Patchen v Village of Waterloo

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[*1] Patchen v Village of Waterloo 2009 NY Slip Op 50998(U) [23 Misc 3d 1129(A)] Decided on May 21, 2009 Supreme Court, Seneca County Falvey, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law ยง 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 21, 2009
Supreme Court, Seneca County

Kenneth Patchen, Jr., Thomas Finnerty Steve Craig, Petitioners,

against

Village of Waterloo, Respondent.



42389



Chamberlain D'Amanda Oppenheimer & Greenfield LLP,

(Matthew J. Fusco, Esq., of Counsel)

Attorneys for Petitioners

Ward, Norris Heller & Reidy, LLP,

(Thomas S. D'Antonio, Esq., of Counsel)

Attorneys for Respondent

W. Patrick Falvey, J.



This is an Article 78 proceeding, wherein petitioners seek a judgment ordering the respondent to continue to pay petitioners' health insurance premium payments. Petitioners allege that respondent's October 7, 2008 resolution discontinuing such health insurance coverage was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Judgment is granted to the respondent, without costs, dismissing the proceeding, on the merits, the Court concluding that the Village's determination was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Petitioners are former elected officials of the respondent Village. On June 11, 1973, the Village passed a resolution providing that the Village would pay full Blue Cross Blue Shield premiums of an elected official who retired, or was defeated in election, who had served ten consecutive years or more prior to leaving office. Petitioner's Ex A.

The Village on May 12, 1986 passed another resolution that provided that any official elected after that date would receive health insurance while in office but not after the official left office, regardless of years of service. The change was applied prospectively. Officials elected prior to May 12, 1986 received health insurance payments after leaving office, under the 1973 resolution. Petitioner Patchen served from 1983- 1994. Petitioner Finnerty served from 4/86- 1998. Petitioner Craig served from 1983 - 1995.

In 1999 Finnerty received a letter from Village Administrator Gary Westfall that referred to the 1973 resolution and stated that Finnerty was covered by the 1973 resolution. Ex D. [*2]Finnerty in turn told Patchen and Craig of this assurance. The petitioners argue that they reasonably relied on this assurance and did not seek other options after leaving office, and that the Village should have known that the petitioners were relying on this assurance.

Petitioners also assert that In November, 2007, Finnerty, a Democrat, supported a Republican for Town Supervisor over a candidate endorsed by Democratic Chair, Theodore Young. Young was elected mayor of the Village of Waterloo in March, 2008, and a few months later he sought to overturn the 1973 resolution, which would deny petitioners coverage. The respondent board voted to overturn the 1973 resolution October, 2008, and the Village has refused to provide health insurance for the petitioners since January, 2009. This is the decision that petitioners claim was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.

The Village has answered the petition, denying generally the allegations of the petition and offering as a defense that the Village's acts were reasonable and within Village discretion; that estoppel is not available against a governmental entity; that legislative acts are not presumed to create a contract, that the 1973 resolution is not a contract and the petitioners do not have a vested contractual right to payment of premiums; that petitioners' claims are barred by statute of limitations and by unclean hands, in that the petitioners made up the board that voted to rescind the 1973 resolution, but took pains to ensure that they themselves were not effected. At the time they voted in 1986, none of the petitioners had served 10 years as elected officials.

Respondent supplies the affidavit of Theodore Young, who states he had been Town Supervisor before becoming mayor, and at that time he had sought to cut costs by eliminating health insurance for town board members. He came to the mayor's post April 2, 2007 ( not March, 2008 as petitioners assert). He was concerned about the costs to the Village and undertook to change the program when he first came to office. Thus, the issue arose with the Village Board before the 2008 election season, and so his actions were not influenced by Finnerty's support of a Republican candidate. He did approach Finnerty in the fall of 2008 when he saw a sign in his lawn, to remind him that the committee would not give him $250 in campaign support since the sign violated the party rules. He suggested Finnerty move the sign to a different lawn, but he refused.

Young asserts that the whole reason for the change was to save tax payer money.

Village Clerk Gary Westfall's affidavit is also provided , referring to the resolutions at issue. He notes his 1999 letter to Finnerty is not a commitment on behalf of the Village to never modify this arrangement. It was to explain the current arrangement at that time. At any rate, as Village Clerk, he cannot bind the Village Board.

As respondent points out, a municipal resolution alone is "a unilateral action that is temporary in nature, and thus, it does not create any vested contractual rights." Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Ass'n v City of Geneva, 92 NY2d 326, 333. Generally speaking, the Courts of New York have not ruled in plaintiffs' favor in cases such as the instant action, unless the Court finds a contract, supported by consideration, given on the part of the plaintiffs. See Lawrence v Town of Irondequoit, 246 F. Supp. 2d 150 (2002, WD NY).

The Court has carefully reviewed the documents upon which the petitioners rely, including the June 11, 1973 resolution, the May 12, 1986 resolution, the April 27, 1999 letter from the Village Administrator to Petitioner Finnerty, and the October 6, 2008 resolution.

Here, the petitioners cannot point to any of the documents at issue to prove a contract. Nor, have [*3]petitioners shown consideration given by them in exchange for the benefit they seek, that is, health insurance coverage for the rest of their lives, at the Village's sole expense. The petitioners have not convinced the Court that they are in a position similar to the plaintiffs in Emerling v Village of Hamburg, 255 AD2d 960 (1998), wherein "Plaintiffs met their initial burden by submitting proof of the rules and regulations in effect throughout the years of their employment, their retirement after years of qualifying service for the Village and their receipt of the benefits upon retirement." Id., at 961. Here, unlike the Emerling plaintiffs, there are no rules and regulations or other indicia of contract between the former officials and the Village.

Instead, the petitioners are more similar to the petitioners in Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Ass'n who..."failed to put forth any evidence, beyond the language of Resolution No. 33, that might establish either that an independent agreement to supply health benefits supported by consideration existed, or that any one of the collective bargaining agreements between the parties is ambiguous on the issue of health benefits for retirees, and thus susceptible to interpretation by parol evidence." 92 NY2d 326, at 333.

The petition is denied, on the merits. Judgment for respondent.

This constitutes the Decision, Order and Judgment of the Court.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 21, 2009s/__________________________________

Hon. W. Patrick Falvey

Acting J.S.C.



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