Beaudin v Guernsey
Annotate this CaseDecided on March 2, 2009
Supreme Court, Albany County
Cecelia Beaudin, Plaintiff,
against
Sarah Guernsey, Sarah Sinnott, Joseph Sinnott, III and Clifford Sinnott, Defendant.
6781-07
E. Stewart Jones, PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
(Meghan Rielly Keenholts, of counsel)
28 Second Street
Troy, New York 12180
Milber, Makris, Plousadis & Seiden, LLP
Attorneys for Defendants
(Adam C. Lease, of counsel)
3 Barker Avenue, 6th Floor
White Plains, New York 10601
Richard M. Platkin, J.
By this action, plaintiff Cecelia Beaudin seeks to recover for personal injuries
sustained in a boating accident. Plaintiff alleges that on June 11, 2005 at approximately 2:00
a.m., the boat in which she was a passenger crashed into a private island owned by defendants in
Lake George, New York, causing her injuries. Defendants now move pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)
(7) to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, arguing that they owed no duty of care to plaintiff.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's complaint makes the
following allegations of negligence:
9. . . . Defendants were under a duty to regulate, control, supervise, inspect, light,
equip, identify, mark, define, made visible and/or monitor Tea Island in a safe and proper
manner and condition.
10. . . . Defendants were under the further duty and obligation to place and position
appropriate signs, buoys, lights and other devices designed to notify and warn operators of boats
upon the said Lake George of Tea Island's presence and approaching conditions, objects and/or
obstructions that presented a potential danger to the said health and safety of operators of boats
upon the said Lake George, as well as to the passengers in the said boats. . . . .
***
12. [I]n violation of their duties . . . Defendants allowed . . . Tea Island . . . to
become and remain in an unsafe, unreasonably dangerous . . . condition . . . .
***
14. [O]n June 11, 2005 at approximately 2:04 a.m., one Steven B. Barber was
operating a Cobalt Bow Rider boat in which the plaintiff . . . was a passenger . . . .
15. [A]t the aforesaid date, time and place, as a consequence of the negligence of the
Defendants herein in, among other things, negligently failing to place, erect and position lights,
buoys, signs and other warning devices in the vicinity of Tea Island . . . the aforesaid Cobalt boat
. . . was caused to collide and enter upon the said Tea Island which accident caused the severe
and permanent injuries to the plaintiff herein . . . .
In moving to dismiss the complaint, defendants argue that "plaintiff cannot establish that the defendants had a duty pursuant to statutory or common law to illuminate Tea Island." Defendants further argue that General Obligations Law § 9-103 explicitly provides that a landowner is under no duty to keep the premises safe for boaters.
In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submits photographs of Tea Island, and a statement
from John Seh, an individual who responded to the accident (but did not witness it directly). Mr.
Seh avers that "[i]t was extremely dark and very foggy. I could not see two feet in front of me . .
. ." He further avers that "[t]he island was completely dark with no lights to mark where it was. .
[*2]. . The weather was foggy and visibility was extremely poor
on the date of 6/11/05." In addition, plaintiff submits the affidavit of William Bradley, who avers
that one of the defendants "stated he was aware of prior boating accidents that involved boats
hitting Tea Island during the night." Plaintiff further argues that GOL § 9-103 is
inapplicable to this matter.
ANALYSIS
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the Court must accept the facts in the complaint as true, afford the plaintiff every reasonable inference and determine whether those facts and inferences fit into any cognizable legal theory. (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).
Since plaintiff's complaint seeks recovery against defendants for negligence, the Court must determine, as a threshold matter, whether defendants owed plaintiff a duty of care (Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 138 [2002]). After all, "[i]n the absence of duty, there is no breach and without a breach there is no liability" (Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781, 782 [1976]). Put another way, "[w]ithout a duty running directly to the injured person there can be no liability in damages, however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm" (Lauer v. City of New York, 95 NY2d 95, 100 [2000]). "[T]he existence and scope of a duty is a question of law requiring courts to balance sometimes competing public policy considerations" (Espinal, supra, at 138).
In this case, it is clear that defendants, the owner of an island located in navigable waters of the State, owe no duty of care to boaters and their passengers. Plaintiff acknowledges, as she must, that defendants are under no duty imposed "by either statute or regulation", instead relying upon an alleged common law duty. However, at common law, the owner of land is not "liable for physical harm caused to others outside of the land by a natural condition of the land" (Restat 2d of Torts, § 363; see Leckanby v. Cohoes Cmty. Ctr., Inc., 299 AD2d 625 [3d Dept 2002]). Here, plaintiff does not and cannot allege that the defendants changed the condition of Tea Island in any respect material to this action. Rather, plaintiff's complaint is that defendants failed to warn boaters, through the use of lights or other aids to navigation, of the open and obvious danger posed by the island to vessels attempting to navigate the lake, particularly those attempting to do so at 2:00 a.m. in "very foggy" conditions with "extremely poor visibility".
After "balancing factors, including the reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of liability" (Palka v Servicemaster Mgmt. Services Corp., 83 NY2d 579, 586 [1994]), the Court declines plaintiff's invitation to impose such a duty on landowners. In the absence of any statutory or regulatory duty upon defendants to illuminate or otherwise warn boaters of the presence of Tea Island (see Navigation Law art 3), the relevant duty of care rests squarely with the owner and operator of the boat to ensure the safety of passengers such as plaintiff. Indeed, plaintiff can cite no precedent for imposing a duty upon landowners in the circumstances presented by this case.
The conclusion that defendants owed plaintiff no duty follows even accepting plaintiff's proof that there were prior accidents involving boats crashing into defendants' island at night. As [*3]explained previously, foreseeability "does not determine the existence of a duty, but, rather, the scope of that duty once it is determined to exist" (Eiseman v State of NY, 70 NY2d 175, 187 [1987]).
Given that defendants did not owe plaintiff a duty of care, the Court has no occasion to consider whether the immunity provisions of GOL § 9-103 constitute a further bar to plaintiff's action.
The Court has examined the parties remaining contentions and finds them to be unavailing or unnecessary to the Court's disposition of this application.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. All papers including this Decision and
Order are returned to defendants' counsel. The signing of this Decision and Order shall not
constitute entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that Rule respecting filing, entry and Notice of Entry.
Dated: Albany, New York
March 2, 2009
RICHARD M. PLATKIN
A.J.S.C.
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