Doe v Madison Med.--Private Practice Group of NY, L.L.P.
Annotate this CaseDecided on July 13, 2006
Supreme Court, Bronx County
Jane Doe, a Fictitious Name Used to Protect the Privacy of the Plaintiff, Plaintiff,
against
Madison Medical—The Private Practice Group of New York, L.L.P., et al, Defendants.
25197/00
Alexander W. Hunter, J.
Upon the foregoing papers, defendant's motion for an order pursuant to C.P.L.R. 4404(a), setting aside the jury's verdict against defendant and granting defendant judgment as a matter of law, is denied. Defendant's further motion for an order setting aside the jury's liability verdict as being against the weight of the evidence and in the interest of justice, is also denied. Defendant's motion to set aside the jury's damages award for both past and future pain and suffering as being excessive and granting a new trial on damages, is denied. Defendant's further motion for an order reducing the jury's award of damages, is granted. The cross-motion by plaintiff for an order setting aside the jury's comparative fault finding is denied.
The cause of action involved injuries sustained by plaintiff who contracted HIV as a [*2]result of being stuck by a needle at the offices of Madison Medical. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2.5 million for past pain and suffering and $5.5 million for future pain and suffering over a period of 30 years. The jury assigned 50% of fault to defendant Madison Medical and 50% of fault to plaintiff. Defendant now moves to set aside the jury's verdict and plaintiff moves to set aside the jury's finding of comparative negligence.
The parties refer to the specific testimony of the different witnesses at the trial and annex the relevant transcripts to their respective motions. However, in this decision, this court will not specifically address all of the testimony that the parties cited to.
First, defendant argues that the testimony of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Arnold Lentnek should have been stricken or that he should have been precluded from testifying because his opinions are "fatally flawed, unreliable, speculative and cannot as a matter of law establish causation." (Plaintiff's motion, p. 14). Defendant contends, inter alia, that because Dr. Lentnek failed to conduct a thorough and complete analysis of all of the risk factors that could have caused plaintiff to contract HIV and because there were no facts in evidence which Dr. Lentnek could have relied upon in reaching his opinions regarding causation, his opinions were scientifically unreliable and could not serve as a basis for a finding of liability against defendant. Defendant cites to different portions of Dr. Lentnek's testimony in support of its argument and then cites to the testimony of its expert, Dr. William McCormack. Defendant concludes that the jury's verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence and it should be set aside.
Plaintiff opposes defendant's motion with respect to Dr. Lentnek's testimony and states that Dr. Lentnek's opinion was based on extensive documentation in evidence, including plaintiff's medical records dating back to 1972, the deposition testimony, and HIV studies as well as relevant experience consisting of more than 24 years in treating HIV patients.
Defendant's motion to set aside the jury's verdict based upon the testimony of Dr. Lentnek, is denied. As plaintiff contends in its opposition, citing to Hoffman v. Toys R'Us, 272 AD2d 296 (2nd Dept. 2000), "To establish the reliability of an expert's opinion, the party offering the opinion must demonstrate that the expert possesses the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge, or experience to render the opinion." Id. Plaintiff sufficiently established the reliability of Dr. Lentnek's opinion. Moreover, courts have held that, "Where conflicting expert testimony is presented, a jury is entitled to accept one expert's opinion and reject that of another." (Citations omitted). Speciale v. Achari, 29 AD2d 674 (2nd Dept. 2006). That the jury accepted Dr. Lentnek's opinion over that of defendant's expert witnesses should not be disturbed by this court. Accordingly, defendant's motion to set aside the jury's verdict on that ground is denied.
Defendant next contends that the jury's verdict should be set aside because plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the needle stick incidents of December 11, 1998 and/or the February 1, 1999 caused plaintiff to become HIV infected. Defendant argues that there were several likely causes of plaintiff's HIV infection for which defendant was not [*3]responsible and that there was no proof that the needles which stuck the plaintiff were contaminated with the HIV virus. Accordingly, defendant contends that the jury's verdict should be set aside. Plaintiff opposes the motion and argues that a plaintiff is not required to exclude every other possible cause, but need only offer evidence from which proximate cause may be reasonably inferred. See, Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544 (1998).
A trial court can set aside the jury's verdict and order a new trial "only if there was no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational men to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented.' The test...is not whether the jury erred in weighing the evidence, but whether any viable evidence existed to support the verdict." (citations omitted). Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 86 NY2d 744 (1995). This court finds that there was a valid line of reasoning that led to the conclusion reached by the jury. Moreover, it is well established that the court's discretionary power pursuant to C.P.L.R. §4404, "must be exercised with caution since, in the absence of an indication that substantial justice has not been done, a litigant is entitled to the benefit of a favorable verdict." Brown v. Taylor, 221 AD2d 208 (1st Dept. 1995). Accordingly, defendant's motion to set aside the jury's verdict is denied.
Defendant's further contention that this court's charge to the jury with respect to proximate cause was "incomplete," and prejudiced the defendant, is without merit. This court charged the proximate cause charge direct from the Pattern Jury Instructions (PJI). That this court did not charge the jury with the "expanded" proximate cause charge proposed by defendant does not make the charge incomplete or erroneous in any manner and this court was not required to adopt the charge proposed by the defendant.
Moreover, defendant's contention that this court allowed impermissible post-accident evidence to be introduced (the March 12, 1999 and March 15, 1999 incidents) is likewise without merit. This court instructed the jury that evidence of these two incidents could not have cause the plaintiff to contract HIV and they were only admitted for a limited purpose. The jury was instructed that it could consider the evidence regarding those two incidents with respect to the issue of whether or not defendant knew or should have known that its employees were not properly disposing of medical waste.
Defendant's further contention that it was improper for this court to give the jury a "missing needles" instruction and that, therefore, a new trial should be granted, is also without merit. Defendant admitted to having the needles in its response to plaintiff's Notice to Admit but then did not produce them at trial. Accordingly, the "missing needles" instruction was warranted.
Defendant also argues that the damages awards were excessive and deviated materially from what would constitute reasonable compensation. Defendant cites to the trial testimony of several witnesses and concludes that the "undisputed medical evidence introduced at trial was that plaintiff has had normal T-cell counts since 1999" and further that the experts concluded that [*4]plaintiff is a "long-term non-progressor." (Defendant's Motion, p. 63).
Defendant further cites to other analogous cases involving HIV transmission, wherein the damages awards for plaintiffs who, developed or with certainty would develop the AIDS virus, was considerably lower. (Doe v. State, 155 Misc 2d 286, modified in part, 189 AD2d 199 (4th Dept. 1993) - Court of Claims awarded $750,000 for past pain and suffering and $3.5 million for future pain and suffering; DiPaolo v. New York Blood Center, Index number 2751/91, Supreme Court, New York County, 1995 - jury awarded $450,000 for past pain and suffering for infant plaintiff who developed AIDS through a blood transfusion and $150,000 for future pain and suffering). Defendant argues that the award to plaintiff in this case, who will not develop AIDS, is excessive and should be set aside or drastically reduced. Since there are so few reported HIV/AIDS transmission verdicts and judgments, defendant lists cases which involved other types of sexually transmitted diseases. In those cases, the jury's awards ranged from $10,000 to $1,565,000. Defendant asserts that the total of $8 million awarded in this case deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.
Plaintiff opposes the motion and contends that the amount of damages to be awarded is primarily a question of fact for a jury. Plaintiff agrees that in evaluating whether a jury's verdict is legally excessive, one must look to awards approved in analogous cases. However, plaintiff asserts that no two cases are alike and a jury's award cannot be reduced to a simple mathematical formula. Moreover, plaintiff contends that when an award is found to be legally excessive, it is reduced to the highest amount that can be justified by the proof or "the upper limit of that range." (Plaintiff's Exhibit I, p. 36). Plaintiff further asserts that the aforementioned cases cited by defendant are eleven and thirteen years old and if inflation is taken into account, then plaintiff's award in this case, is low. Plaintiff did not cite to any analogous cases in support of her motion.
Courts have held that the amount of damages to be awarded for personal injuries is primarily a question of fact for the jury. Iazzetti v. City of New York, 216 AD2d 214 (1st Dept. 1995). In order to determine if an award is excessive, the standard that has been applied in the appellate courts and which has been applied at the trial court level as well is, "deviates materially from what would be reasonable." C.P.L.R. §5501( c). Thus, the amount of damages awarded by a jury may be set aside if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation. See, Donlon v. City of New York, 284 AD2d 13 (1st Dept. 2001). In the Donlon case, the First Department stated, "The method of review is to evaluate whether the appealed award deviated materially from comparable awards...More often, analogous cases will be useful as benchmarks." Id. at 15-16.
Although there is a dearth of reported HIV/AIDS transmission verdicts and judgments, the two cases that were cited by the defendant are useful as benchmarks. Taking into account the two analogous cases and reviewing the factual analysis in the case at bar, this court finds that the jury's award for past pain and suffering in the amount of $2.5 million is excessive and should be reduced to $1,750,000 and the jury's award for future pain and suffering in the amount of $5.5 million over 30 years is also excessive and should be reduced to $2,750,000. [*5]
Movant is directed to serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon all parties within thirty (30) days of the date of the entry of this order and file proof thereof with the clerk's office.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated July 13, 2006
J.S.C.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
