People v Prefontaine

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[*1] People v Prefontaine 2005 NY Slip Op 50259(U) Decided on March 2, 2005 District Court Of Suffolk County, First District Bergson, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 2, 2005
District Court of Suffolk County, First District

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

against

Richard T. Prefontaine, Defendant



2003SU047263

Howard M. Bergson, J.

The defendant moves prior to sentencing for an order pursuant to CPL §330.30(l) setting aside a jury verdict of guilty of Assault in the Third Degree in violation of Penal Law section 120.00(l).

The defendant sets forth four grounds for the requested relief. First, the Court's denial of the defendant s motion (based upon an alleged Payton violation) to suppress the defendant's written statement given to the police was error which requires that the verdict be set aside. Second, the Court's denial of the defendant's Sandoval motion, with respect to the defendant's 2000 felony conviction for criminal possession of stolen property, was incorrect and prevented the defendant from testifying with respect to certain material facts. Third, the introduction into evidence of two photographs of the injuries suffered by the complainant, as a result of the defendant's conduct, was cumulative and sufficiently prejudicial to justify the verdict being set aside. Fourth, the complainant, David Austin, perjured himself in areas of his testimony and as a result, the verdict of guilty must be set aside.

A trial court does not have the inherent power to set aside a guilty verdict. This Court's authority is limited to the specific grounds set forth in CPL 330.30. See People v. Jackson, 78 NY2d 638 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991); People v. Carter, 63 NY2d 530, 483 NY S.2d 654 (1984) and People v. Carthrens 171 AD2d 387, 577 NY S.2d 249 (1st Dept. 1991).

Pursuant to section 330.30 (1) of the CPL, a verdict may be set aside on "any ground appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal from a perspective judgment of conviction, would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court".

This section authorizes a trial court to vacate a jury verdict of guilty, prior to sentence, only if the grounds for the motion would constitute the basis for an intermediate appellate court to reverse as a matter of law. People v. Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 736 N.Y.S.2d 643 (2001) see People v. Carthrens, supra at p.391. In People v. Carter, supra the Court of Appeals made clear that the power granted to a trial judge is far more limited than that granted to an intermediate appellate court. An appellate court has the authority to determine not only questions of law, but also issues of fact and to reverse a judgment when the verdict is against the weight of the evidence or reverse as a matter of discretion in

the interest of justice. Since a reversal of a conviction pursuant to CPL 330.30(1) would have to be "as a matter of law" a trial court does not have the authority to evaluate the quality or the weight of evidence unless the defendant claims that the testimony of the witness was so unworthy of belief as to be incredible as a matter of law. See also People v. Adams, 272 AD2d 177, 709 NY S.2d 509 (1st Dept. 2000), and People v. Garcia, 272 AD2d 189, 707 NY S.2d 441 (1st Dept. 2000).

After review of the defendant's motion I have concluded that the first, second, and third basis for the defendant's motion clearly constitute questions of law which can be properly addressed by a CPL 330.30(1) motion. See People v. Thompson, 158 Misc 2d 397, 601 N.Y.S.2d 418, (Sup. Ct., Queens, 1993). That portion of the motion, which asserts the alleged perjury of the complaining witness as the basis for relief under CPL 330.30(1) raises more difficult [*2]issues. Although the defendant does not frame the issue in a way that easily fits within the scope of this Court's authority it is clear that the thrust of the defendant's motion suggests that the complainant testified in a manner which so severely undermined his credibility that he was totally unworthy of belief; to wit that he was incredible as a matter of law (see People v. Adams supra and People v. Garcia, supra). It is therefore appropriate to treat the defendant's fourth claim as appropriate request for relief pursuant to CPL 330.30(1).

Having so concluded, the defendant's motion is denied in all respects and the Court reaffirms its previous rulings and sees no reason to revisit same. With respect to the alleged perjured testimony of the complainant, the defendant points out three areas of alleged falsity and/or inconsistency which the defendant contends render the complainant's testimony incredible as a matter of law; 1.) inconsistencies with respect to discussions with the complainant's attorney and pleading regarding a civil law suit arising out of the assault, 2.) the complainant's testimony that he was not intoxicated notwithstanding the blood alcohol content set forth in the medical records introduced by the People and 3.) the complainant's testimony that three people took part in the assault when only one was involved.

Notwithstanding these claims, none of these matters render the complainant's testimony so untrustworthy as to be of no value, as a matter of law. Further, the complainant was cross-examined extensively by defense counsel who introduced numerous documents to contradict and impeach the complainant. The jury was instructed that, as judges of the facts, they could disregard all of the testimony of a witness who they found to be untruthful or accept such portions of that witness's testimony which they found to be truthful and disregard such portions if found to be untruthful. The jury had the opportunity to hear all the testimony and view all the evidence. Obviously, the jury concluded, from all the credible evidence, that the defendant had in fact assaulted the complainant and done so without justification as that term is defined by Article 35 of the Penal Law. Motion by the defendant to set aside the verdict of guilty is denied.

Dated: March 2, 2005 HOWARD M. BERGSON

J.D.C.

/kom

Robert P. Leonard II, Assistant District Attorney

Stephen N. Preziosi, Esq. Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County

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