Matter of Cady v County of Oneida
Annotate this CaseDecided on March 31, 2006
Supreme Court, Oneida County
In the Matter of the Application for Benefits made pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c by David Cady, Petitioner,
against
County of Oneida; Daniel G. Middaugh as Oneida County Sheriff, Respondents.
CA-2005-002567
For Petitioner:
Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O'Shea, Esqs.
By: Ronald G. Dunn, Esq., of counsel
For Respondents:
Coughlin & Gerhart, LLP
By: Lars P. Mead, Esq., of counsel
John W. Grow, J.
In this Article 78 proceeding Petitioner David Cady "Cady" seeks an order and judgment (1) annulling the determination of Respondents County of Oneida and Daniel G. Middaugh as Oneida County Sheriff "County" which adopted the Decision of Hearing Officer, David Watkins "Watkins", denying Cady compensation and benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law "GML" §207-c; (2) directing the County grant Cady GML §207-c compensation and benefits;
(3) granting Cady costs and disbursements; (4) such other and further relief as may be just.
BACKGROUND
Cady is employed as a Deputy/Investigator for the County's Sheriff's Department. In connection with his work he has been assigned an unmarked Sheriff's vehicle which he is allowed to keep at his residence and use, inter alia, to transport himself to and from his employment at the Department on Judd Road. On the morning of April 15, 2004, while driving the vehicle to his place of employment to commence his work shift, 10:00 A.M. - 6:00 P.M., he was involved in an automobile accident. The car collided with another vehicle which allegedly pulled out of a lot in an attempt to cross Judd Road. Apparently the accident was not Cady's fault. The accident occurred at 9:49 A.M., some eleven minutes prior to the commencement of Cady's shift.
Cady was injured in the accident and applied for and received worker's compensation benefits. He also applied for GML §207-c benefits. His application for these benefits was denied by the County. It reasoned that GML §207-c provides benefits for injuries to a sheriff who has been injured in the performance of his duties and that at the time of the accident Cady had not commenced his work duty shift and therefore was not in the performance of his duties.
Cady then instituted a timely demand for a hearing to review this determination. Watkins was duly appointed the Hearing Officer. The hearing was held April 7, 2005; there was a transcript of the proceeding and a copy has been furnished the Court. Watkins issued his
Decision September 5, 2005, which included findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Decision affirmed the County's determination that Cady was not entitled to GML §207-c benefits because he was not injured in the performance of his duties. This Decision was adopted by the County in a letter Decision dated September 12, 2005 confirming the denial of §207-c benefits from the accident. This Article 78 proceeding followed. Oral arguments were heard February 23, 2006. The Court has reviewed the parties submissions including Watkins' Decision.
DISCUSSION
It is well settled that judicial review of an administrative determination is limited to whether the determination was "affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion". See CPLR §7803(3). In Matter of Pell v.Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, 231, the Court of Appeals explained the arbitrary and capricious standard, as follows: "The arbitrary or capricious test chiefly relates to whether a particular action should have been taken or is justified...and whether the administrative action is without foundation in fact' (1 NY Jur.,
Administrative Law, §184, p.609). Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts."
The issue presented is whether the Hearing Officer's determination was arbitrary, capricious, without foundation in fact, and an abuse of discretion.
GML §207-c provides in applicable part:
Any...deputy sheriff...of the sheriff's department of any county...
who is injured in the performance of his duties so as to necessitate
medical or other lawful remedial treatment shall be paid by the
municipality...by which he is employed the full amount of his
regular salary or wages from such employer until his disability
arising therefrom has ceased, and, in addition such municipality... [*2]
shall be liable for all medical treatment and hospital care
necessitated by reason of such injury or illness.
Cady submits he was in the performance of his duties because he is "on call" twenty-four hours a day to be dispatched to emergencies or to investigate criminal acts; further, while en route to work with the assigned car he is directed to be observant for accidents and criminal activity. He contends the Department assigned him the "take home" vehicle for the Department's benefit. As further evidence he was working at the time of the accident, he submits he applied for and has received worker's compensation benefits. While conceding that under normal circumstances an employee is not performing job duties during a commute to or from work there is an exception, namely, when the employee is acting for the benefit of the employer. See Fine v. SMC Micro Systems, 75 NY2d 912,914. Cady contends the assignments he frequently receives on his travel to and from work qualifies him for the exception.
In support of Watkins's Decision the County submits it was not irrational or an abuse of discretion to find that Cady was not in the performance of his duties at the time the accident occurred. In further support the County points out that Cady acknowledged during his drive to work on the accident date he was not dispatched to conduct any investigation nor did he observe any criminal activity. The County further counters that Cady receives additional compensation
when called upon to perform an official act while driving to and from work and he did not receive any additional compensation for his travel on the morning of the accident. 1. The County also advances the Decisions which find that the fact that Cady received worker's compensation benefits does not provide a basis for collateral estoppel in a GML §207-c case because the standards for workers compensation benefits differ from §207-c benefits, See Balcerak v. County of Nassau, 94 NY2d 253. The County concludes that driving an official duty vehicle, subject to dispatch, observation, or to perform a duty en route to or from work, does not translate into §207-c coverage since the obligation of a police officer to be constantly vigilant is always a duty.
The Court determines that the Hearing Officer's well-reasoned seven page Decision which sets forth the factual issues, findings of fact and conclusions of law determining Cady does not qualify for GML §207-c benefits, is not irrational, not based on an error of law, and not arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion. The Court confirms the Hearing Officer's determination. For this Court to find otherwise on the facts presented would be tantamount to a determination that all commutation by sheriffs, such as Cady, in take-home vehicles translates to performance of duties as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The relief sought by Mr. Cady is DENIED. The Petition is DISMISSED. The County's counsel is directed to submit a proposed order, copy to opposing counsel for his review and any appropriate comment. Upon signing of an order your respective submissions will be returned.
Dated: Rome, New York
March 31, 2006.
__________________________________________
John W. Grow
Justice of the Supreme Court
1. Even though Investigator Cady testified he was not eligible for pay for merely driving from his home to his office to begin his shift (T-58), he now contends that under federal law an employee should be compensated for the work the employee performs while traveling to the workplace where the travel is for the convenience and benefit of the employer. The County counters that Cady's travel to work is not solely for the convenience and benefit of the Department but also a benefit for him since he gets the use of the vehicle, without any cost to him.
2. This case is also discussed/cited in the Hearing Officer's Decision, page 5.
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