Giarletta v Martinez
Annotate this CaseDecided on May 31, 2006
Supreme Court, Richmond County
Trudy A. Giarletta, Robert Castellanos, Ralph Giarletta, As Administrator of the Estate of Rudolph Micharoni, Sarah Micharoni and Luis R. Castellanos, Petitioner(s), Plaintiff(s),
against
William Martinez, Toby Hanna Corporation And Republic One d/b/a Toby Hanna Corporation, Respondent(s), Defendant(s).
Trudy A. Giarletta, Robert Castellanos, Ralph Giarletta, As Administrator of the Estate of Rudolph Micharoni, Sarah Micharoni and Luis R. Castellanos, Third-Party Plaintiff(s).
against
Swap Meet Carrier Corp., et al., Third-Party Defendant(s).
Trudy A. Giarletta, Robert Castellanos, Ralph Giarletta, As Administrator of the Estate of Rudolph Micharoni, Sarah Micharoni and Luis R. Castellanos, Plaintiffs,
against
Jagtrux, Inc. and Lynn D. Weaver, Defendants.
Trudy A. Giarletta, Robert Castellanos, Ralph Giarletta, As Administrator of the Estate of Rudolph Micharoni, Sarah Micharoni and Luis R. Castellanos, Plaintiffs,
against
IESI NY Corporation, et al., Defendants.
10817/00
Thomas P. Aliotta, J.
Defendants, Jagtrux, Inc. and Lynn D. Weaver, move for an Order granting summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 on the ground that no triable issue of fact exists with respect to the liability of Jagtrux, Inc. and Lynn D. Weaver. Plaintiffs, Trudy A. Giarletta, et al., oppose said motion and their arguments in opposition are adopted by defendants Siegfried Groeger s/h/a Groeger, Siegfried, William Martinez, Toby Hanna Corporation and Republic One Corporation. Plaintiff, on the counterclaim, Trudy Giarletta, likewise opposes defendants' motion and adopts the arguments and factual representations set forth in the affirmation in opposition of plaintiffs.
This litigation is the result of a four-vehicle chain reaction accident which occurred on the westbound Staten Island Expressway on August 31, 1999. In support of their motion, defendants produce the deposition testimony of plaintiff Trudy A. Giarletta and plaintiff Rudolph Micharoni. Plaintiff Giarletta testified that at the time of the accident, Rudolph Micharoni was a front-seat passenger in a vehicle registered to Louis R. Castellanos and operated by plaintiff Trudy Giarletta. Ms. Giarletta testified that she was fully stopped in a traffic jam in the middle lane of the expressway and that she was directly behind a flatbed truck which was likewise stopped due to construction on the roadway. She testified that she was stopped for a full 60 seconds. She heard a loud noise, looked in her rear-view mirror and saw the stopped truck owned by defendant Jagtrux, Inc. and operated by Lynn D. Weaver. Approximately 30 seconds later, the Weaver vehicle came into contact with the rear of her vehicle upon which impact the Giarletta vehicle made contact with the flatbed truck stopped in front of it. Defendants Jagtrux, Inc. and Lynn D. Weaver claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because evidence exists that their vehicle was lawfully stopped behind the vehicle operated by the injured plaintiff before it was struck from behind by another vehicle. In this multiple-vehicle collision, they argue, the rear-most vehicle is clearly responsible.
By their combined opposition, the opposing parties argue that Ms. Giarletta testified that the Jagtrux vehicle was "stopped" based upon a rear-view mirror glance which lasted for only a "split second". They submit that Ms. Giarletta's split second glance behind her is not proof that the Jagtrux vehicle was at a complete stop or had not caused the accident. They claim that summary judgment is premature because discovery is still proceeding in the case and Lynn D. Weaver has never been deposed. Plaintiff on the counterclaim, Trudy A. Giarletta, further argues that Jagtrux, Inc. and Lynn D. Weaver failed to set forth any affirmative evidence from their clients, either by affidavit or deposition transcript, indicating that they were stopped prior to the impact of plaintiff's vehicle. [*2]
In order to obtain summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law (CPLR 3212). Summary judgment is considered a drastic remedy and should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a material and triable issue of fact (Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v Ceppos, 46NY2d223; Bank of New York v Granat, 197AD2d653). The movant must make out a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment based upon submission of sufficient evidence (Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68NY2d320).
The burden then shifts to the opposing party, who must "...produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of material questions of fact on which he rests his claim" (Zuckerman v The City of New York, 49NY2d557, 562). Mere conclusory statements, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to defeat the motion (Rodriguez v New York City Housing Authority, 87NY2d87; Ayotte v Gervasio, 81NY2d1062). The requirement that evidence in opposition to a summary judgment motion must be in competent and admissible form protects the meritorious motion from "frivolous defenses" (Sprung v Jaffe, 3NY2d539; Fender v Prescott, 101AD2d418).
In the instant case, Vehicle and Traffic Law §1129(a) provides:
"(a) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway."
This statute imposes a duty upon drivers to maintain a safe distance from the car ahead of them and the failure to do so, without adequate explanation or some defense of sudden or unavoidable
circumstances, is negligence as a matter of law (Silberman v Surrey Cadillac Limousine Service, Inc., 109AD2d833[2nd Dept.]).
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability with respect to the operator of the rear-most vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision (see, Purcell v Axelsen, 286AD2d379; Colonna v. Suarez, 278AD2d355).
Here, Jagtrux, Inc. and Lynn D. Weaver have succeeded in presenting a prima facie case that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as there is no showing of their negligence herein. Opposing parties submit no compelling evidence sufficient to create an issue of fact, nor have they provided any alternative explanation or excuses for the occurrence of the accident.
Accordingly, Jagtrux, Inc. and Lynn D. Weaver's motion for summary judgment is granted in full.
Case dismissed with respect to these defendants. [*3]
This case is set down for a settlement conference on June 20, 2006 at 12 P.M. in Courtroom 312, at the Courthouse, 18 Richmond Terrace, Staten Island, New York 10301.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Law Clerk to notify both sides of this Decision/Order.
DATED: MAY 31, 2006/s/
THOMAS P. ALIOTTA
J.S.C.
ASN by KD/pt on 5/31/06
ROBIN, HARRIS, KING, YUHAS, FODERA & RICHMAN\
ATT: STEVEN G. KOKULAK, ESQ.
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HODGSON RUSS, LLP
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MONTFORT, HEALY, MCGUIRE & SALLEY
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