People v Malaussena
Annotate this CaseDecided on September 13, 2005
Supreme Court, Bronx County
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
against
John Malaussena, Defendant.
0461/04
David Stadtmauer, J.
The defendant was charged with two counts of Murder in the Second Degree, based upon theories of Intent (P.L. 125.25[1]) and Depraved Indifference Recklessness (P.L. 125.25[2]). At trial, after the People elected to proceed on the theory that the murder was committed intentionally (see People v. Payne, 3 NY3d 266), the defendant, prior to summations, requested an instruction to the jury on the "defense" of intoxication. That request was refused. This Opinion reiterates the court's earlier oral ruling and sets out, in greater detail, the court's reasoning for its refusal.
Initially, it is noted that intoxication as such is not a defense to a criminal charge. However, "in any prosecution for an offense, evidence of the intoxication of the defendant may be offered whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the crime charged." [P.L. §15.25]
According to the evidence adduced at trial, on the evening of January 8, 2004, the defendant was at J-Lana's bar on West 231st Street, Bronx County, where he had been continually playing "Joker-Poker," a slot machine variety of Poker. After losing a considerable amount of money at the machine over the course of the night, defendant asked for permission to stay after closing hours in an effort to recoup his losses. There was no objection from the bar manager or the night porter, Charles Mannino, and defendant continued to play.
On January 9, 2004, at approximately 7:00 a.m., sanitation workers discovered the bruised and battered body of Charles Mannino. The decedent had suffered multiple bruises to the head and body but, according to the New York City Medical Examiner, the cause of death was manual strangulation. The Medical Examiner also testified that it takes at least three minutes to strangle a person to death. Defendant was not seen to have committed the murder but he was on the premises immediately before the events in question and he admitted, in a pre-trial videotaped statement to a prosecutor, to striking the victim several times with a pool stick and punching him repeatedly when they were alone in the bar. According to the defendant, he committed these acts around 4:00 a.m. after Mannino, who was of slight body frame, weighing approximately 110 to 120 pounds, directed defendant to leave the bar and also made a "threatening" gesture with a mop. Defendant also claimed, in conclusory and self-serving fashion, to have been drinking.
In addition to the defendant's unsworn statement on the videotape, the jury heard evidence [*2]regarding defendant's consumption of alcohol from four witnesses Johanna Walsh, Douglas Bazzuro, Robert Laurenzano, and Bernadette Lynch.
Johanna Walsh, called by the defense, was defendant's girlfriend with whom he had fathered a child. She testified that she was in the bar at about 8:00 p.m. and saw defendant playing the Joker-Poker machine and drinking. She described the defendant's condition as "... drunk a little bit, buzzed" he "had a little buzz from drinking." (Trial minutes, p. 963) She further stated that they drank and sniffed until approximately 2:00 a.m., at which time she saw defendant still at the Joker-Poker machine. She described the various drinks that the defendant consumed as "I think it was Vodka, 7-Up, Orange Juice" and "Sex on the Beach," the ingredients of which were never elicited. (See minutes, P. 1000) The last time she saw him was at 2:00 a.m., two hours prior to the murder.
Douglas Bazzuro, a local drug user and small-time neighborhood trafficker in narcotics, also testified on behalf of the defense. He admitted to being on a two-day drug binge at the time in question, but remembered seeing defendant at a neighborhood park in the early morning hours, at about 5:00 a.m. According to Bazzuro, the defendant was slouched over on a bench. He stated that they took a cab to a nearby motel to use drugs and that defendant looked intoxicated in the cab. (Minutes, p. 839)
Robert Laurenzano, another defense witness who knew the defendant for ten years, was the bartender at J-Lana's that evening. He testified that when he left the bar at 3:15 a.m., defendant "had a lot of drinks but he wasn't sloppy [and he] wasn't bouncing around or anything." He further testified that he had never seen defendant out of control, including on the night in question, and that defendant was there primarily for gambling rather than drinking. (Minutes, p. 1073)
Bernadette Lynch, a witness called by the People, was employed as a bartender at J-Lana's. She was off-duty on the night in question but, according to her testimony, she was on the premises until approximately 3:45 a.m. Thus, she was the last person to see the defendant and Mannino prior to the murder at 4:00 a.m. She stated that she saw the defendant at the Joker-Poker machine the entire night and that the defendant was upset at losing money; otherwise, according to Lynch, the defendant appeared normal. (Minutes, p. 345)
There is no presumption of law that consumption of alcohol over a course of any particular time period is the equivalent of intoxication. Thus, evidence of drinking does not automatically entitle a defendant to an instruction on intoxication, and each case must turn upon its own circumstances. In People v. Gaines (83 NY2d 925, decided June 9, 1994), the Court of Appeals set
forth the standard for consideration of an instruction to the jury as to intoxication. The court stated, in relevant part, that evidence of intoxication, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, "requires more than a bare assertion by a defendant that he was intoxicated. A charge on intoxication should be given if there is sufficient evidence of intoxication in the record for a reasonable person to entertain a doubt as to the element of intent on that basis...." Since the murder of Charles Mannino occurred at approximately 4:00 a.m., the issue of defendant's mental state is critical with respect to that time. The only evidence in support of defendant's claim, however, is the testimony of Johanna Walsh, who did not see defendant after 2:00 a.m., and the testimony of Douglas Bazzurro, who observed defendant at approximately [*3]5:00 a.m. There was no evidence whatever of intoxication at or proximate to the time of the murder.
Defense counsel argued that defendant's mental state at 2:00 a.m., before the murder, and at 5:00 a.m., after the murder, were relevant because they suggest one continuous period of intoxication over that three-hour period. The court disagreed. The testimony of Walsh and Bazzuro was, at best, equivocal and "lacked requisite details tending to corroborate [defendant's] claim ...."(Gaines, supra, at 927.) For example, there was no evidence as to the overall number of drinks defendant consumed, the period of time during which they were consumed, the lapse of time between consumption and the events at issue, whether he consumed alcohol on an empty stomach, whether his drinks were high in alcoholic content, what the unspecified ingredients of certain drinks were, and the specific impact of any alcohol upon his behavior or mental state. Moreover, defendant's body is of a large frame, weighing approximately 250 or more pounds at the time of the incident. There was no evidence of what effect the amount of alcohol allegedly consumed would have had on a person defendant's size. Irrespective of the foregoing, the jury was nevertheless permitted to consider evidence of defendant's drinking as part of its overall deliberative process. In charging the jury on the crime of Murder in the Second Degree, the court defined the term "Intent" (see P.L. §15.05[1]), and then gave the following explanatory instruction:
In determining whether or not a defendant had the intent required for
the commission of a crime, the jury may consider the person's conduct
and all of the circumstances surrounding that conduct including, but not
limited to the following what, if anything, did the person do or say,
what result, if any, followed the person's conduct; and was that result
the natural, necessary and probable consequence of that conduct.
(See CJI Expanded Charge on Intent.)
The jury heard testimony regarding the defendant's drinking. It could, therefore, have considered such evidence as one of the circumstances surrounding defendant's conduct in evaluating the issue of intent. However, a separate charge on intoxication was not warranted.
DATED: September 13, 2005
BRONX, NEW YORK
s/ J.S.C.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
