Premiere Eglise Baptiste Haitienne De Manhattan v Joseph

[*1] Premiere Eglise Baptiste Haitienne De Manhattan v Joseph 2006 NY Slip Op 52434(U) [14 Misc 3d 1207(A)] Decided on December 15, 2006 Supreme Court, New York County Acosta, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 15, 2006
Supreme Court, New York County

Premiere Eglise Baptiste Haitienne De Manhattan, Plaintiff,

against

George Joseph, Defendant.



109554/06



Clyde Jay Eisman, Esq

450 7th Avenue, Room 939

New York, NY 10123

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Rudy Hirschheimer, Esq.

300 Old County Road, Suite 241B

Mineola, NY 11501

Attorneys for Defendant

Rolando T. Acosta, J.

Background [FN1]

The late Rev. Karnest Joseph, defendant's father, had been the pastor of the First Haitian Baptist Church of Manhattan. In 1996, due to his advanced stages of Parkinson's disease, his assistant, the Rev. Anorjuste was promoted to "active pastor." Rev. Joseph, at defendant's urging, commenced an action in Supreme Court seeking an order to be reinstated as pastor of the church. Supreme Court found in favor of the church and Rev. Joseph appealed. Pending the appeal, the then-existing Board of Trustees and Rev. Joseph settled their dispute by stipulation dated April 5, 1998. Plaintiff's Exhibit A. Pursuant to ¶2A of the stipulation, the Rev. Anorjuste was "the active pastor of the church and [Rev. Joseph]. . . the counseling pastor." As Counseling pastor, the Rev. Joseph would give counseling, make suggestions and recommendations as needed, and be in the "comity"[sic]. Stipulation ¶¶ 3 - 5. In addition, he would "have all the rights and privileges as [the Rev. Anorjuste] or any other member(s) of the church to enforce his rights and privileges, especially whenever the spiritual condition of the church is in danger." Stipulation ¶ 8.

Significantly, the stipulation also provided that defendant "was to be referred to as a Sunday School teacher" and a "church member." Stipulation ¶ 1. His reappointment as Sunday School teacher, however, was contingent on defendant "go[ing] through a process of reintegration for one year in the church [and] participate in a course made to qualify Sunday school teachers." Stipulation ¶ 6.

According to plaintiff, when the Rev. Joseph passed in June 2000, defendant proceeded to lay claim to a leadership role in the Church arising from the 1998 stipulation as well as pursuant to a power of attorney issued to him by the Rev. Joseph prior to his death. Pursuant to the power of attorney, in addition to having unlimited power over the Rev. Joseph's affairs, [*2]defendant "has no limitation over the property which is situated at 313-315 West 141st Street, NY, NY [the Church]." See Plaintiff's Exhibit B. Consequently, during a general assembly on September 11, 2005, the majority of the church members approved the Board of Trustees unanimous decision to suspended defendant's membership in the Church. See Plaintiff's Exhibit C. The Board listed the following reasons for the suspension: 1.Diverting church mail to defendant's address without Board consent;2.Claiming to be the executor of the church and the person to whom all communication from the Building Department of the City of New York as well as the New York City Department of Finance should go to without Board approval;3.Submitted and Amendment of the Certificate of Incorporation of the Church in which defendant presented himself as the President of the Board; and4.Refusing to accept that the "function of Senior Counselor that your grant yourself does not exist in the Church because it was not created neither by the By-laws nor the Church Constitution."

Defendant asserts that he is not interfering with the management of the church, but rather is merely exercising his position as "legal" or "senior counselor." According to defendant, as legal counselor, he deals with "the legal problems of members of the church, at their request, as well as those of members of the Board of Trustees." He notes, however, that "[r]epresentaion on my part is not as an attorney but rather as an advisor." Affidavit in Opposition at ¶ 8 (f). He claims that he neither solicits nor is he paid for his help. Affidavit in Opposition at ¶ 8 (f).

According to defendant, his father conferred the position of Counsel on him. Defendant attached a letter from his father dated July 3, 1998, in response to defendant's request to be an "Assistant Counselor." That letter states: Your request to be my Assistant counselor is redundant.You have been my legal advisor (counselor) prior to the commencement of the legal action against Rev. Emmanuel Anorjuste and several members of the Eglise Baptiste D' expression Francaise De Manhattan.You were always authorized by me to do whatever it takes within the law and are now authorized by me to enforce any and all portions of the agreement in accordance with Section 6(a), Section 5(a)(b) and Section 2(d) within the agreement which we made on April 5, 1998 not only for our rights and privileges but for the rights and privileges of any and all members within the Eglise Baptiste D'expression Francaise De Manhattan whenever a violation occurs.In executing these duties, if you feel that it is necessary, you are appointed to represent me, obtain power of attorney on my behalf, sign any and all legal documents which might [*3]have been signed by me, make decisions on my behalf, obtain any and all documents from any city, state or federal agencies, corporation, individual(s), and authorities, and replace me in any and all legal proceedings which must be filed by me or that has been commenced against me or my organization (Eglise Baptiste D'expression Francaise De Manhattan).

Defendant also asserts that by Letters of Administration dated September 18, 2000, he was appointed as administrator of Rev Joseph's estate. When it came to his attention that mail addressed to his father was being opened at the church, defendant went to the Post Office and requested that all mail addressed to his father be sent to defendant's address. Other than complain, according to defendant, plaintiff failed to take any action with the Post Office.

Although Defendant does not deny that he signed the Amended Certificate of Incorporation as President (nor could he, see Plaintiff's Exhibit F), he noted that the Amended Certificate of Incorporation was filed in January 2003, and plaintiff likewise took no action until now. Interestingly, ¶ 6 of the Amendment recognized the "Legal/Counseling Department" with defendant as its head, and ¶ 7, which lists "[t]he current names and addresses of the officers, counselors, deacons and trustees," listed defendant's name and address. The Amendment also changed the name of the Church to Eglise Baptiste D'Expression Francaise De Manhattan. Paragraph 8 of the Amendment states that [t]he foregoing amendment is being made as a result of an April 5, 1998 agreement [the Stipulation] and a recent May 7, 2001 Supreme Court judgment." There is, however, no May 7, 2001 Supreme Court judgment. Rather, on May 17, 2001, a Justice of the Supreme Court issues an Order enjoining the Board of Trustees from interfering in any way with defendant's rights pursuant to the April 5, 1998 Stipulation. That order, issued as a result of an Order to Show Cause by defendant, was unopposed by the Church. See Last Exhibit in Defendant's Opposition. Last, defendant asserts that he holds no church property.

On July 11, 2006, plaintiff filed a summons and complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, plaintiff seeks a declaration that defendant holds no management authority in the Church (first cause of action); a declaration that the Amended Certificate of Incorporation filed in 2003 is null and void (second cause of action); an injunction enjoining defendant from obstructing the Board of trustees from managing the temporal affairs of the Church, including representing such authority to third parties; making corporate filings; opening, redirecting or confiscating plaintiff's mail; and disturbing church worship services (third cause of action); and compelling plaintiff to return all church property in its possession, including the seal, title and deed to the church property.

One day later, on July 12, 2006, plaintiffs moved by order to show cause (OSC), for an order: enjoining defendant from representing to third parties, including church members, that he holds any office, whether official or unofficial with the church; enjoining defendant from taking any action purportedly on behalf of plaintiff or that interferes with the lawful authority of the board of trustees of the church without express resolution of the Board; directing defendant to return to plaintiff all church property held by him and directing that he cease opening, redirecting or confiscating church mail; declaring that neither the power attorney issued by the late Rev. Joseph nor the 1998 stipulation granted defendant any official or unofficial position in the church or any authority to manage the affairs of the church; and declaring that the 2003 Amended [*4]Certificate of Incorporation is null and void.

On the return date of the OSC, the matter was adjourned to September 7, 2006 and a briefing schedule was set. Defendant was to file opposition by August 31, 2006 (which they did on August 30) and plaintiff a reply by September 7. On August 25, 2006, before filing opposition, defendant filed his answer to the complaint. In their opposition, it was never argued that plaintiff's motion, which essentially sought summary judgment on the complaint, was premature. Instead, defendant lay bare his proof.

Analysis

Preliminarily, this Court finds that entertaining this motion does not run afoul of the protections extended by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits courts from encroaching on the activities of a religious society or its members in furtherance of religious beliefs. See, Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). In contrast, the Establishment Clause, prohibits a court from becoming excessively entangled with religious doctrine and its standards. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989); see also Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 NY3d 510 (2006). Thus, a court must refrain from determining ecclesiastical questions. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyt. Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969); First Presbyt. Church of Schenectady v United Presbyt. Church in U.S. of Amer., 62 NY2d 110 (1984).

The First Amendment prohibitions, however, do not prevent a court from adjudicating disputes involving religious entities if it may be done by applying "neutral principles of law" and without resolving or impinging upon underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyt. Church, supra ,393 U.S. at 449; First Presbyt. Church of Schenectady v United Presbyt. Church in U.S. of Amer., 62 NY2d 110, 119-120 (1984); Park Slope Jewish Ctr. v Congregation B'Nai Jacob, 90 NY2d 517 (1997); Siegler v. Union of Orthodox Rabbis of United States and Canada, 1 AD3d 180, 182 (1st Dept. 2003). Here, the Court can employ "neutral principles of law"to resolve the underlying dispute between the parties, namely, whether the 1998 Stipulation or the power of attorney vested defendant with authority over the temporalities and property of the church. This dispute has little to do with religious doctrine and revolves around one individual who pridefully refuses to subject himself to proper legal authority.

The Court finds that plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to partial summary judgment by showing that neither the 1998 agreement nor defendant's father power of attorney conferred on defendant any authority over the temporalities and property of the church. Indeed, Article 2, Section 5 of the Religious Corporation Law vests those powers on the trustees of the church. Specifically, Section 5 provides that: The trustees of every religious corporation shall have the custody and control of all the temporalities and property, real and personal, belonging to the corporation and of the revenues therefrom, and shall administer the same in accordance with the discipline, rules and usages of the corporation . . . for the support and maintenance of the corporation, . . . . [T]hey may also, in their discretion, delegate and grant to the trustee or custodian designated by them all or any portion of the powers, responsibilities and discretionary authority possessed by them with respect to the retention . . . of such property or any part [*5]thereof.

See also Article 7, Section 139 of the Religious Corporation Law ("The temporal affairs and property of an incorporated Baptist church shall be administered by its trustees in accordance with and subject to its lawfully adopted by-laws and to the general or special rules, regulations, or resolutions lawfully adopted by the church at its annual or other regular corporate meeting or at any duly called special corporate meeting."); Ward v. Jones, 154 Misc 2d 597 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1992). The primary purpose of the Religious Corporation Law is "to provide for an orderly method for the administration of the property and temporalities dedicated to the use of religious groups and to preserve them from exploitation by those who might divert them from the true beneficiaries of the trust." Morris v. Scribner, 69 NY2d 418, 423 (1987).

Baptist churches are different from other churches, however, in that they are congregational in nature and governed by the will of its membership. Ward v. Jones, supra , 154 Misc 2d at 602. Indeed, the general provisions of the Religious Corporations Law contained in Sections 25 and 26, which provide that meetings and basic governance of a church are governed by the rules, discipline and practices of its denomination, do not apply to Baptist churches. Id.; Religious Corporations Law § 27. "This exclusion makes clear that the governance of a Baptist church is solely in the hands of the membership. (cf., Walker Mem. Baptist Church v Saunders, 285 NY 462, 467-468. (1941))." Id. Thus, "[t]rustees have limited authority and conduct the financial affairs of the church subject to the will of its members. (Religious Corporations Law § 139.)" Id.

Here, since defendant was not elected to the Board of Trustees, he had no authority over the temporal affairs and property of the church, including amending the certificate of incorporation, holding himself out to be an officer of the Church to third parties (including the New York City Department of Finance and the Building Department), opening and redirecting church mail, having possession of church property, or creating a "Legal/Counseling Department" in the church and appointing himself its "head."[FN2]

Defendant's assertions to the contrary, neither the April 5, 1998 Stipulation, the power of attorney signed by the Rev. Joseph, nor the May 17, 2000 Order conferred on defendant the authority to act in behalf of the Church or hold himself out to be the Church's Legal or Senior Counselor. At most, the April 5 Stipulation conditionally granted defendant the position of Sunday School teacher provided, however, that he went through a "process of reintegration for [*6]one year in the church [and] participate in a course made to qualify Sunday school teachers."[FN3] The May 17, 2001 Order merely enjoined the Board of Trustees from interfering with this right. However, as the entity with authority over spiritual matters, the congregation, including communicants, led by its Pastor, remained the last word on whether defendant ultimately qualifies to be a Sunday school teacher. Metropolitan Baptist Church v Braxton, 137 NYS2d 294 (Sup. Ct. NY Co 1954), aff'd 285 App. Div 1044 (1st Dept. 1955). Moreover, inasmuch as "the governance of a Baptist church is solely in the hands of the membership," once the congregation voted to adopt the Board of Trustees' recommendation to suspend defendant's membership on September 11, 2005 (see Plaintiff's Exhibit C), the April 5, 1998 Stipulation became void.

Last, defendant is subject to the powers of the Board of Trustees notwithstanding his father's power of attorney. The Rev. Joseph could not confer on his son powers which the Religious Corporation Law placed within the ambit of the Board of Trustees or the congregation. It is axiomatic that one may only confer to another powers that he possesses in the first place. Cymbol v. Cymbol, 122 AD2d 771 (2d Dept. 1986); see generally GOL Section 5-1501. Furthermore, although a single officer of the church may under certain circumstances bind the church if acting under constructive or implied authority, see e.g., Butler v. Sacred Heart of Jesus English Rite Catholic Church, 178 Misc 2d 851 (Civil Ct, Kings Co. 1998) and cases cited therein, such was not the case here. It is disingenuous for defendant to claim that he had constructive or implied authority to, inter alia, amend the Certificate of Incorporation, while at the same time claiming that his authority stems from the April 5, 1998 Stipulation which expressly limited his role in the church to the possibility of achieving the position of Sunday School teacher.

To be sure, the 1998 Stipulation was the result of an action commenced by plaintiff to prevent defendant from usurping power vested on the Board of Trustees or the congregation. Since at least 1998, plaintiff's position with respect to defendant has been very clear: you do not have any authority to manage the temporalities of the church. Defendant, however, simply will not accept that fact.[FN4] [*7]

Although defendant is correct that the Board of Trustees by itself has no authority to suspend his membership, defendant ignores the fact that he was suspended by the majority of church members at a duly constituted "General Assembly". A congregational decision as to whether or not defendant's membership is in good standing is binding on the courts inasmuch as examining the standards of membership would require this Court's incursion into constitutionally protected ecclesiastical matters, including biblical standards and requirements of church membership. Rodyk v.Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church of St. Volodimir, 31 AD2d 659 ( 2d Dept. 1968), aff'd 29 NY2d 898 (1972). In Christian orthodoxy, the church (literally "those called out") is an assembly or gathering of "the elect." That is, those the Lord calls out of the world, inter alia, away from sin and into a state of grace. Clearly, the courts are ill equipped, indeed constitutionally proscribed, from examining membership criteria so deeply imbedded in religious principles and doctrine. In any event, whether defendant was properly suspended is irrelevant to the disposition of this matter.

Inasmuch as the Court has ruled that defendant lacks any authority to act in behalf of the plaintiff church and that the congregation's decision to suspend defendant's membership is binding on the courts, that portion of the motion which seeks to enjoin defendant from, inter alia, disturbing or in any way interfering with church worship services (third cause of action) is hereby granted. Cf. Malankara Archdiocese of Syrian Orthodox Church in North America v. Thomas, 33 AD3d 887 (2nd Dept. 2006)(plaintiff property granted summary judgment in action to enjoin defendants from entering of and using church inasmuch as resolution of dispute based on neutral principles of law).

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ADJUDGED and DECLARED that defendant holds no management authority in the Church by virtue of the 1998 agreement, the May 17, 2000 Order or the power of attorney signed by the Rev. Joseph (first cause of action); and it is further [*8]

ADJUDGED and DECLARED that the Amended Certificate of Incorporation, filed 2003, is null and void (second cause of action); and it is further

ADJUDGED that defendant is permanently enjoined from obstructing the Board of trustees from managing the temporal affairs of the Church, including representing such authority to third parties; making corporate filings; and opening, redirecting or confiscating plaintiff's mail(third cause of action); and it is further

ADJUDGED and ORDERED that plaintiff return all church property in its possession, including the seal, title and deed to the church property; and it is further

ADJUDGED that defendant is enjoined from disturbing the church worship services and comporting himself in such services as if he has any authority at all, including to manage the affairs of the church.

This constitutes the Decision, Judgment and order of the Court.

December15, 2006ENTER

___________________________

Rolando T. Acosta, J.S.C. Footnotes

Footnote 1:This decision was edited for publication.

Footnote 2:.Notwithstanding defendant's self designation, he is not admitted to practice law in New York nor is there any evidence in the record that he is admitted in any jurisdiction or trained to performed the duties of "head" of the "Legal/Counseling Department he improperly created. Furthermore, contrary to defendant's assertions, it appears that he is holding himself out be an attorney. See, e.g., September 2, 2005, letter from defendant to Mr. Ibo Balton, Director of Manhattan Planning, Plaintiff's Exhibit E; Defendant's Exhibits "Enclosures" 2, 5-8 & 11.

Footnote 3:Defendant's arguments to the contrary, plaintiff's alleged violation of the 1998 agreement is irrelevant inasmuch as that agreement only obligated plaintiff to consider defendant as a Sunday school teacher as long as defendant went through a process of reintegration for one year and participated in a course made to qualify him. Even if such agreement were relevant, this Court would be concerned with its enforcement since it is replete with terms invoking religious meaning. For instance, the idea of "reintegration" is premised on either ex-communication or when someone has "fallen away from the faith." The reintegration process is grounded on biblical principles of reconciliation. For this Court to decide whether defendant's rights pursuant to this stipulation have been violated would necessarily involve improper incursion into religious principles and doctrine.

Footnote 4:Although CPLR 3212(a) provides that a "party may move for summary judgment in any action, after issue has been joined," and "there is strict adherence to that requirement," City of Rochester v. Chiarella, 65 NY2d 92, 101 (1985), in this Court's opinion, the prohibition is aimed at "not entertain[ing] a motion for summary judgment prior to joinder of issue." Pitts v. City of Buffalo, 298 AD2d 1003 (4th Dept. 2002). As the Appellate Division, Fourth Department noted in Miller v. National Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 92 AD2d 723, 724 (4th Dept. 1983), "[t]he requirement that issue be joined before a motion for summary judgment is granted is intended to show the court precisely what the plaintiff's claims and defendant's position as to them, and his defenses, are.'" Citing Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3212:11, p. 431.

Here, although plaintiff moved for summary relief before joinder of issue, defendant answered the complaint prior to opposing the motion. Inasmuch as issue has been joined, the Court treated plaintiff's motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212(a). Moreover, the Court made it clear to the parties on September 7, without objection, that the Court would treat the motion as one for summary judgment. The decision to do so does not run afoul of St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. York Claims Service, Inc., 308 AD2d 347 (1st Dept. 2003), where the IAS court was found to have improperly granted plaintiff the ultimate relief it sought under the guise of a provisional remedy although issue had not been joined.