Perez v N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp.
Annotate this CaseDecided on January 14, 2009
Supreme Court, Bronx Co
Perez, Plaintiff, v N.Y.C. Health and Hospitals Corp., Defendant.
16565/03
Douglas E. McKeon, J.
Plaintiff's motion for an order deeming the Notice of Claim previously served as
having been served timely, nunc pro tunc, or granting Plaintiff leave to file a new Notice of
Claim, and cross-motion by the Defendants for an order dismissing Plaintiff's complaint for
failure to comply with the requirements of General Municipal Law §50-e are consolidated
for disposition and decided as follows:
This is a medical malpractice action based on allegations of negligent prenatal labor
and delivery care which allegedly caused permanent injury to the infant-Plaintiff. Initially,
Plaintiff served a Notice of Claim on December 20, 2001. That Notice of Claim was filed more
than three years subsequent to the alleged malpractice without leave of this court. Instead of
seeking leave of the court to deem the late Notice of Claim timely, Plaintiff commenced this
action by filing a summons and complaint almost one and a half years later, on May 5, 2003.
Plaintiff's counsel now seeks leave of this court, almost seven years after first filing a late Notice
of Claim, and just one month before the statute of limitations will expire, to file a late Notice of
Claim.
Pursuant to General Municipal Law §50-e, the Legislature established the
filing of a Notice of Claim as a condition precedent to bringing suit against any public
corporation. In determining whether to allow a late filing, the court must consider various
factors, including whether the claimant was an infant, whether the claimant has demonstrated a
reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely Notice of Claim, whether the public corporation
has acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within ninety days of its
accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay will substantially prejudice the
public corporation in defending the matter on the merits. See General Municipal Law §50-e
(5).
Because this application is made within the statute of limitations, tolled by the
Plaintiff's infancy [*2]for ten years from the date of the infant's
birth, the court has discretion to consider the various factors set forth in General Municipal Law
§50-e.
Based on the entire record before it, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet
the criteria set forth in General Municipal Law §50-e (5) and thus, the application is denied
and the cross-claim granted. Although Plaintiff claims that the delay in bringing the instant
application is due to infancy, the court finds the argument to be weak. Counsel had access to the
mother's and the infant's Lincoln charts which are the pertinent records in this case. Bringing the
instant application did not require a physical examination of the Plaintiff so that it is immaterial
that counsel was able to obtain a physical examination of infant only recently (as the infant was
in foster care). Plaintiff's argument is further weakened by the fact that counsel had enough
information to file a medical malpractice action with the certificate of merit on May 5, 2003. If
the 'intervention of the child neglect proceedings' did not delay the commencement of this suit
brought on May 5, 2003, more than five years ago, any argument that it has delayed the filing of
the instant application until September 2008 is without merit. Plaintiff also argues that the late
filing is partially due to the infant-Plaintiff's mother's youth. The mother was sixteen at the time
of the infant's birth. The court notes that Ms. Torres turned eighteen on November 27, 1999 but
did not contact counsel until two years later in December 2001.
The court finds that Defendant did not acquire actual notice of the facts underlying
this claim within ninety days or a reasonable time thereafter as the maintenance of the records
did not provide actual knowledge of the claim of malpractice. Plaintiff's papers do not
demonstrate that Defendant had actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim. Instead, the
court finds that the medical records merely demonstrate Plaintiff's theory of the case. The expert
affidavits ignore portions of the chart and Plaintiff's own testimony which illustrate that the root
of the infant-Plaintiff's problems has never been determined, even after genetic tests. Further,
although the precise source of the infant's problems have never been determined, the infant's
diagnosis has always been 'congenital hypotonia'.
Plaintiffs argue that Javier's low birth weight, low Apgars and multiple medical
problems including hypotonia from birth was a product of Lincoln's staff's failure to prevent a
premature birth. However, a review of the records does not reveal a causal link between actions
taken by staff members and injury to the infant. The records indicate that the prenatal course and
labor and delivery were normal except for the genetic testing during the pregnancy for which
Plaintiff's mother was counseled. Where, as here, there is little to suggest injury attributable to
malpractice during delivery, a recording of the facts surrounding the delivery cannot equate to
knowledge of facts underlying a claim. See Williams v. Nassau County Medical Center, 6 NY3d
at 538. Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's staff failed to notice intrauterine growth
retardation and a supposed discrepancy in growth and dates, Plaintiff fails to mention that
Lincoln's analysis of sonograms on April 6, 1998 and May 27, 1998 found that the mother had
given the wrong date of her last menstrual period which was confirmed based on consistent and
adequate interval growth during the time period. Clearly, the staff monitored the fetal growth.
Plaintiff's arguments do not establish notice but merely allege departures and only recite to
certain portions of the [*3]record. For example, in citing two
notes of September 2 and September 30, as indicative of an arrest in fetal growth, Plaintiff fails
to mention that notes of October 7 indicate that the fundal height at the time had gone from thirty
seven centimeters from September 30, to thirty nine centimeters on October 7. A non stress test
was performed on September 30 and notes regarding that test state the fetal heart rate was
reactive and that the fundal heights corresponded with the correct gestational age. Plaintiff's
expert claims that were irregular fetal heart tracings on October 8. However, this contention is
contraindicated by notes on the chart on that day and throughout the labor and delivery period
which state that the fetal heart rate was reassuring and constantly reactive with no decels and
positive acceleration. On October 10, delivery took place without any noted complications. At
birth the infant's Apgar scores were six and the infant was noted to have respiratory distress and
low muscle tone. It is important to note that the cause of these problems was never determined.
Furthermore, the cord blood gases did not indicate birth asphyxia or hypoxia. In the end, the
infant was discharged from Lincoln with a diagnosis of congenital hypotomia. No treating doctor
has attributed any of Plaintiff's injuries to anything that occurred during the prenatal or labor and
delivery course at Lincoln. Instead, and unfortunately, the infant has been diagnosed with
congenital problems. Plaintiff's expert's affidavits, which the court finds to be vague and
conclusory, fail to establish that the hospital had actual notice of the facts underlying the claim.
Finally, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a lack of prejudice.
Plaintiff's counsel argues that Defendant is not prejudiced by virtue of the actual notice provided
by the hospital records. As the court has found that Defendant did not have actual knowledge
based on the medical records, that argument is rejected. Furthermore, the court notes that the
physician who delivered the infant, Dr. Joan Valle, has not been in the employ of the hospital
since 2000 and is not under its control. Clearly, Plaintiff's delay has prevented Defendant from
investigating the claim while the facts were fresh and may well have frustrated the ability even to
locate and speak with the doctors involved in the Plaintiff's care. The First Department has held
that lengthy delays in service can lead a court to infer substantial prejudice and the facts herein
support the validity of such an inference. See Matter of Nieves v. New York City Health and
Hospitals Corporation, 34 AD3d 336 citing Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini and Spencer, 97 NY2d
95 (2001).
Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a late Notice of Claim herein almost ten years after
the alleged malpractice is denied. The court finds there is no reasonable excuse for the delay in
filing the instant application, nor for counsel's inexplicable seven year delay in seeking the
instant relief. While lack of an excuse may not be fatal to Plaintiff's application, the lack of an
excuse together with the lack of actual notice and Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate lack of
prejudice is fatal to this application. Based on Plaintiff's failure to meet a condition precedent to
suit against NYCHHC, Plaintiff's motion is denied in its entirety and the cross-motion by
NYCHHC is granted and the action dismissed.
So ordered.
1/29/2009 NYLJ 28, (col. 1)
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.