People v Espanda

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[*1] People v Espanda 2006 NY Slip Op 50408(U) [11 Misc 3d 1067(A)] Decided on February 8, 2006 Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Queens County Gerald, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on February 8, 2006
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County

The People of the State of New York

against

Ausberto Espanda, Defendant.



2005QN057711

Lenora Gerald, J.

The defendant has been charged with Operation of a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs.

The defendant, in an omnibus motion, seeks: (1) Dismissal of the Information as Defective; and (2) A Reservation of Rights.

The Court has read the defendant's moving papers and has reviewed the court file and finds as follows:

DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION

The defendant moves for dismissal of the information as defective (CPL 170.30 [1] [a]; 170.35 [1] [a]). The Court has read the information and finds it meets the requirements for facial sufficiency pursuant to CPL 100.15 and 100.40.

A legally sufficient information must contain non-hearsay allegations establishing, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof. An information which fails to satisfy these requirements is jurisdictionally defective (see, CPL 100.40[1] and 100.15[3]; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133; People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729).

The Court finds that the factual allegations contained in the information are sufficient for pleading purposes to make out the count charged. The defendant asserts that the information fails to allege facts, independent of his confession, to sustain the charge of Operation of a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs as required by CPL 60.50.

Criminal Procedure Law §60.50 reads as follows:

A person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission [*2]made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.

The Court initially notes that the prima facie case requirement is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt at trial (see People v Gordon, 88 NY2d 92). The above statute does not require that charges be proven totally independent of a defendant's admission or confession. They merely require that there be some other independent proof that the offense charged actually has been committed. This requirement is satisfied by slight circumstantial corroboration (see People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185). It is the defendant's statement that furnishes the "key or clue to the explanation of circumstances, which, when so explained, establish the criminal act" (see People v Lipsky, 57 NY2d 560).

In the case before the Court, the defendant admitted to operating a motor vehicle and being involved in an accident in that he admitted that "he was trying to park and he might of (sic) tapped the parked vehicle and that he had a few beers." In addition, he was observed by the arresting officer at the scene of the motor vehicle accident and exhibited the common law indicia of intoxication. After being placed under arrest he refused to take an Intoxilyzer test. The Court finds that these factual allegations serve to corroborate the defendant's admissions. The Court finds that the defendant's statement supplies the necessary element of operation for purposes of pleading. These factual allegations taken together with his admissions establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident while his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol. This is all that is required at the pleading stage. The Court is unpersuaded by the cases relied upon by the defendant, specifically, People v Kaminski, 143 Misc 2d 1089 (Crim Ct, NY Co, 1989). The Court instead chooses to follow the holding in People v Heller, 180 Misc 2d 160 (Crim Ct, NY Co, 1998), wherein the court held that CPL 60.50 did not apply to misdemeanor accusatory instruments and corroboration was not required (see also People v Clinkscales, 3 Misc 3d 333 [Dist Ct, Nassau Co, 2004]; People v Dolan, 1 Misc 3d 32 [Sup Ct, App Term 1st Dept, 2003]). The People may establish the defendant's operation of the vehicle at trial through the testimony of the owner of the other vehicle or by circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court finds that the facts as alleged are sufficient for pleading purposes and the motion to dismiss is denied.

RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

The branch of the defendant's motion seeking the right to make further motions is granted to the extent indicated in CPL 255.20.

This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: February , 2006 /GERALD

Kew Gardens, New York Judge of the Criminal Court of the City of New York

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