People v Williams
Annotate this CaseDecided on May 23, 2006
Criminal Court, Kings County
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
against
Kerryn Williams, Defendant.
2006N019139
Eileen N. Nadelson, J.
This domestic violence action was brought against defendant husband on behalf of complaining witness wife. The couple have two children together, a daughter, 15 years old, and a son, age eleven.
The initial charges against Defendant included:
PL 120.00(1)Assault, Third Degree
PL 110/120.00(1) Attempted Assault, Third Degree
PL 120.15 Menacing, Third Degree
PL 240.26(1) Harassment, Second Degree
PL 260.10(1) Endangering the Welfare of a Child.
The original complaint was superseded and subsequently amended shortly before trial, at which point the charge of assault (PL 120.00(1) was dropped and the charge of Endangering the Welfare of a Child was reduced to PL110/260.10(1) Attempted Endangering.
The complaining witness alleges that on two occasions in March, 2006, Defendant assaulted her and caused her physical injury in the presence of one or both of their children. Defendant denies all charges.
Defendant was held on bail and, at the time of trial, had been incarcerated for 45 days. Since all A misdemeanor charges were dropped, the only remaining charges were B misdemeanors, which carry a maximum sentence of 90 days upon conviction.
A bench trial was held on May 3, 2006. The People presented two witnesses, the complainant wife and one of the arresting officers. Defendant testified on his own behalf. At the conclusion of People's case, Defense made a motion to dismiss for failure of the prosecution to make its prima facie basis for the charges. The court reserved its decision on this motion. After hearing all of the testimony and reviewing the documents offered in evidence, the court finds on each of the charges, in seriatem:
PL 110/120.00(1) Attempted Assault, Third Degree is first dissected for clarification. PL [*2]110 states:
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.
PL 120.00(1) states:
A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when:
1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; ...
A conviction on the charge of attempted assault requires an intent to commit the assault or physical injury to another and to engage in such conduct that would (if the crime were completed) have resulted in the injury intended. Although the charge for assault had been dropped, both sides spent considerable time on the alleged injury to Defendant's wife, presumably, on the part of the prosecution, to show that an actual injury is the res ipsa loquitor of the attempt, and on the part of defense to show that the injury was not intended or merely "reflexive" (a reflex action on the part of Defendant based upon his allegations that the complaining witness was lunging at him.
Even assuming, arguendo, that an injury occurred, which need not be shown in an attempt charge, the People still carry the burden of proving that Defendant's objective or purpose was to cause the injury. See, PL 15.05(1); See, also, People v. Vukel, 178 Misc 2d 218 (Sup.Ct., Bronx 1998), 682 NYS2d 331.
Essential to a conviction of a violation of PL 120.00(1) is the mens rea, not only the actus reus. The court in Vukel refers to the maxim in the hoary case of Stokes v. People, 53 NY 164 (1873), actus non [facit] reum [nisi]mens [sit rea] ("an act does not make [the doer of it] guilty, unless the mind be guilty." People v. Vukel, 178 Misc 2d 218, 223 (1998), (trans. from Black's Law Dictionary 36 [6th ed 1990]. Neither the testimony of the complaining witness nor that of the police officer satisfied that burden. Although, the wife's rendition reported a violent tussle with Defendant including his holding her down and allegedly punching her eye and her pulling his dreadlocks forcefully, it failed to demonstrate the requisite element of intent to do harm on the part of Defendant. Her testimony did not supply sufficient facts and circumstances to show Defendant's mental state. As for the testimony of the officer, her only view of the Defendant and complaining witness occurred outside the premises after the altercation and, therefore, offered no revelation of Defendant's mental state at the time of the occurrence. Accordingly, the court concluded that the People failed to prove the elements of this charge.
PL 120.15 Menacing, Third Degree occurs when one "intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury." Similar to assault, a conscious objective or purpose to commit the crime is required in order to procure a guilty conviction. According to the wife's testimony, after being let go by Defendant [*3]who allegedly held her down and struck her, she pulled his hair and began throwing items at him. While this court cannot predict an individual's reaction to fear of physical harm, it does opine that the wife's behavior of retaliation, rather than the usual "cut and run" deportment, does not exhibit a fear of actual harm. In fact, Defendant later testified that it was he who fled from the scene while his wife was tossing items at him. In view of the conflicting testimony, the court cannot discern beyond a reasonable doubt the actual intent by Defendant to place fear or its presence in the wife. See, People v. Peterkin, 245 AD2d 1050 (4 Dept. 1997), app. denied, 91 NY2d 1011, 667 NYS2d 559.
PL 240.26(1) Harassment, Second Degree is another charge requiring mens rea. The guideline is not whether a person has been harassed, annoyed or alarmed, or even feels that he or she is being harassed, annoyed or alarmed, but whether the actor intended to harass, annoy or alarm. See, People v. Concannon, 28 NY2d 854 (1971). Although Concannon precedes the division and new designation, which was added in 1992 to the harassment offense, its precepts are still good law and are generally applied to current cases. For the same reasons above, based upon the testimony, the People failed to carry their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to commit the offense of harassment.
PL 110/260.10(1) Attempted Endangering Welfare of Child, which refers to PL 260.10(1), as follows:
A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when:
1. He knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old ...
The term, knowingly, has its own definition as noted in PL 15.05, as follows:
2. Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists.
The progeny of cases on this offense consistently require "that a person knowingly act ... in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child.'" People v. Cenat, 176 Misc 2d 39 (Crim.Ct, Kings 1997), 671 NYS2d 578, citing People v. Doe, 137 Misc 2d 582 (Sup. Ct, NY 1987).
While the likelihood of harm may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the child, the degree of culpability required to convict a Defendant is actual knowledge. See, People v. Simmons, 221 AD2d 994 (4 Dept 1995), 635 NYS2d 373, app. denied, 88 NY2d 885.
In the instant case, Defendant is charged with attempting to endanger the welfare of a child. All attempt charges are applied pursuant to PL 110.00, which requires an intent to commit [*4]a crime and conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.
There is little difference between an attempt to endanger and the actual endangering since, in either event, the statute does not require that an injury be effected upon the child. See, People v. Vega, 185 Misc 2d 73 (Crim.Ct, Bronx 2000), 712 NYS2d 283 . The question is whether Defendant, being fully aware of his conduct, was attempting to create a likelihood of physical, mental or moral injury to his child. The court finds that the testimony and evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to answer that question affirmatively beyond a reasonable doubt.
In view of the court's decision below, Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to present a prima facie case to prove the charges, is moot.
Based upon the findings above, the court holds, as follows:
As to PL 110/120.00(1), Attempted assault, third degree Defendant not guilty;
As to PL 120.15, Menacing, third degree Defendant not guilty;
As to PL 240.26(1), Harassment, second degree Defendant not guilty;
As to PL 110/260.10(1), Attempted Endangering welfare of child Defendant not guilty.
Dated: May 23, 2006________________________________
Eileen N. Nadelson, J.C.C.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
