People v Martin
Annotate this CaseDecided on July 20, 2005
Yates County Court
The People of the State of New York,
against
Matthew D. Martin, Defendant.
05-01
Hon. Susan H. Lindenmuth
Yates County District Attorney
(Jason Cook, Esq., of Counsel)
Counsel for the People
Edward J. Brockman, Esq.
Yates County Public Defender,
Counsel for the Defendant
W. Patrick Falvey, J.
Defendant, Matthew D. Martin, was indicted on four counts, to wit: One Count of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Third Degree, a class D felony, in violation of Penal Law §165.50; One Count of Criminal Mischief in the Second Degree, a class D felony, in violation of Penal Law § 145.10; One Count of Forgery of Vehicle Identification Number, a class E felony, in violation of Penal Law § 170.65 and One Count of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Penal Law § 165.40.
Said defendant moved for assorted forms of relief as requested in his Notice of Omnibus Motion argued May 3, 2005.
The Court subsequently ruled on the defendant's motions and granted his application for hearings regarding so called Huntley (People v. Huntley, 15 NY2d 72), Mapp (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643, 81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed2d 1081) and Sandoval (People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371) issues. The hearings were held, in the defendant's presence, on June 21 and June 22, 2005 with the Sandoval application being decided on the Court record.
At the conclusion of the "Huntley" and "Mapp" hearings, counsel were given an opportunity to file submissions germane to the issues and the case was marked "submitted" on July 19, 2005.
Based on the defendant's motion papers, accompanying legal memoranda, the District [*2]Attorney's answering affirmation in opposition, the hearing, the arguments had, all submissions and the proceedings herein the Court makes the following findings of essential facts and conclusions of law.
Six witnesses testified, to wit: New York State Police Investigators Alan Morse and Rodney Mays, for the People and Llewellyn Brink, Elizabeth Brink, Denise Martin and Matthew Martin for the defendant. The Court notes that any conflict in the testimony presents credibility questions for the Suppression Court. People v. Munro, 86 AD2d 6,83, 684.
FACTS
Defendant claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure, has moved to suppress the 2004 Dutchman camping trailer and other property seized by the New York State Police from 3842 Shay Road, Town of Italy, Yates County, New York on October 15, 2004.
The People have the burden in the first instance of going forward to show the legality of police conduct. People v. Malinsky, 15 NY2d 86, 91. The defendant, however, bears the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the physical evidence should be suppressed. People v. Alberti, 111 AD2d 860, app den. 66 NY2d 760.
On October 14, 1004, State Police Investigator Alan Morse, accompanied by Investigator Rodney Mays (both dressed in plain clothes), drove his unmarked police vehicle to a property located at 3842 Shay Road, Town of Italy, Yates County in an attempt to find Matthew Martin so that Morse might speak to him about the theft of a camper stolen from Dansville, Livingston County. Morse considered Martin to be "a person of interest" in regard to the Dansville theft. (Transcript, p. 21, line 21). Morse believed that Martin might be living at this property with his girlfriend at the time, Denise Mayer, or at least it was a place to go to inquire about the defendant's whereabouts. Morse was familiar with the property as he had visited it in the spring or summer of 2004 regarding a different investigation. At that time, he spoke to Ms. Mayer's parents, Llewellyn and Elizabeth Brink, whom he believed owned the property at the time.
The investigators did not notice any "Posted" signs, and there was no gate blocking the driveway on October 14, 2004. They drove up the driveway, up a hill, which was surrounded by heavy foliage on both sides, and which bent to the right at the top. They traveled the driveway 400 yards, to access the camping trailer that the Brinks lived in, and where they hoped to find Ms. Mayer or the defendant. They knocked on the door, but no one answered.
As they turned from the door, they noticed through the foliage (see photo on bottom left corner of Exhibit 10) another shiny, newer trailer in the direction of Shay Road, about 250 to 300 feet from the first trailer, that looked like it had recently been installed on the premises. The investigators walked down the path or the grass to the back side of that trailer, which was the side that presented itself from the path they had followed, to see if anybody was home. A large, "unfriendly" dog barked loudly from inside the sliding glass door. Morse yelled to see if anybody was home, but no one answered the door. He also observed a locked padlock and hasp on the outside of the sliding glass door, so he assumed no one was home. He walked away from the door, slipped in a mud puddle, and then proceeded to a dirt driveway, where he stood, waiting. Shay Road was not visible from this spot, but became so after walking a few feet along the drive. In the meantime, Mays walked around across the front of the new trailer, looking at it. While doing so, he noticed that there was no vehicle identification number (VIN) on the bumper which [*3]he testified from his experience would have been located on the front left side of the trailer on the tongue or on the very front left side (Transcript p. 103). Mays walked past that part of the camper where the VIN would have usually been located. This left side of the trailer was not the side closest to the driveway (Exhibit 7), nor was it on the normal route one would take from the sliding glass door, back to the area where the car was located. Mays then walked back to the police car parked in the first driveway.
Morse became aware that he was standing on a second driveway that accessed this newer trailer from Shay Road when a school bus stopped on Shay Road and let a boy out next to this driveway. The boy approached him, from Shay Road, walking on the second driveway, and Morse asked him where his parents were, and who his parents were. The boy told them that Denise Mayer was his mother, and that she would be right home.
Meanwhile, after Mays had noticed the lack of a VIN on the second trailer, and had walked back to the police car, he drove the car back down the first driveway to Shay Road, and then up the second driveway. When he arrived at the second trailer, Morse was standing there with the boy.
Denise Mayer, along with the defendant, then drove into the second driveway where the investigators and boy were standing. Morse and Mays recognized the defendant from pictures they had. They identified themselves, and Martin agreed to accompany them to the Naples State Police barracks and speak with them about a stolen trailer. However, at the time neither investigation knew the trailer in question was stolen (Transcript p. 38). The defendant was visibly shaking. He was not under arrest, nor was he made any promises or threatened. There were no discussions regarding the case during the trip to the police station. Mays then returned alone to the property to speak with Denise Mayer from whom he obtained a written statement.
Morse gave the defendant his so-called "Miranda" warnings for the first time at the police barracks. The defendant understood those rights and never asked for an attorney or requested to stop speaking (Exhibit 1). Then after speaking with Morse for a short period the defendant gave a written statement (Exhibit 2) in which he stated that he had stolen the "Dutchman" trailer and removed the VIN. After the defendant read the statement, made additions, signed and initialed it before Investigator Morse he was placed under arrest.
Morse returned to the Shay Road property the next day and removed the trailer, in question, as Mays had previously obtained "Voluntary Consents to Search Certain Premises" from Elizabeth Brink (Exhibit 3) and Denise Mayer (Exhibit 4) after defendant's arrest. It is noted that Llewellyn Brink was the sole owner of the real property in question (Exhibit A). However, he and Elizabeth had been married for 25 years and lived at this location for approximately four to five years. Ms. Mayer and defendant had lived together continuously since March of 2004 on the premises in question. Ms. Mayer, her son and the defendant lived nearby on the premises in a car or camper where they would sleep. However, they ate, showered and watched television on a regular basis at the Brinks.
Witnesses for the defendant testified that there were "Posted" Signs in many places on the property, that were visible from the routes taken by the police on October 14, 2005; while both officers maintain there were no such signs on the property that day.
LAW
1. Search and Seizure:
[*4]The People bear the burden of showing the police conduct was appropriate in the first instance. People v Malatesta, 186 M2d 312, 317, citing People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367-368. Initially, the Court must determine whether the conduct of Investigators Mays and Morse on October 14, 2005, constituted a search, subject to constitutional protections. "If so, the dispositive question is then whether the warrantless search violated defendant's constitutional protection from unreasonable search and seizure." People v Malatesta, supra, p. 316.
Did the defendant have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area where the police saw the second trailer? Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 351.
The People argue that the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy, over the driveway and entire property owned by the Brinks.
The defendant was not the owner of the premises, although the uncontroverted testimony was that the defendant and his girlfriend, Denise Mayer (his wife since October, 2004) lived together with her son; paid $400 per month rent and did work around the premises for the Brinks but not on a regular basis. The defendant considered the premises to be his home, and he lived in the "Dutchman" on a continuous basis. Therefore, the defendant had Fourth Amendment "standing". People v Cleveland, 14 AD3d 798, 799. Also, it is only the area where the "Dutchman" stood that is at issue.
Whether the first driveway was posted or not, it would appear that the investigators' initial entry on the premises was not in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. In approaching the first trailer, having driven up the first driveway, the police action was "no more intrusive an event than ordinarily occurs during the daily incidents of life in an urban neighborhood by e.g., a paperboy, garbage collector or door-to-door salesman" . People v Crapo, 103 AD2d 943 at 943. See also People v Kazlowski, 69 NY2d 761.
However, by approaching the second trailer, via a grassy path not a driveway, the investigators did tread on the defendant's constitutional rights, since they did not reach the second trailer by "means the defendant had made available for public access to his house." People v Kozlowski, 69 NY2d 761. Then, Investigator Mays conducted a warrantless search when he walked by the front left side of the second trailer looking for the vehicle identification number, which he found to be missing. However, the scope of this search was very limited. Mays did not enter the trailer, or look inside or examine the trailer more closely. In essence, this illegal search did not yield any evidence, especially in light of the fact that neither officer knew the trailer was stolen. (Transcript p.38).
The next critical event was the appearance of the defendant at the "Dutchman" trailer. The uncontroverted testimony established that at that time, Investigator Morse spoke to the defendant, and told him they were there to ask him about a stolen trailer, referring to the Dansville trailer, and asked him if he would go to the state police barracks to speak with them and he consented (Transcript, pp 33-35).
It was only after the defendant spoke to Investigator Morse at the barracks and told him that he had stolen the "Dutchman" that the investigators' had information sufficient for them to search the premises. It was not until the evening of October 14, 2004, at the Naples Town Court that Mays obtained the consents of Denise Meyer and her mother to go back to search the "Dutchman" camper, defendant's home and surrounding area. This search and seizure yielded the "Dutchman" trailer and various other personal property, which were seized on October 15, [*5]2004.
Voluntary consent to search is an exception to the warrant requirement. If valid consent is obtained, then there is no requirement for probable cause for the search. People v. Hodge, 44 NY2d 553. However, the People have a "heavy burden" of proving voluntariness. People v. Whitehurst, 25 NY2d 389, 391.
Where a defendant shares a "common authority" with others over a premises or property, "he has no right to prevent a search in the face of the knowing and voluntary consent of a co-occupant with equal authority." People v. Cosme, 48 NY2d 286. Thus, for example, where a defendant shares common authority with a family member (People v. Carter, 30 NY2d 279), fiancée (People v. Cosme, supra p. 286) or girlfriend (People v. Gilman, 135 Ad2d 951) that individual has the ability to consent to a search of the shared premises.
Clearly, Mrs. Brink and Ms. Mayer had authority to consent to a search and there is no evidence to suggest that either consent was not voluntary.
The Court concludes that even though the actions of May and Morse may have constituted an illegal search of the defendant's lot area on October 14th, this search did not result in the seizure of any property because the officers did not know the "Dutchman" was stolen at that time and the defendant was not under arrest at that time. It was only after the defendant admitted to stealing the "Dutchman" at the police barracks that they obtained valid voluntary consents to search resulting in a valid seizure on October 15th.
Therefore the defendant's motion to suppress the seized property is denied.
2. Statement:
A confession or admission is admissible at trial in this state only if its voluntariness is established by the People beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Witherspoon, 66 NY2d 973.
Then, if the prosecutor in the first instance establishes the legality of the police conduct in obtaining a statement the defendant has the burden of persuasion in seeking suppression. People v. Love, 85 AD2d 799, affd 57 NY2d 998.
In determining the voluntariness of a confession the Court must look to all relevant factors, and all facts and circumstances must be weighed and considered. People v. Carbonaro, 48 Misc 2d 115, affd 21 NY2d 271, remittitur amended 21 NY2d 971, reargument denied 20 NY2d 1040. In doing so, the Court is entitled to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v. Huber, 144AD2d 583, app. den. 73 NY2d 922.
The right to counsel attaches when formal charges are filed with a state Court (People v. Samuels, 49 NY2d 218) or when an attorney has "entered" the proceeding. Neither of the foregoing are an issue in this case.
Miranda warnings must be given, with certain exceptions, to all people subjected to custodial interrogation "regardless of the nature of severity of the offense." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3148.
However, without both custody and interrogation the Miranda warnings are not required. whether a person is in custody is determined by ascertaining whether a person in the defendant's position would have felt that he was not free to leave. People v. Yukl, 25 NY2d 585. However, the Court also stated that it is not the subjective beliefs of the defendant that are determinative, "but rather what a reasonable man innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the defendant's position." [*6]
Here the defendant was asked, and he agreed, to accompany the police to the barracks to speak with them regarding a stolen trailer. He was not under arrest, restrained, coerced or under duress in any way. The investigation was of short duration. The defendant was twenty-six years of age.
Under all the circumstances presented in the case at bar, the defendant was not in custody at the time even though he was being questioned at the police station but nevertheless, he was given his four fold Miranda rights before any questions. He voluntarily and knowingly gave up those rights and spoke with Investigator Morse.
The Court also having examined the totality of the circumstances as to voluntariness the defendant's statement should not be suppressed.
In addition, the Court finds that the defendant's statement was not derived from the constitutional violation, i.e., the October 14, 2004 search of the outside of the "Dutchman" by Mays. Once the defendant arrived at the scene, the officers were merely resuming their initial, lawful, stated mission of seeking to speak with the defendant about the Naples stolen trailer. By this point, Mays had driven the police car up the proper driveway, Morse was asking the defendant if he would come to the station to speak with him; the officers did not question him in any manner about the Naples trailer or the "Dutchman" before the defendant was at the station or given his rights. Nor had the defendant been placed under arrest at this time. See, New York v. Harris, 495 US14, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13. Here, the statement taken at the police station was not an exploitation of an illegal entry into the environs of the "Dutchman".
The case at bar is distinguishable from People v. Harris, 77 NY2d 434, decided by the Court of Appeals on the same case after the US Supreme Court made its decision in New York v. Harris, supra. In People v. Harris, supra, the statements by the defendant followed an illegal arrest of the defendant. The Court of Appeals held that unless there is an attenuation, the New York State Constitution prohibits use of statements obtained by the police after the illegal arrest, because the defendant's right to counsel attached upon the arrest. This was not the situation in the case at bar. Here, there had been no arrest at the time the defendant agreed to speak to the officers.
Therefore, for the above reasons the defendant's statements are admissible at trial upon the People's case in chief.
The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision and Judgment of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 20, 2005.
_________________________
W. Patrick Falvey
Yates County Judge
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