Stevens v Smith
Annotate this CaseDecided on May 8, 2006
Supreme Court, Livingston County
William Stevens, Richard Marr, Debra Cairns and Christopher Martin, Petitioners,
against
Joanne M. Smith, Stanley Smith and Kathleen Smith Drum, Respondents.
613-2004
Matthew A. Rosenbaum, J.
The above captioned bench trial having come before New York State Supreme Court by Petitioners against Respondents for a Declaratory Judgment declaring that Petitioners have rights to use of a dock on Conesus Lake; and, Respondents counterclaiming for judgment in their favor against Petitioner Marr for monetary damages for trespass and interference with Respondents' use and enjoyment of certain lands owned by Respondents; and, the proceeding having been tried by the Court without a jury; and due deliberation having been had on this proceeding; the Court finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
This case centers around dock rights for individuals who own property at Conesus Lake. The four Petitioners have brought this action for a Declaratory Judgment to determine their rights to use of a dock on Conesus Lake.
Conesus Lake is located in Livingston County and has had a long history of residential and recreational use. The history of ownership of these properties has an interesting background which merits discussion. The four Petitioners, or their parents, at one time rented property from the upland owner, one Helen Stoner, although Petitioners actually owned the homes on the property they rented. Sometime after the upland owner passed away, the properties were legally subdivided and each of the Petitioners purchased the lots where their homes stood. Respondents retained upland ownership, immediately adjacent to the lake by virtue of two separate deeds. The first deed recorded in the Livingston County Clerk's Office on December 7, 1982 was to Glenn A. Smith and Kathleen Smith, and conveyed the property upon which their cottage stood. The second deed, also to the Smiths, was recorded October 6, 2003 and conveyed a right of way, a driveway and a small portion of land situated on the lake itself. The second deed states that the properties owned by the Respondents and the properties owned by Petitioners (lots 2,3,45,6 and 7) had rights "to use the lake frontage for non-commercial, recreational purposes." Some of the Petitioners' deeds clearly state that the lake [*2]front property was "an area to be kept open for the benefit of lot owners 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7." The Smith property was subsequently conveyed to the Respondents in this matter. (Joanne Smith and Stanley Smith are children of Glenn A. Smith and Kathleen Smith, while Kathleen Smith n/k/a Kathleen Smith Drum retained a life estate.)
From the time of purchase of the lots in 1982 until 2003, and in some cases well before, Petitioners used seasonal docks extensively and without objection by Respondents. In fact, seasonal docks had been in use as far back as the 1950's by certain Petitioners without objection. Respondents used a separate dock. In 1995, the town of Conesus passed an ordinance which effectively restricted the use of docks on Consesus Lake. Specifically, lake front properties were restricted by limiting docks to one per fifty feet of frontage. The lake frontage for the "area to be kept open" has a width of forty five feet. Therefor, the lake front property was restricted to one dock. Nevertheless, by admission of all parties, the dock law was not followed by any of the parties in this suit nor was it enforced by the town.
In 2003, however, Respondents sought to restrict any dock use by Petitioners. Respondents had their attorney write a letter to the town complaining of a violation of the ordinance which effectively barred Petitioners from using any temporary dock. Respondents cited the dock law as reason to restrict any dock use by Petitioners and stated Respondents only had exclusive rights to use the dock as the upland owner. The end result was this declaratory judgement action, originally brought before the Honorable Ronald Ciccoria, Livingston County Court Judge.
Judge Ciccoria denied motions for summary judgement, citing issues of fact to be determined at a declaratory judgment trial. In denying Respondents' motion for summary judgement, Judge Ciccoria stated that although the right to build a dock in navigable waters is an appurtenance of title vested in the upland owner, "in this case, however, that principle of law does not end the inquiry. Petitioners and Respondents trace their chain of title to a common upland owner. Since that common transferor could manifestly have either reserved or transferred out any or all of her littoral rights, the issue which must be resolved in this litigation is whether, and to what extent she did so." (Citations omitted). Petitioners and Respondents thereafter appeared before this court.
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE
Any facts decided or law handed down by the previous judge binds this court under the doctrine of the law of the case. Post v. Post, 141 AD2d 518 at 519 (2nd Dept., 1988). The question that is left to the court, is whether Petitioners have dock rights similar to those of Respondents. It is clear that Respondents have title to the property immediately adjacent to the shoreline of Conesus Lake; however, evidence has been admitted which clearly shows that at or about the time the Stoner property was subdivided, the owners of the homes located behind Respondents' property, but also on the same original Stoner property, were conveyed rights which included non-commercial, recreational use of the lake frontage. It is abundantly clear from the testimony of each of the Petitioners that they believed they had dock rights, enforced the use of those rights for the better part of two decades without interruption, and had some legal recording which allowed for use of the lake frontage.
Normally, when language in a grant or deed is found to be "certain and unambiguous...it alone may be considered in determining the true intent of the parties to the grant..." Durham v. [*3]Ingrassia, 105 Misc 2d 191 at 200 (Nassau Co.,1980); Senate Realty Corp. v. Lattingtown Harbor Devel. Co., 198 NYS2d 882 (Nassau Co.,1960). However, where the language is ambiguous or "is susceptible to more than one interpretation the Court will look at the surrounding circumstances existing when the contract was entered into, the situation of the parties and the subject matter of the instrument." See Durham, Supra; Wilson v. Ford, 209 NY 186 at 196 (1913). Here, as noted by Judge Ciccoria, there is no true clarity as to intentions and writings, the facts need to be determined at trial. This court sees a substantial amount of testimony amplifying the grant to use the lake frontage in a non-commercial recreational manner.
Respondents argue that the enforcement of Conesus Lake's dock law prohibits more than one dock to be placed on the frontage. They are correct. This court does not see any reason to disturb Conseus Lake's dock ordinance. (Town of Conesus, Local Law No. 1 of 1995). It is clear to the court that the dock ordinance was passed to promote safety and diminish visual pollution on an important and vital location in Livingston County. Nevertheless, Respondents' never took it upon themselves until 2003 to enforce the dock law and assert their claim as the upland owner of the Stoner property. It is clear that some event occurred in and around 2003 which prompted Respondents to take action, but that event was never firmly defined at trial, although Respondents certainly had some disagreements with Petitioners which led to enforcement of the dock law and respondents promoting themselves as the upland owner with sole dock rights.
In promoting themselves as the upland owner, Respondents cited the case of Allen v. Potter, 64 Misc 2d 938 (Yates Co. 1970), wherein the court held the Plaintiff was not a riparian owner and did not have an easement to place a cat walk and boat hoist in Canandaigua Lake. Id. at 940. The court further held, as it did in it's previous case of Potter v. Allen (Sup. Ct., Yates County, May 21, 1969), that "a clearly stated written agreement may not be varied by extrinsic evidence" (see also, Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Turner Constr. Co., 2 NY2d 456, 459-460 (1957); Loch Sheldrake Assoc. v. Evans, 306 NY 297, 304-305 (1954)) as it related to Defendant's deed and rights as a riparian owner. Id. At 939. Justice Richard Rosenbaum's decision made clear that there were no dock rights conveyed, nor were there any rights as to non-commercial recreational use of the lake frontage. There was merely an easement to use a driveway. Justice Rosenbaum's cases are clearly distinguishable from the one currently at bar.
In the case before the court, there is ample evidence that Petitioners were granted rights to use the lake frontage in an uninterrupted manner for at least twenty years and continued to utilize their dock rights in an uninterrupted manner for nearly a decade after Livingston County's dock law was amended. As noted in Durham and Wilson, supra , it is of great importance that the court now look at any surrounding circumstances and evidence or rights of the owners. Clearly there was an understanding that Petitioners had rights to place their docks in the lake. There is written evidence granting rights to use the lake frontage for the "area to be kept open." It is also clear to the court that Respondents lived in harmony for many years with Petitioners before some disagreement occurred, prompting Respondents to exercise any littoral rights they had.
The court finds that Petitioners and Respondents have equal rights to the use of a dock in the "area to be kept open." As the dock law is not to be disturbed, all parties will need to find a way to equally share the one dock.
Finally, Respondents claim that Petitioner Marr placed seasonal docks on the frontage of the lake, effectively blocking Respondents' view. The court is disturbed that the seasonal dock and boat [*4]hoist were placed squarely in front of the steps to Respondents' deck. Petitioner Marr is directed to move the obstruction no later than May 24, 2006. In the event the docks are not removed, the court finds that Petitioner Marr shall pay a fine in the amount of $50.00 per day.
This constitutes the decision of the court .
Dated the 8th day of May, 2006.
Hon. Matthew A. Rosenbaum, J.S.C.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
