Matter of Britt v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs.

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[*1] Matter of Britt v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. 2009 NY Slip Op 51007(U) [23 Misc 3d 1130(A)] Decided on May 5, 2009 Supreme Court, New York County Rakower, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 5, 2009
Supreme Court, New York County

In the Matter of the Application of Johnnie Britt, Jr., Petitioner,

against

New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, Respondents.



400339/09



Paul Keefe

Community Service Society

105 E. 22nd Street

New York, NY 10010

(Attorney for Petitioner)

Elizabeth A. Forman

Office of the New York State Attorney General

120 Broadway,

New York, NY 10271

(Attorney for Respondent)

Eileen A. Rakower, J.



Petitioner Johnnie Britt, Jr. ("Petitioner") brings this Article 78 Petition seeking an order annulling Respondent New York State Department of Motor Vehicles' ("DMV") determination that Petitioner was statutorily barred from employment as a school bus driver under Article 19-A of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL").

According to the Petition, Petitioner applied for a position as a school bus driver at CBT Para Transit, Inc. in Brooklyn, NY, in or around September of 2008. Petitioner was accepted into the two-week training program, which he successfully completed. Petitioner also underwent a physical examination, which found him physically qualified for the position. [*2]

However, on or around October 23, 2008, Petitioner received a letter from the DMV advising him that he was disqualified from driving a school bus under Article 19-A of the VTL, based upon information the DMV received from the New York State Department of Criminal Justice Services.

In 1992, Petitioner was convicted and sentenced for attempted third degree criminal sale of a controlled substance (a Class C Felony), in violation of Penal Law §220.39. Five years later, Petitioner was convicted of fifth degree criminal sale of a controlled substance (a Class D Felony), in violation of Penal Law §220.39.

On February 23, 2004, Petitioner was issued a Certificate of Good Conduct ("CGC") by the New York State Board of Parole pursuant to Correction Law §703-b in connection with the above felony convictions.

Petitioner argues that the DMV's decision to deny Petitioner's application for a position as a school bus driver pursuant to Article 19-A of the VTL was arbitrary and capricious, due to the fact that Petitioner possesses a CGC pertaining to his 1992 and 1997 felony convictions; and the decision denies Petitioner equal protection of the laws. Petitioner has submitted a Notice of Petition and Verified Petition. Annexed to the Petition as exhibits are the 10/23/08 letter from the DMV advising Petitioner of his disqualification; Petitioner's CGC and a cover letter from the New York State Division of Parole; the Governor's Approval Memorandum to legislation amending Article 23-A of the Correction Law in 1976; the Governor's Approval Memorandum to legislation creating Certificates for Relief from Disabilities ("CRDs") for first-time offenders in 1976; the Memorandum of Senator Marino regarding 1976 legislation intended to "revamp" CGCs; a Budget Report on Bills discussing amendments to Article 23 of the Correction Law and the Public Health Law in 1983; the Memorandum of Senator Levy regarding 1985 amendments to Article 23 of the Correction Law and the VTL; the Memorandum of Senator Goodman regarding 2001 amendments to Article 19-A of the VTL; and Session Laws pertaining to 2007 amendments to Article 23 of the Correction Law and the Penal Law.

The DMV has submitted a Verified Answer and a Memorandum of Law in opposition to the Petition. Annexed to the Answer as exhibits are the administrative record pertaining to the instant Petition; and portions of the legislative history of VTL §509-a et seq and Correction Law §700 et seq. Petitioner has submitted a Reply Affirmation in response.

VTL §509-cc provides, in pertinent part:

(1)A person... shall be disqualified from operating a school bus...

(a)permanently, if that person

(iii)has been convicted of [inter alia, attempted third degree criminal sale of a controlled substance]. However, such disqualification shall be waived provided that five years have expired since the applicant discharged or released from a sentence of imprisonment imposed pursuant to conviction of an offense that requires disqualification under this paragraph and that the applicant shall have been granted a certificate of relief from disabilities as provided for in section seven hundred one of the correction law.

Due to Petitioner's 1992 conviction, he cannot be employed as a school bus driver unless he [*3]obtains a CRD. Correction Law §§ 702 and 703 allow for the issuance of CRDs by courts or the New York State Board of Parole to "eligible offenders." An "eligible offender" is defined by Correction Law §700 as "a person who has been convicted of a crime or of an offense, but who has not been convicted more than once of a felony." Since Petitioner was convicted of two separate felonies in 1992 and 1997, he does not meet the statutory criterion for an "eligible offender" and thus cannot receive a CRD.

Petitioner claims that the DMV's denial of Petitioner's application to be a school bus driver on the grounds of VTL Article 19-A was arbitrary and capricious because CGCs must logically be read into VTL §509-cc alongside CRDs. Petitioner argues that this is the case because, since CRDs and CGCs confer essentially the same relief, the legislature clearly intended that CGCs would also remove the barrier of a permanently disqualifying offense such as the one for which Petitioner was convicted in 1992.

The court is unpersuaded by Petitioner's argument that the legislature intended that CGCs also operate to waive a permanently disqualifying offense under VTL §509-cc because the statute plainly sets forth the criterion for such waiver: the passage of five years from the applicant's discharge or release from his/her prison sentence in connection with the permanently disqualifying offense;"and that the applicant shall have been granted a certificate of relief from disabilities as provided for in section seven hundred one of the correction law." There is simply no indication that the legislature intended to use the term "certificate of relief from disabilities" so as to mean, "certificate of relief from disabilities or certificate of good conduct."

Petitioner also argues that, pursuant to Hodes v. Axelrod, 56 NY2d 930 [1982], his CGC supersedes the statutory disqualification of his 1992 conviction, in the absence of clear statutory language to the contrary. This argument fails because VTL §509-cc is clear; it plainly sets forth that permanent disqualification for certain offenses is waived only if Petitioner: (1) has been released/discharged from his/her prison sentence pertaining to the disqualifying offense for a period of at least five years; and (2) has been granted a CRD. Failing to meet both criteria, Petitioner is statutorily barred from being employed as a school bus driver. Were the statute totally silent as to waiver of permanent disqualifying offenses (as was the statute in Hodes), Petitioner could argue that his CGC supersedes his statutory disqualification under Hodes. However, where, as here, the legislature has provided that waiver of the statutory disqualification occurs only if the applicant has a CRD, the statute's silence as to an applicant who possess a CGC but not a CRD mandates the conclusion that the possession of a CGC does not permit waiver of the statutory bar under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (see Arons v. Jutkowitz, 9 NY3d 393, 417-18 [2007]).

Nor does the DMV's adherence to, and application of VTL §509-cc violate Petitioner's right to equal protection of the laws. The legislature's drawing a distinction between individuals who have committed only one felony (allowing them to obtain a CRD) and those who have committed two or more felonies (thereby preventing them from obtaining a CRD) neither targets a suspect class nor implicates a fundamental right. Accordingly, the only question for the court herein is whether a rational basis exists for Petitioner's statutory disqualification, D'Amico v. Crosson, 93 NY2d 29, 31-32 [1999], and clearly one does. It is rational for the legislature to conclude that an individual who [*4]has committed only a single felony (and has otherwise met the statutory qualifications for a CRD) may be considered for a position as a school bus driver; while a person who has committed felonies on two or more separate occasions may be disqualified from a position in which they are responsible for the safety and well-being of children and other vulnerable persons.

Wherefore it is hereby

ORDERED that Petitioner's Article 78 Petition is dismissed.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court. All other relief requested is denied

Dated: May 5, 2009______________________________

Eileen A. Rakower, J.S.C.

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