, where does this stairway go?
A:It leads towards my apartment and the basement.
Q:Does it go out 232nd Street?
A:No.
Q:There appears to be a second stairway. What is that stairway?
A:Show me what you are talking about.
Q:Right here (indicating.
A:Oh, that's always been there. When that started falling apart, my father fixed it up,
but it has always been there.
Q:So from the time you moved in 38 years ago, there was a stairway that existed?
A:Leading to my apartment, yes.
Q:Was there also the stairway that's on the left-hand side of this building that leads
down to the area?
A:These steps here (indicating)?
Q:Yes.
A:Yes, they were always there.
Footnote 22:
Dickerson EBT
21-24; Serafin EBT 18-20; Affirm. Ex. "5."
Footnote 23:
See
Serafin EBT 16-17.
Footnote 24:
Dorothy
Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; Anna Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; Merced Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5.
Footnote 25:
Id.
Footnote 26: Q:I'm showing you what has
been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit F which appears to be an invoice with the word Accurate
Fence Corporation on top indicating that it had been paid May 22, 1986.
Q:Do you have"by looking at this document, can you tell what work that
document refers to?
A:No, I cannot.
Q:I'm going to show you two money orders which appear to be dated 1986. Do you
know what those money orders are for: can you tell? One is to Percy Dickerson, the other is to
cash.
A:No.
Q:Are you the one who provided your attorney with this document?
A:Yes.
Q:What does this document refer to?
A:It refers to the wall and to the steps.
Q:That's what you were referring to previously that it had started to crumble and
your father had made some repairs?
A:Yes.
Q:And to the best of your knowledge and recollection, what are the repairs that were
made pursuant to this purchase order?
A:He did something to the block wall, the big fat wall out there because the concrete
was coming loose like it's starting to do now. And the steps here.
Q:Are you referring to the concrete steps that go up?
A:Yes, and he did something to the walkway because it was crumbling.
Q:When you say the walkway are you referring to the area from the bottom of your
steps that come down on the side?
A:Yes, the side of the house.
Q:Now, when this work was done and he replaced the crumbling walkway, did he
change the walkway in any way in terms of its size or dimension?
A:Not that I'm aware of.
Footnote 27:
Def.'s
Cross-mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D.
Footnote 28:
Serafin EBT 10.
Footnote 29:
Affirm. Ex. "7."
Footnote 30:
Affirm. Ex. "5";
Def.'s Cross-mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A.
Footnote 31:
Dorothy
Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; Anna Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; Merced Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5.
Footnote 32:
Affirm. Ex. "5";
Def.'s Cross-mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A.
Footnote 33:
Effective July 7,
2008"subsequent to the date upon which Plaintiff brought this action"the New
York statute codifying the essentials of adverse possession not under written instrument was
amended. Previously, the statute required adversely possessed property to be "usually cultivated
or improved" or "protected by a substantial enclosure"; the revised statute alters the usual
cultivation requirement to call for "acts sufficiently open to put a reasonable owner on notice."
NY R.P.A.P.L. § 522. As noted in the practice commentaries, this statutory change appears
to be a codification of the case law which interpreted the cultivation requirement as a conduct by
the adverse possessor sufficiently open to put a reasonably diligent owner on notice and would
not therefore impact the outcome herein. De Winter and Loeb, Practice Commentaries,
McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 49½, RPAPL § 522; Walling v. Przybylo, 7
NY3d 288.
Footnote 34:
Dorothy
Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; Anna Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5; Merced Dickerson Aff. ¶ 5.
Footnote 35:
Id.
Footnote 36:
Affirm. Ex. "5."
Footnote 37:
Pet'r's Resp. to
Counter-cl. ¶ 21.
Footnote 38:
Affirm.
¶¶ 22-24.
Footnote 39:
Dickerson EBT
26; Affirm. Ex. "5."
Footnote 40:
Dorothy
Dickerson Aff. ¶ 6; Anna Dickerson Aff. ¶ 6; Merced Dickerson Aff. ¶ 6.
Footnote 41:
Def.'s
Cross-mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A
Footnote 42:
Def.'s
Cross-mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B.
Footnote 43:
Nicoletti Aff. in
Supp. of Pet. ¶ 8.
Footnote 44:
Affirm. Ex. "5."
Footnote 45:
Def.'s
Cross-mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A.
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