People v Price

[*1] People v Price 2006 NY Slip Op 51283(U) [12 Misc 3d 1178(A)] Decided on May 10, 2006 Supreme Court, Queens County Flaherty, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 10, 2006
Supreme Court, Queens County

The People of the State of New York

against

Steven Price, Defendant.



1421-98

Timothy J. Flaherty, J.

Defendant's motion for resentence is denied for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum.

Defendant moves for resentence, pursuant to Section 23 of

Chapter 738 of the Laws of 2004, for the purpose of reducing the

term originally imposed upon him on January 17, 2001, upon his

conviction by a jury of the crime of Criminal Possession of a

Controlled Substance in the First Degree for which this Court

sentenced him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from 20

years to life. Defendant's judgment of conviction has been

reviewed and affirmed by the Appellate Division [People v. Price,

14 AD3rd 718 (2nd Dept 2005)] and leave to appeal was denied by

the Court of Appeals [4 NY3rd 856 (2005)]. Defendant remains

incarcerated pursuant to the judgment.

On December 14, 2004 Governor Pataki signed legislation

enacting sweeping changes in the sentencing provisions that were

applicable to drug offenses such as that committed by the

defendant herein [Chapter 738 of the Laws of 2004]. Thereafter

the defendant, pro se, wrote a letter to this Court invoking the

new legislation and requesting that he be resentenced.

Subsequently, defendant retained new counsel who has adopted and

supplemented defendant's application.

Because the defendant was convicted of a Class A-1 drug

offense prior to the enactment of the aforementioned legislation,

he is eligible for re-sentence unless "substantial justice"

dictates otherwise. Excluding from consideration the evidence

set forth at trial that the defendant shot and killed a fourteen

year old boy named Ramon "Lightfoot" Garcia, this Court is

nevertheless convinced that the defendant is not entitled to the

relief sought herein.

The primary reason is the criminal record of the defendant,

prior to his incarceration on the case at bar. He was arrested

and indicted four times between November 1989 and January 1990.

On February 14, 1990 he pled guilty to Possession of a

Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree, Criminal Sale of a

Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, Attempted Criminal Sale

of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and Criminal

Mischief in the Second Degree. These four pleas were separately

taken to cover the four indictments and he was sentenced to

concurrent terms of imprisonment of from one and a third to four

years for each of the crimes.

Two years later, while on parole, defendant was arrested and

indicted on two separate occasions, first for First Degree [*2]

Robbery and then for another drug sale. On July 23, 1993 he pled

guilty to Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree and Criminal

Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree to cover the

respective indictments. He was sentenced to indeterminate

concurrent terms of imprisonment of from two and one half to five

years as a predicate felon.

With respect to the instant case the Court notes there was

evidence adduced at the instant trial which made it clear that

the defendant was in the business of distributing drugs in

Queens. Specifically, the record established that the defendant

was the head of a drug gang called "The Foundation". This fact

strongly buttresses the Court's conclusion that resentence is not

warranted.

The decision of this Court made on January 17, 2001 to

impose a sentence of twenty to life on the defendant was based

upon the proof adduced at trial concerning his leadership role

in drug trafficking coupled with his criminal background. These

same factors underlie this Court's conclusion that , applying

the language of the statute [Section 23 of Chapter 738 of the

Laws of 2004] that "substantial justice dictates that the [*3]

application should be denied." Defendant's motion for resentence

is therefore denied.

Order entered accordingly.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this

Memorandum and Order to the attorney for the defendant and to the

District Attorney.

DATED: May 10, 2006

Gloria D'Amico __________________________

Clerk of the Court Timothy J. Flaherty, J.S.C.

M E M O R A N D U M

D