Matter of Stiehler

[*1] Matter of Stiehler 2006 NY Slip Op 50566(U) [11 Misc 3d 1075(A)] Decided on April 4, 2006 Surrogate's Court, Richmond County Fusco, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected in part through April 25, 2006; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on April 4, 2006
Surrogate's Court, Richmond County

In the Matter of the Estate of CATHERINE STIEHLER, Deceased.



A-20/04



Attorney for Petitioner: Lainie Fastman, Esq., of Hall 7 Hall LLP at 718-447-1962

Attorney for Respondent: Aaron D. Frishberg, Esq., at 212-740-4544

Attorney for Public Administrator of Richmond County, Arthur Decker, Esq. at 718-979-4300

John A. Fusco, J.

In this contested administration proceeding, the petitioner seeks an Order holding that John Stiehler, who post-deceased his wife, was instrumental in having caused her death, and that as a wrongdoer, he cannot profit from his wrongful act, and therefore, should not share in the estate (Riggs v Palmer, 115 NY 506). John Stiehler's cousin and distributee of his estate, Walter Remiszewski, opposes this petition.

On December 10, 2003, the police found the body of Catherine Stiehler after being summoned to the home by her husband, John Stiehler. He was arrested in his home, where police found a gun in his pocket after he confessed to shooting his wife in the head and killing her. John Stiehler was indicted for Murder in the Second Degree, and was awaiting arraignment when he died on January 4, 2004, after being hospitalized for medical reasons.

Jean Artesi, as Limited Administratrix of her sister's estate, filed a petition in which she asked the Court to issue an order and judgment holding that, a) John Stiehler brought about the death of his wife; b) the value of John Stiehler's interest in the marital home and any other assets held by them as Tenants by the Entirety is limited to the commuted value of his life estate in one-half of the premises on the date of decedent's death; c) John Stiehler's interest in any other jointly held property is limited to a one-half interest; and d) having brought about the death of his wife, John Stiehler is not a "distributee" of decedent, entitled to share in her estate pursuant to EPTL 4-1.1.

John Stiehler's distributee, in his answer, made general denials and raises an affirmative defense that John Stiehler, by virtue of a mental disease or defect, may not have been criminally culpable and would therefore be able to share in his wife's estate. In the course of discovery, respondent requested the medical records of the decedent, Catherine Stiehler, for the purpose of proving, by his expert psychiatrist, that John Stiehler was not guilty of wrongdoing, as he suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the shooting, "triggered" by his wife's poor health. Upon petitioner's motion for a protective order, however, the Court held in a decision and order dated September 28, 2005, that respondent was precluded from presenting his expert testimony on the grounds that the "trigger" theory of defense had not gained general acceptance, and must therefore be excluded by the Court in the exercise of its gatekeeper function. Petitioner now moves, once again, for summary judgment to strike and dismiss respondent's answer.

Respondent argues, in part, that because there has been no adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that John Stiehler intentionally murdered the decedent, there is insufficient evidence to establish that fact. Indeed, he contends that it will be for this court to [*2]weigh the evidence and determine, at trial, whether John Stiehler was a man so overcome with debilitating mental illness that his illness caused him to end his wife's life, or whether he was a murderer.

To defeat the summary judgment motion, respondent once again offers an affidavit from Stephen S. Teich, MD, a forensic psychiatrist, who this time contends that he should be given an opportunity at trial to establish by a "psychiatric autopsy" that John Stieher's psychiatric condition was causal in his killing his wife and that he lacked capacity to be held criminally responsible for this act.

Petitioner characterizes Dr. Teich's affidavit as nothing more than speculation and unsubstantiated allegations which do not rise to the level of triable issues of fact, sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Indeed, petitioner contends that John Stiehler's hospitalization at Bayley Seton Hospital Mental Health Unit two years before killing his wife, absent intervening examination and diagnosis, is too far removed from that date to have any probative value with regard to his mental state on December 8, 2003. In fact, there is no other hospitalization examination or treatment of John Stiehler, psychiatric or otherwise, save the final one after his wife's death.

CPLR 3212(b) provides that a motion for summary judgment is to be granted if "upon all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court, as a matter of law in directing the judgment in favor of any party... The motion shall be denied if any party shall show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact."

Although Respondent suggests that certain defenses to the crime of murder may have been proffered had there been a criminal trial, said trial did not take place due to the death of John Stiehler.

The standard here is whether Respondent has raised a triable issue of fact. Based upon all of the papers heretofore submitted herein, the Court can only conclude that he has not. Essentially, nothing more than conclusory allegations and speculation have been presented. Furthermore, the cases cited by Respondent for allowing a "psychiatric autopsy" are all medical malpractice cases wherein there was a failure to recognize a psychiatric problem within a short period of time before the patient took his own life. None relate to a psychiatric episode over two years before death.

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is hereby granted and Respondent's answer is stricken and dismissed. The petition of the limited administratrix, Jean Artesi, is granted in all respects, and the Court holds that a) John Stiehler brought about the death of his wife; b) the value of John Stiehler's interest in the marital home and any other assets held by them as tenants by the entirety is limited to the commuted value of his life estate in one-half of the premises on the date decedent's death; c) John Stiehler's interest in any other jointly held property is limited to a one-half interest; and d) having brought about the death of his wife, John Stiehler is not a "distributee" of decedent, entitled to share in her estate pursuant to EPTL 4-1.1.

Settle Order.

Dated: April 4, 2006 [*3]

JOHN A. FUSCO, Surrogate