Calkins v Police Benevolent Assn. of the NY State Troopers, Inc.
Annotate this CaseDecided on July 17, 2007
Supreme Court, Ontario County
Timothy E. Calkins, STEPHEN J. WILLIAMS, ROBERT J. HODGES, IVAN MULLIKIN, RICHARD E. DAILEY and HERBERT I. STOPKA, Plaintiff,
against
Police Benevolent Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc., Defendant.
96755
Craig Doran, J.
The plaintiffs herein were "Special Troopers", which was a special title created as a result of the
terrorist attacks on 9/11/01 to provide a short term emergency increase in the number of available
state troopers. The Governor brought recently retired state troopers back to active service and
suspended certain limitations on mandatory retirement age and earnings. In December, 2001, the
State began assigning special troopers to work in various locations in New York State. It was
agreed initially that the special troopers would be a part of the regular troopers bargaining unit
(i.e. the Police Benevolent Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. hereinafter referred
to as "PBA").
At the time of the special troopers' initial hire, members of the PBA were working under the terms of an expired Interest Arbitration Award. In December, 2002, an Interest Arbitration Panel rendered an award for a period covering April 1, 2001, through March 31, 2003. Plaintiffs were included in the lump sum payments and the wage increases.
In 2004, the negotiating committee for the PBA and the State commenced bargaining in an effort to negotiate an agreement for the period subsequent to March 31, 2003. The terms of the agreement were memorialized in the 2003-2007 Memorandum of Agreement which was executed by the State and the PBA on May 19, 2005. Both regular troopers and special troopers were given an opportunity to vote for or against the agreement. It was overwhelmingly ratified by the troopers.
In the instant action, plaintiffs allege that the PBA breached its duty of fair representation to them with respect to the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the PBA and the State of New York for a new collective bargaining agreement for the period April 1, 2003, through March 31, 2007. The gravamen of the amended complaint is that the 2003-2007 Memorandum of Agreement favors some bargaining unit members over the plaintiffs.
The defendant now moves this Court for an order granting summary judgment in its favor. Defendant PBA argues inter alia, that the plaintiffs' amended complaint must be dismissed as a matter of law because plaintiffs have failed to establish the requisite elements for a breach of duty of fair representation against the PBA. [*2]
In opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs assert that there is evidence which supports a claim of a breach in the duty of fair representation. The plaintiffs allege that the combination of the history of the PBA not wanting the special troopers, not representing the special troopers, cutting them out of benefits from the outset of its representation, the PBA's subsequent exclusion of the special troopers from all the monetary increases of the new contract, and the totally false statements about the relative positions of the State and the PBA with regard to the special troopers in the only communication to the membership about the contract, is a clear showing of bad faith. Plaintiffs further claim that the PBA's actions in sacrificing the interests of the special troopers to the interests of the regular troopers, its failure to have a special trooper on the negotiating committee or to provide an appropriate representative for the special troopers, and its justification for such discrimination based on the concept that the special troopers were already receiving a pension, amount to arbitrary conduct violating its duty of fair representation.
The duty of fair representation in New York State public sector employment is a judicially developed doctrine which is traceable to Federal law (see, Matter of Civil Serv. Bar Assn. v. City of New York (64 NY2d 188).In the Federal courts, it was held that a union is obligated to act "fairly" toward all employees it represents stemming from its statutory authority and responsibility as their exclusive bargaining representative. In Vaca v. Sipes (386 US 171, 190), the court established the standard for determining when the duty of fair representation is violated. According to the Vaca court, such a breach "occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith" (Vaca v. Sipes, supra). The federal law's treatment of a union's breach of its duty of fair representation has been adopted by the New York courts. Thus, in Matter of Civil Serv. Bar Assn. v. City of New York, supra, the Court of Appeals recognized a similar duty of fair representation. "To sustain a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation there must be substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action, or dishonest conduct, or evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives" ( Mellon v. Benker, 186 AD2d 1020).
The duty of fair representation is not, however, a guarantee that every member of a bargaining unit will be treated exactly alike (see, Matter of Civil Serv. Bar Assn. v. City of New York, supra).As the Court of Appeals in Civil Serv. Bar Assn. recognized, conflict between employees represented by the same union is a recurring fact. Courts in this state have consistently recognized that unions must have leeway to resolve their obligations to employees who have conflicting interests. "To remove or gag the union in these cases would surely weaken the collective bargaining and grievance processes" (see, Matter of Civil Serv. Bar Assn. v. City of New York, supra).
The Court of Appeals has recognized that a union's basic purpose is to address the needs of the union as a whole which at times creates an inherent conflict between or among bargaining unit members. The Court in Civil Serv. Bar Assn. held:
"Where the union undertakes a good-faith balancing of the divergent interests of its membership and chooses to forgo benefits which may be gained for one class of employees in exchange for benefits to other employees, such accommodation does not, of necessity, violate the union's duty of fair representation...a union's settlement of a group salary grievance cannot be viewed in isolation from its role as collective negotiating representative for the union as a whole".
(Civil Serv. Bar Assn. v. City of New York, supra at 197-198). [*3]
Applying the standards set forth above to the claims made by the plaintiffs in the instant action, this Court finds that the defendant has satisfied its initial burden of establishing its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. The defendant submits proof that the 2003-2007 Memorandum of Agreement and the treatment of the special troopers therein was the product of back and forth negotiations between the State and the PBA. The actions of the PBA were not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.
The burden thus shifts to the plaintiffs to lay bare their proof in opposition to the motion and to submit evidentiary facts sufficient to raise a triable issue (see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557).
An examination of the plaintiffs' claims reveals that essentially all that is alleged is that the 2003-2007 Memorandum of Agreement favors some bargaining unit members over them. The plaintiffs fail, however, to produce any document or testimony which would constitute "substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action, or dishonest conduct, or evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives" ( Mellon v. Benker, supra).
In support of its claim that the PBA breached its duty of fair representation, the plaintiffs refer to a post-Agreement "Contract Update" posting on the PBA website describing the 2003-2007 Memorandum of Agreement. Plaintiffs allege that this posting is evidence of fraud and bad faith on the part of the PBA. The plaintiffs allege that the PBA falsely misrepresented the facts within this posting as proof of the PBA's fraud and bad faith.
In view of the fact that this post-Agreement "Contract Update" posting by the PBA occurred after the Memorandum of Agreement was reached, this Court finds this update to be irrelevant to its determination herein.
An analysis of the plaintiffs' claims in the context of the law regarding a union's duty of fair representation in the context of collective bargaining, leads to a determination that the plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence of fraud, deceitful action, or dishonest conduct, or evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives. It is not a violation of a union's duty of fair representation to reach an agreement that treats different groups differently. In essence, that is the gravamen of plaintiffs' claim against the defendant. Such a claim is insufficient to establish a violation of the duty of fair representation.
In light of this Court's determination that defendant's motion for summary judgment must be granted because the plaintiffs have failed to establish, as a matter of law, the requisite elements for a breach of the duty of fair representation against the defendant herein, the other arguments raised by the defendant in support of its motion for summary judgment are not addressed herein.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court hereby grants the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
[*4]
This constitutes the Decision of the Court. Counsel is directed to submit an order in accordance herewith.
________________________________________
Craig J. Doran
Acting Supreme Court Justice
Dated at Canandaigua, New York,
thisday of July, 2007.
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