People v Rodriguez

[*1] People v Rodriguez 2005 NY Slip Op 50715(U) Decided on May 16, 2005 County Court, Suffolk County Hinrichs, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 16, 2005
County Court, Suffolk County

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

against

Anna Rodriguez, Defendant



208-04



Hon. Thomas J. Spota

Suffolk County District Attorney

Dari Schwartz, Esq.

Rosa Abbate, Esq.

Assistant District Attorneys

Criminal Courts Building, 200 Center Drive, Riverhead, New York 11901-3303

George H. Duncan, Esq.

William J. Keahon, Esq.

Attorneys for Defendant

1 Suffolk Square, Suite 500, Islandia, New York 11749

C. Randall Hinrichs, J.

Defendant has been indicted for Murder in the Second Degree under Penal Law (PL) § 125.25(4) and Manslaughter in the First Degree under PL § 125.20(4 .) Defendant is alleged to have caused the death of her new born son on January 8, 2004. On April 27, 2005, given the nature of the case and the Court's knowledge of the alleged facts from the pre-trial hearings and the Grand Jury minutes, the Court asked defense counsel, on the record, if there was any claim of privilege with respect to defendant's medical treatment. Defendant moved to preclude the People from introducing medical testimony or records at trial as violative of the physician/patient privilege.

On April 28, 2005 the Court heard the People's offer of proof and legal argument from both sides regarding the proposed medical testimony. The People stated that they intend to elicit testimony at trial that on January 10, 2004 the defendant appeared at the emergency room at Southside Hospital. Medical staff will testify that defendant presented with a protruding umbilical cord, delivered a placenta, that a pregnancy test was positive for pregnancy, that defendant denied giving birth or having been pregnant and that defendant's chief medical complaint was vaginal bleeding. Medical staff will further testify that they called 911 regarding their concern for a missing child. On January 15, 2004, pursuant to the mandatory reporting provisions of the Soc Serv Law, the hospital submitted a report regarding defendant with the Central State Registry.

The People submit that they should be permitted to elicit testimony regarding the medical staff's observations of defendant's medical condition on January 10, 2004 including her denial of [*2]having been pregnant or giving birth. The People also submit they should be permitted to introduce testimony regarding all medical treatment administered to defendant on January 10, 2004, as well as, medical records from January 11, 2004, January 12, 2004 and January 14, 2004. The People submit that the Social Service Law (Soc Serv) provides an exception to the physician/patient privilege in cases involving child abuse. The People also submit that on January 12, 2004 and January 14, 2004 defendant executed written consent forms authorizing release of her medical records which permits their use at trial. The People acknowledge that defense counsel revoked the written consent forms by letter from defense counsel to the People on March 8, 2004.

Defendant contends that all proffered medical testimony is protected by the physician/

patient privilege and that no exclusion applies. Defendant urges in the alternative that, to the extent that the Soc Serv Law provides an exclusion to the physician/patient privilege, this exclusion is very narrow and in this case the exclusion is limited to the report made by the hospital on January 15, 2004 to the Central State Registry. Defendant also contends that the written waivers are not binding since they were executed on January 12, 2004 and January 14, 2004, two days and four days after defendant's admission to the hospital, and were revoked by letter on March 8, 2004.

This decision is a written memorialization of the Court's bench decision of April 29, 2005 wherein the Court held that the People may elicit testimony from medical personnel regarding defendant's condition and statements to emergency room staff during defendant's initial presentment to the emergency room on January 10, 2004.

The Court finds that the defendant's asserted physician/patient privilege must yield, to some extent, to the public policy favoring the mandatory reporting of alleged child abuse inherent in the Soc Serv Law. Soc Serv Law § 413(1) requires health care providers to report suspected cases of child abuse or maltreatment when they have reasonable cause to suspect abuse or maltreatment. Soc Serv Law §§ 415, 420 and 422 provide statutory guidance to the reporting procedure. These mandatory reporting provisions would be meaningless if the mandatory reporters were prevented from testifying as to their observations and findings by the assertion of the physician/patient privilege. Accordingly, case law makes clear that in enacting the mandatory reporting provisions "the Legislature intended to preclude the application of the physician/ patient privilege in 'any proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect', including criminal prosecutions, where the defendant's statements trigger the requirement to report." People v Gearhart, 148 Misc 2d 249, 255, 560 NYS2d 247 (County Ct, Nassau County 1990.) See also, People v Strawbridge, 299 AD2d 584, 751 NYS2d 606 (3rd Dept. 2002.)

Having found a Soc Serv Law preclusion of the physician/patient privilege to exist, the Court must determine the scope of the preclusion as it applies in this case. The People contend that the preclusion should permit them to introduce testimony and records as to defendant's entire hospital stay following her admission on January 10, 2004. The defendant urges that the preclusion is limited solely to the contents of the report which was generated by the hospital and forwarded to the State Central Registry on January 15, 2004. The Court holds, however, that the Soc Serv Law preclusion to the physician/patient privilege is neither as broad as the People claim, nor as narrow as the defendant claims.

In a similar case, the court in Strawbridge, supra, held that the trial court erred in [*3]allowing extensive medical testimony beyond the scope of the Soc Serv Law preclusion. The essence of the preclusion is the very strong public policy of protecting abused or maltreated children. The preclusion, therefore, may only be justified to the extent necessary to guarantee the safety of abused or potentially abused children. The Court finds that the Soc Serv Law preclusion, as applied in the instant case, precludes the defendant's assertion of her physician/patient privilege with respect to her condition and statements during her initial presentment at the Southside Hospital emergency room on January 10, 2004, including her

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denial of being pregnant or having given birth, up to the time the hospital staff called 911 to report a missing baby. This limited exception covering defendant's initial presentment at the hospital does not extend to January 11, 2004, January 12, 2004 or January 14, 2004.The Court's conclusion, that the Soc Serv Law preclusion permits the People to elicit testimony regarding defendant's statements to hospital staff (denying being pregnant or having given birth) requires further discussion. The Court is of the opinion that the decision of the hospital staff to conclude that a baby was missing can only have been reached by the staff's considering both 1) that defendant had a protruding umbilical cord and delivered a placenta; and 2) that defendant denied being pregnant or having delivered a baby. If, for example, defendant had explained that she had delivered a baby at home and the baby was home and fine, the staff may have confirmed this information informally without concluding that a child was missing. Defendant's denying being pregnant or having given birth are clearly crucial to a complete understanding of the facts and circumstances which led to the staff's reasonable conclusion that a child was or had been abused or maltreated. Accordingly, in addition to defendant's medical condition at the time, defendant's denials of being pregnant or having given birth during her initial presentment at the Southside Hospital emergency room on January 10, 2004 may also be elicited.

The medical consent forms were signed by the defendant on January 12, 2004 and January 14, 2004. These consent forms were not in effect on January 10, 2004 or January 11, 2004 and were revoked by defense counsel on March 8, 2004. The Court finds they may not be relied on by the People as a basis for admitting defendant's entire medical records from January 10, 2004 through January 14, 2004 into evidence. Also, the Court finds defendant's statements to hospital staff (denying being pregnant or having given birth) do not implicate her Fifth Amendment rights. Defendant was not in custody at the time of the statements at issue and the statements were not made to law enforcement. See, People v Gearhart, supra, at 258, citing People v Gwaltney, 140 Misc 2d 74, 77, 530 NYS2d 437 (Supreme Ct, Queens County 1988.) This memorandum, together with the Court's bench decision of April 29, 2005, constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

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J.C.C.

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