Maddison v Furneaux
Annotate this CaseDecided on February 18, 2005
Supreme Court, Onondaga County
Maria F. Maddison and CHARLES C. MADDISON, Plaintiffs,
against
Kathleen A. Furneaux and DONA M. BEAVATEA a/k/a DONA M. BEAUCHEA, , Defendants.
02-8614
WAYNE M. CHARIFF, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1204 Press Building
19 Chenango Street
Binghamton, NY 13901
MARK D. GORIS, ESQ.
MITCHELL GORIS STOKES & KNYCH, LLC
Attorneys for Defendants
P.O. Box 312
Cazenovia, NY 13035
John V. Centra, J.
The above-referenced matter was tried before a jury in January 2005. The jury found that Plaintiff Maria F. Maddison (hereinafter "Plaintiff") sustained a significant limitation of use of a body function or system. Plaintiff was awarded $10,000 for past pain and suffering, $10,000 for future pain and suffering which was intended to provide compensation over a five year period, and $390,000 for future medical expenses.
Plaintiff testified that she sustained injuries to her neck and right shoulder when she was struck from behind by a vehicle [*2]operated by Defendant. On cross-examination, Plaintiff admitted to having been involved in two subsequent accidents, another rear-end collision approximately one year after the subject accident, and a mini-bike accident two and one-half years after. She denied that either accident affected her symptoms or involved injury to her neck or shoulder.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff's medical records directly contradicted her testimony. On cross-examination, Plaintiff's doctor, Dr. Scerpella, conceded that both Plaintiff's disc herniation and rotator cuff injury could have been degenerative in nature. She also conceded that Plaintiff's symptoms and complaints were largely, if not solely, subjective. On direct examination, Dr. Scerpella testified that Plaintiff would incur medical expenses of $10,000 to $12,000 per year for pain management for the rest of her life.
Defendant has brought an application before this court arguing that a new trial is required as a matter of law because the jury's verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent, the result of impermissible compromise, contrary to the weight of the evidence, and/or a material deviation from what would be reasonable compensation. The jury determined that Plaintiff had sustained a significant limitation of use of a body function or system but not a permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member. The future pain and suffering of $10,000 was to compensate her for a five-year period. In light of these determinations, Defendant contends that the jury must have decided that Plaintiff's injuries were not as serious as she alleged and her ongoing symptoms were caused or contributed to by one or both of her subsequent accidents. Defendant also moves for an evidentiary hearing on the issues of collateral source and reduction to present value.
Plaintiffs cross-move for a new trial or an additur seeking an increase for both past pain and suffering and future pain and suffering. The jury found Defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries Plaintiff sustained. Further, the jury found that Plaintiff had a significant loss of use of a body function or system.
Plaintiffs argue that the jury's determination of a lack of permanent consequential loss of use of a body organ or member and its determination for past pain and suffering and future pain and suffering is not based upon the facts of the case. According to Plaintiffs, the damage award constitutes a material deviation from reasonable compensation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the portion of the verdict relating to past and future pain [*3]and suffering be set aside and a new trial ordered on the limited issues of damages for pain and suffering, past and future, or the court determine an amount of an additur for pain and suffering.
The court listened to the proof at trial and finds that the jury's determination was not necessarily inconsistent. The jury could have found that Plaintiff sustained a serious injury, i.e., a significant limitation of use of a body function or system but not a permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member. Defendant appears to be distinguishing between "significant limitation" and "consequential limitation" without having regard for the fact that there is also a difference in the two in terms of the "body function or system" and "body organ or member". The jury may well have been focusing on the latter differences rather than the former.
Also, the jury could have found that Plaintiff's future pain and suffering will only last five years although she will be on medication for her lifetime. This is plausible because the jury may have found that it will take five years for Plaintiff to get to the point where her medications will control her pain even though she will have to be on pain medication forever. Accordingly, that portion of Defendant's motion seeking a new trial because the jury's verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent, the result of impermissible compromise, contrary to the weight of the evidence, and/or a material deviation from what would be reasonable compensation is denied.
As to Plaintiffs' motion, the court finds that the jury's determination of $10,000 for past pain and suffering is inadequate. The court also finds that the jury's finding of $10,000 for future pain and suffering is inadequate. Accordingly, the court sets aside the past and future pain and suffering awards. The court orders a new trial unless Plaintiffs agree to an additur to $25,000 for past pain and suffering and an additur to $50,000 for future pain and suffering over a five-year period.
The court finds that the award for future lost medical expenses need not be set aside. First, the parties stipulated during trial that the future economic loss exceeds $50,000.
Second, the court finds that the evidence supports the determination of $390,000. Dr. Scerpella testified that Plaintiff would incur medical expenses of $10,000 to $12,000 per year for pain management for the rest of her life. By awarding $390,000 over 39 years, the jury made a determination that was consistent with the evidence. [*4]
Third, the award for future medical expenses can be easily separated out from the other awards. Even if the jury had found no serious injury, it could have still awarded Plaintiff damages over and above the first $50,000 of basic economic loss. Colvin v. Slawoniewski, 2005 WL 273164, ___ AD3d ___ (4th Dept 2005); Barnes v. Kociszewski, 4 AD3d 824 (4th Dept 2004); Tortorello v. Landi, 136 AD2d 545 (2nd Dept 1988).
Thus, Plaintiffs' motion is granted to the extent that a new trial is granted unless Plaintiffs agree to an additur as above-stated. That portion of Defendant's motion seeking an evidentiary hearing on the issues of collateral source and reduction to present value is also granted.
Plaintiffs are to submit an Order on notice.
JOHN V. CENTRA
Supreme Court Justice
Dated: February 18, 2005
Syracuse, New York
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