Cassidy v Scoppetta

[*1] Cassidy v Scoppetta 2005 NY Slip Op 50473(U) Decided on February 3, 2005 Supreme Court, Kings County Douglass, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on February 3, 2005
Supreme Court, Kings County

Stephen J. Cassidy, individually as a New York City Firefighter, and as President of the Uniformed Firefighters Association of Greater New York, acting on behalf of all Firefighters assigned to ladder companies responding to alarms with fewer than four (4) Firefighters, all Firefighters assigned to Engine Companies responding to alarms with fewer than four (4) Firefighters and all Firefighters assigned to five-man Engine Companies within the Fire Department of the City of New York, and the UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION OF GREATER NEW YORK, Petitioners, For a Judgment Pursuant to CPLR §7502(c)

against

Nicholas Scoppetta, as Commissioner of the Fire Department of the City of New York, THE FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and THE CITY OF NEW YORK, , Respondents.



41983/04

Lewis L. Douglass, J.

This is a continuing dispute between the City Firefighters Union and the City about whether the City can reduce the number of firefighters assigned to certain fire houses.

In the most recent round of ligation, Judge Starkey ruled that it would violate "separation of power" to "embroil the Judiciary and the Management of Operation of the Fire Department." There is no doubt about that proposition. But here the dispute takes a different posture. Here the Union is arguing that the Court should freeze all current efforts to reduce the number of firefighters until this matter is resolved through normal Labor/Management Grievance Mechanism. The City argues that in the Stipulation of Settlement signed following the last round of negotiations, the Union gave up its right to arbitrate any dispute pertaining to the number of firefighters assigned to the firehouses as evidence by paragraph 11 of the Stipulation of Settlement: [*2]

By entering into to this Stipulation of Settlement, the Union agrees to waive its right to file any litigation or grievance regarding the Department Roster Staffing program as set forth in the case docketed with the Office of Collective Bargaining as BC-1265-90, or with regard to the practical impact of this agreement until January 31, 2006. Should a court of competent jurisdiction or any other administrative entity, except for enforcement purposes, grant the right to initiate any such litigation or grievance within that time, this agreement will be terminated immediately. Should litigation or a grievance commence, this agreement or any portion thereof shall not be admissible in any court proceeding or other administrative forum. After the expiration of this Agreement, January 31, 2006, the City in view of factors including, but not limited to changes in technology, structural and non-structural fires, and response times, may wish to change staffing levels. In the event the City plans to make such changes, the parties will negotiate to the extent required by the New York City Collective Bargaining Law. Should differences between the parties arise, it is the intent of the parties to work expeditiously to resolve them.

The critical question therefore, is an interpretation of the forgoing paragraph 11.

We begin by recognizing that public policy in this State is that labor disputes are better resolved through arbitration then in the courtroom (see, Board of Education of Bloomfield etc. v. Christen Construction Inc. 80 NY2nd 1031). Additionally, when disputes arise about the meaning of clauses in contracts, the resolution of dispute is determined by an objective test, that is, not by what may or may not have been the uncommunicated intention of the drafters, but rather, what would a "reasonable person" knowing all the facts and circumstances conclude was the understanding of the parties about the meaning of the clause.

To my mind, given the history of labor negotiations, that the parties did not intend to give up the right to argue about its enforcement in the venue where labor disputes are usually resolved.

Moreover, the language contemplates that some administrative entity might be involved in the resolution of the dispute by providing in that event of a grievance the Stipulation of Settlement agreement is "terminated immediately" and if a "grievance is commenced . . ." the agreement shall not be admissible evidence in any other administrative forum. Even assuming that somehow the clause is read to mean that the union gave up its rights to litigate this matter in Court or to ever file a grievance, the clause specifically provides that the restriction on the right to litigate does not apply where the litigation is for "enforcement purposes."

I conclude that a "reasonable person" reading this document, knowing its background, could only reach the conclusion that the parties fully anticipated that if there were disputes arising out of the document it would be arbitrated as one would ordinarily expect labor disputes to be arbitrated. Accordingly, the Union's application to restore and retain the ladder companies [*3]to five firefighters to respond to alarms, pending the resolution of the grievance is granted.

The question of the amount of the bond is deferred until the Court can review affidavits describing the expenses that the City may face in the event that this injunction is unsuccessful. Those affidavits should be submitted within 60 days from the signing of a formal Order granting the requested injunction.

Petitioners are directed to submit an order on notice consistent with this decision.

This constitutes the order and decision of the Court.

Hon. Lewis L. Douglass

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF KINGS -

X

STEPHEN J. CASSIDY, et al., Index No: 41983/04

Petitioners, January 7, 2005

For a Judgment Pursuant to CPLR §7502(C)

-against- Hon. Lewis L. Douglass

NICHOLAS SCOPPETTA, et al.,

Respondents. -

X

Having reviewed the papers submitted in connection with this motion, further oral argument is required.

The parties are directed to appear January 25, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. for further oral argument.

Hon. Lewis L. Douglass