Matter of Farraj

[*1] Matter of Farraj 2009 NY Slip Op 50684(U) [23 Misc 3d 1109(A)] Decided on April 14, 2009 Sur Ct, Kings County L¢pez Torres, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on April 14, 2009
Sur Ct, Kings County

In the Matter of the Petition for a Compulsory Accounting in the Estate of Daoud Farraj a/k/a DAVID I. FARRAJ, Deceased.



4803/07



Appearances:

For Petitioner

Peter Piddoubny, Esq.

25-84 Steinway Street

Astoria, NY 11103

For Respondent

Alexander M. Dudelson, Esq.

26 Court Street, Suite 2306

Brooklyn, NY 11242

Margarita L³pez Torres, J.

In this proceeding for a compulsory accounting, Saed Farraj ("respondent") has moved for an order pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(3) dismissing the petition of Rabaa M. Hanash ("petitioner"). Respondent argues that petitioner lacks standing to petition the Court as she was never the lawful spouse of the decedent and, therefore, lacks the requisite standing to compel an accounting. SCPA § 103 (39). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that under choice of law principles, New York law governs the validity of the marriage and that the couple were validly and legally married under the laws of New York.

BACKGROUND

Daoud Farraj ("decedent") died intestate on July 14, 2007, leaving five adult children from a previous marriage, including respondent, and a purported surviving spouse, petitioner. Respondent obtained Letters of Administration on January 3, 2008. On March 23, 2008, petitioner commenced a proceeding to compel an accounting of the estate. On September 25, 2008, respondent moved to dismiss the petition, challenging petitioner's status as surviving spouse by contending there was no valid marriage between decedent and petitioner. [*2]

It is undisputed that, on May 2, 2003, decedent and petitioner were married. On that date, decedent, a resident of New York, traveled from New York to petitioner's brother's home in New Jersey for the marriage ceremony. Petitioner asserts that the ceremony occurred in New Jersey because Islamic law dictates that the marriage ceremony occur at the premises of the bride's eldest male relative. Here, petitioner's brother was her eldest male relative and he resided in New Jersey. An imam traveled from New York to solemnize the marriage. When the ceremony was complete, the wedding party returned to New York for the wedding reception. From that day forward, decedent and petitioner lived in New York as husband and wife.

Respondent asserts New Jersey law governs the legal status of the marriage because the marriage occurred in New Jersey. Under New Jersey law the marriage would not be valid [FN1] because the couple failed to obtain a valid state license as is required by New Jersey law.[FN2] As evidence that the marriage occurred in New Jersey, respondent submits the affidavit of the imam who presided over the ceremony, in which the imam confirms that the marriage certificate was signed in New Jersey.[FN3]

Petitioner argues that New York law should control because the couple were domiciled in New York, owned property in New York, and had no connection to New Jersey other than the fact that the ceremony occurred there. Petitioner also argues that she and the decedent believed themselves married, had an expectation that they were married, and believed that their marriage ceremony had resulted in a valid marriage. Petitioner argues, inter alia, that under New York law their marriage would be valid despite the absence of a state license.[FN4]

DISCUSSION

The statutory requirements for a valid marriage differ in New York and New Jersey. Under the laws of New Jersey, a marriage is void without a state issued marriage license. N.J. Stat. § 37:1-10 (2008) ("[N]o marriage shall be valid unless the contracting parties shall have obtained a marriage license and failure in any case to comply shall render the purported marriage absolutely void."). Although a marriage license is also required under New York Domestic Relations Law § 13, a marriage is not void for failure to obtain a marriage license if the marriage was solemnized. NY [*3]Dom. Rel. Law § 25 ("Nothing in this article contained shall be construed to render void by reason of a failure to procure a marriage license any marriage solemnized ."). A marriage is solemnized when "the parties solemnly declare in the presence of a clergyman or magistrate and the attending witness or witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife." NY Dom. Rel. Law § 12. Accordingly, there is a conflict of law with regard to the validity of this marriage.

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that in New York there is a "strong presumption favoring the validity of marriage." In re McDonald, 276 AD2d 631, 632 (2d Dep't 2000); Fisher v. Fisher, 250 NY 313, 317 (1929) ("Every presumption lies in favor of the validity of a marriage."); Hynes v. McDermott, 91 NY 451, 459 (1883) ("The presumption of marriage, from a cohabitation, apparently matrimonial, is one of the strongest presumptions known to the law."); Persad v. Balram, 187 Misc 2d 711, 717 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 2001) (noting "plaintiff ha[d] failed to overcome the strong presumption favoring the validity of marriages"). "Wherever possible the courts have endeavored to sustain the validity of a marriage." Helfond v. Helfond, 53 Misc 2d 974, 977 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1967). Respondent has a heavy burden in overcoming the presumption that favors the validation and legitimization of marriage, and even more so here because the parties completed a ceremony, cohabitated, and held themselves out as being married. See Hynes, 91 NY at 459 ("Where there is enough to create a foundation for the presumption of marriage, it can be repelled only by the most cogent and satisfactory evidence.").

The general rule is that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law of the state where the marriage itself took place. In re May's Estate, 305 NY 486, 490 (1953) ("[T]he legality of a marriage between persons sui juris is to be determined by the law of the place [of contract]."). This rule is derived from the general principle that a marriage is a type of contract, Dom. Rel. Law § 10, and that the validity of a contract is governed by the laws of the state where it was formed. Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 NY 18, 24 (1881) ("[I]t is a general rule of law that a contract entered into in another State or country, if valid according to the law of that place, is valid everywhere . . . .").

However, it has long been recognized that a marriage is not merely an ordinary contract. Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 NY 282, 284 (1874) ("[Marriage] is more than a contract . . . It partakes more of the character of an institution regulated and controlled by public authority, upon principles of public policy; for the benefit of the community."). Marriage creates a personal status that carries with it non-transferable rights, duties, and obligations that are recognized and imposed by the state. Wade, 58 NY at 285 ("Neither the rights, duties nor obligations created by or flowing from [marriage] can be transferred, and the action scarcely resembles, in its main features, an action upon contract."). Marriage works as an important social institution that provides a cultural and religious infrastructure fundamental to our society. See Fearon v. Treanor, 272 NY 268, 272 (1936) ("It constitutes an institution involving the highest interests of society. It is regulated and controlled by law based upon principles of public policy affecting the welfare of the people of the State.").

Because a marriage is more than a contract and other states may have an interest in a particular marriage, there are exceptions to the traditional rule that the validity of a marriage is governed by the laws of the state where the marriage occurred. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922, 926 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977) (determining that the laws of Connecticut governed the validity of a marriage that was contracted in Maryland); McPeek v. McCardle, 888 N.E.2d 171 (Ind. 2008) (applying Indiana law to uphold a marriage where domiciles of Indiana went to Ohio to have their marriage solemnized and then returned to Indiana, even if it would have been [*4]invalid under Ohio law); In re Estate of Shippy, 37 Wn. App. 164, 678 P.2d 848(Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (applying Washington law to uphold a marriage even though it would have been invalid in the state where it took place). For example, the state where the parties are domiciled has a strong interest in the marriage, even if it is not the state where the marriage occurred. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) ("Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its borders."); Bell v. Little, 204 A.D. 235, 237 (4th Dep't 1922) ("The State has unquestioned jurisdiction over the marital status of its own citizens."); In re Palmer's Estate, 192 Misc. 385, 390 (Sur. Ct. Monroe Co. 1948) ("[I]f the parties are not domiciled in the State where the marriage is celebrated, to some extent the law of the domicile will control.").

In order to resolve conflicts such as the one now before the Court, the Court turns for guidance to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.[FN5] Section 283 of the Restatement provides that the laws of the state with the most significant relationship with the parties and the marriage govern the validity of a marriage; this is not necessarily the state where the marriage ceremony occurred.[FN6] If the domicile state has the most significant relationship with the parties and the marriage, then the laws of the domicile state can be used to determine the validity of the marriage even if it would be invalid in the state where it was celebrated. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283, cmt. I ("[E]ven if the requirement is a mandatory one, the marriage should not necessarily be held invalid in other states provided that it would be valid under the local law of some other state having a substantial relation to the parties and the marriage.").

Courts look to general principles of choice of law in determining the state with the most significant relationship with the parties and marriage. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6 and 283(1). The most important factors for purposes of marital status are: 1) the protection of justified expectations, 2) the relevant policies of the forum state, and 3) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of a [*5]particular issue. The interests of the parties, the forum state, and contracting state must be weighed, and "[t]he marriage should not be held invalid in such a case unless the intensity of the interest of the state where the marriage was contracted in having its invalidating rule applied outweighs the policy of protecting the expectations of the parties by upholding the marriage and the interest of the other state with the validating rule in having this rule applied." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283, cmt. I.

1) Justified Expectations of the Parties

The protection of justified expectations is the most important factor for determining which state has the most significant relationship with the parties and the marriage. Restat. 2d of Conflict of Laws §§ 6(2)(d) and 283(1). A New York court noted:

Because marriage is a status entered with forethought, planning and certain justified expectations and the need of the parties to anticipate certainty and predictability in the incidents of marriage, those justified expectations are the basic policy underlying the law of marriage. The state where those justified expectations arose and where they were domiciled at the time of the marriage and made their home immediately thereafter, is the state who has an obvious interest in the validity of an allegedly void bigamous marriage (Restatement Second Conflict, § 283[1], Comment (b).

Matter of Earl Levi, N.Y.L.J., March 18, 1996, at 31, col. 1 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 1996).

In this case, the events surrounding the marriage ceremony gave petitioner and decedent a justified expectation that their marriage would be valid. It is not disputed that decedent and petitioner intended to be married and took part in a religious marriage ceremony to signify their union. The "Certificate of Marriage" issued by the mosque with which the imam was affiliated was signed by the decedent as "husband" and the petitioner as "wife." The Certificate states in part that the decedent and petitioner, "have declared and affirmed before [the imam] that each and both of their own free will, agree to be united in marriage," and that the imam, "by virtue of the power vested in [him] as the Imam of the Center, do[es] hereby confirm that the [decedent and petitioner] have been unified by [the imam] in matrimony as husband and wife." Additionally, it is not disputed that New York was their intended and actual matrimonial domicile throughout their marriage beginning on the day of the marriage ceremony. The imam who performed the ceremony was from New York and traveled to New Jersey for the sole purpose of solemnizing the marriage. Although the parties do not address this discrepancy, the marriage certificate even indicates that the certificate was signed in Brooklyn, New York . After the marriage ceremony was performed and the certificate signed, the couple chose to have the marriage celebration in New York in the community in which they resided on that day and, and indeed, throughout their marriage.

It is noteworthy that the parties did not travel to New Jersey to evade restrictions under New York law, rather, they traveled to New Jersey because that was where petitioner's eldest male relative resided. Because New York was their intended matrimonial domicile and their connection with New Jersey was quite limited, it was reasonable for the parties to expect that their marriage would be upheld under the laws of New York. See, e.g., Manning, 568 F.2d at 926 n.4 (choosing Connecticut law to determine the validity of a marriage celebrated in Maryland, "[s]ince at the time of their marriage [the parties] lived in Connecticut, where they continued to live until her death, their justified expectations undoubtedly were rooted in the law of Connecticut"). The parties clearly expected that their marriage would be upheld and relied on the validity of their marriage when they cohabitated and held themselves out as married. To have their marriage retroactively invalidated [*6]after years of living as a married couple would impose undue hardships and stigma on the parties such as the perceived disgrace of having cohabitated while unmarried and the denial of the plethora of rights and privileges of marriage, including spousal inheritance rights. For these reasons, their justified expectations of a valid marriage should be protected.

2) Relevant Policies of the Forum State

The Court must also consider the relevant policies of the forum state. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6 (2)(b) and 283 (1). New York clearly has a significant relationship with the decedent, petitioner, and their marriage because it was the decedent's domicile before and after the marriage and it was the couple's matrimonial domicile. New York has a strong public policy interest in validating the marriage of its domiciliaries to protect their individual rights, especially when they have had a marriage ceremony, held themselves out as being married, and reasonably believe that they were indeed married.

For these reasons, the New York legislature has chosen to recognize marriages that have been celebrated in accordance with the customs of a religion, even if the parties do not obtain the required marriage license. NY Dom. Rel. Law § 25.[FN7] This policy decision reflects a balancing of competing interests, among them the need to maintain formal records, the threat of falsely purported marriages when no license is required, and the citizens' expectations that rights and obligations of marriage have attached because they have participated in a religious marriage ceremony. The New York legislature has decided that the harm from denying the benefits of a valid marriage to those who have taken action to show their intent to be married outweigh the administrative ease of requiring a marriage license. Here, because the parties have gone through a public wedding ceremony, there is a clear indication of an actual marriage, which eliminates many of the problems of common law marriages. The New York legislature's decision that a religious marriage ceremony is sufficient to form a valid marriage reflects New York's public policy decision to favor the validation of marriage over the enforcement of technical requirements.

3) Relevant Policies of Other Interested States

Finally, the relevant polices and interests of other interested states in the determination of the particular issues must be considered in determining which laws govern the validity of the marriage. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6 (2)(c) and 283(1). New Jersey also has a substantial interest in having its formal marriage requirements enforced because the marriage was entered into within its borders. However, "the state where the marriage was contracted does not necessarily have the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage even at the time the marriage was contracted." Manning, 568 F.2d at 926 n.4. New Jersey's interest in having its marriage license requirement enforced must be considered in light of the requirement's purpose. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283, cmt. b. According to its legislative history, New Jersey adopted its mandatory license provision, N.J. Stat. § 37:1-10, to ensure that people [*7]marrying within the state submit to a blood test and to abolish common law marriage "loose form of matrimony" that left open the possibility of manipulation. Legislative History of R.S. 37:1-10 (unpublished General Assembly Statement, Bill 10 of 1939, on file with the New Jersey State Library).

Here, however, it appears that the concerns New Jersey sought to alleviate by the enactment of § 37:1-10 are absent. There was a clear event marking the marriage through a formal public ceremony; the marriage was not formed merely by cohabitation. In addition, there was no threat of parties claiming that a common law marriage was established in New Jersey because the parties resided in New York immediately after the marriage ceremony.

Moreover, because the parties did not intend to make New Jersey their domicile and immediately left the state after the marriage was performed, New Jersey's interest in this particular marriage is slight. See Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865, 877 (S.D. Tex. 1969) ("[W]hen neither party to a marriage intends to make a state his domicile after the marriage, this state cannot possess the dominant interest in determining the validity of the marriage."). Although New Jersey has a substantial interest in having it's residents comply with its formal marriage requirements, the policy concerns behind the requirement are not as significant relative to New York's interest in protecting the rights of its citizens.

FINDINGS

Inasmuch as New York has the most significant relationship with the parties and the marriage, the laws of New York therefore govern the validity of the marriage. If the marriage had been performed entirely in New York, it would have been valid, and thus, the marriage is valid. See, e.g., McPeek, 888 N.E.2d at 176-77("[When] the marriage would have been valid if solemnized in this state, we will recognize the marriage as valid even if the marriage ceremony took place in another state and did not comply with that state's law or public policy.") As one New York court reasoned, in denying an annulment where the parties had cohabitated for less than half a year: The marriage would have been valid if contracted here There is no evidence that the parties went outside the state to evade the laws of this state [I]t is clear that their intent was to return immediately to this state where they were residents and here establish their matrimonial domicile [K]nowing the law of this state they intended to enter into a contract which would be legal where it would be consummated, and the solemn ceremony had the significance to them of establishing a marriage relation which would be valid in this state where they were citizens [I]t would be contrary to both legal and moral principle to hold otherwise than that the status so created and maintained for months is valid and binding on both parties.

Bays v. Bays, 105 Misc. 492, 499-500 (Sup. Ct. Cortland Co. 1918).

When New Jersey's relationship with the parties and the marriage is compared with New York's relationship, it is clear that New York's relationship is more significant: decedent was a New York domiciliary; the imam was brought from New York to perform the ceremony; they returned to New York immediately after the marriage; they were domiciled in New York throughout their marriage and they held themselves out as married in New York for over four years. The couple's [*8]only connection with New Jersey was that the marriage was performed in New Jersey. As such, New Jersey's policy requiring marriage licenses does not outweigh the presumption of a valid marriage that protects the rights and interests of parties living in New York who intentionally engage in a marriage ceremony and believe that they have been married. Thus, under these facts, New York clearly has the most significant relationship with the parties and the marriage.

CONCLUSION

Although the marriage between the decedent and petitioner would be invalid under New Jersey law, the Court finds that because New York has a more significant relationship with the parties and the marriage, New York law governs the validity of the marriage. Under New York law, this marriage is not invalidated simply because the couple failed to obtain a marriage license. Because the parties had capacity to marry, engaged in a religious marriage ceremony and were domiciled throughout their marriage in New York, this marriage is valid under New York law.

Because respondent has failed to prove that the marriage was invalid as a matter of law, respondent's motion to dismiss is denied and the petitioner has standing to petition the Court as the surviving spouse.

The respondent, Saed Farraj, is hereby ordered to file an accounting within 60 days of service of a copy of this decision and order with notice of entry.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: April 14, 2009__________________________________

Hon. Margarita L³pez Torres

S u r r o g a t e Footnotes

Footnote 1:Respondent's other argument, that petitioner was previously married and did not obtain a divorce is without support of any kind, and as such, the argument will not be considered in this motion.

Footnote 2:In Respondent's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, language is taken almost word for word from a New Jersey court opinion without giving any sort of attribution as to the source of the language. Respondent's counsel is cautioned to cite authority appropriately.

Footnote 3:The Court notes, however, that the actual Certificate of Marriage signed by the imam indicates that the certificate was signed in Brooklyn, New York.

Footnote 4:Petitioner also argues that, under Islamic law, the place of the marriage is where the final steps of the marriage, the walima or reception, and consummation occur. Petitioner asserts that these two events occurred in New York and therefore the marriage was finalized in New York. The Court declines to reach the merits of when the marriage was considered "final" under the laws of Islam and chooses instead to look to conflict of laws principles for resolution of this matter. The Court does find, however, that the decedent and petitioner were married in a ceremony in New Jersey.

Footnote 5:Although the Restatement is not binding law, courts routinely use it as guidance, and it has been referred to as an "eminent authority." Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 224 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Manning, 568 F.2d at 926 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977) (relying on Restatement § 283 to conclude that the laws of Connecticut were to be used to determine the validity of the marriage because it had the most significant relationship with the parties and marriage rather than the laws of Maryland where the marriage was contracted); Indosuez Int'l Fin. B.V. v. Nat'l Reserve Bank, 98 NY2d 238, 245 (2002) (citing the Restatement for the proposition that "New York choice of law principles require a court to apply the law of the state with the most significant relationship with the particular issue in conflict").

Footnote 6:While the Restatement provides that a valid marriage in the state where it is contracted will be valid everywhere, it does not state the inverse that a marriage invalid where contracted is invalid everywhere. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283. Notably, in the Restatement (First), there was a provision asserting this proposition, but in the more recent version this language was omitted. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 122 (1934). In fact, the Comments to the Restatement (Second) suggest that a marriage does not necessarily have to be held invalid even if it is invalid under the laws where it was contracted. § 283, cmt. I ("The fact that a marriage does not comply with the requirements of the state where it was contracted should not therefore inevitably lead to the conclusion that the marriage is invalid.").

Footnote 7:Although there does not appear to be any record of legislative intent for this provision, which was adopted in 1907, a contemporaneous commentary noted that the provision would avoid "[t]he evil resulting from invalidating marriages because of technical defects in the ceremony," based on the experience in England under a prior statute that made such marriages absolutely void. Battershall, Fletcher W., The Law of Domestic Relations in the State of New York, 24-25 (1910).