Matter of Children's Rights v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs.
Annotate this CaseDecided on February 22, 2005
Supreme Court, Rensselaer County
In the Matter of the Application of Children's Rights, Petitioner, For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,
against
New York State Office of Children & Family Services, and JOHN A. JOHNSON, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Children & Family Services, , Respondents.
212812
Erik S. Pitchal, Esq
Attorney for the Petitioner
Children's Rights
404 Park Avenue South, 11th Floor
New York, New York 10016
Hon. Eliot Spitzer
Attorney General of New York State
Attorney for Respondents
(Nancy G. Groenwagen, Assistant Attorney General,
of Counsel)
Department of Law
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
James B. Canfield, J.
Petitioner, Children's Rights makes the novel argument that Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Public Officers Law (POL) §§ 84 et seq., permits those seeking confidential information both to avoid Social Services Law (SSL) §§ 422 and 422-a's procedural requirements and to abrogate the statutory restrictions on release of confidential information.
Prior to Children's Rights' counsel Eric S. Pitchal's (Pitchal) FOIL request, Children's Rights applied for information pursuant to SSL § 422(4)(A)(h). Children's Rights withdrew its SSL § 422 application because it was unwilling to conform to the normal requirements for obtaining access to confidential information. On March 3, 2004, Pitchal made his separate FOIL request. Respondents denied Pitchal's FOIL application on the ground that the requested records involve institutional abuse investigations, which are exempt from disclosure under FOIL.
On June 1, 2004, Pitchal appealed the FOIL denial, but instead of addressing the question of whether the records were confidential, Pitchal began raising issues that would only be relevant in the event that Children's Rights had pursued its SSL § 422(4)(A)(h) application rather than withdrawing it or had made an application pursuant to SSL § 422-a. Despite the fact that neither Children's Rights nor Pitchal had a pending application for the records pursuant to SSL §§ 422(4)(A)(h) or 422-a , Pitchal argued that he and Children's Rights are entitled to the records pursuant to those sections. Pitchal also alleged unspecific "constitutional principles [that] are implicated."
Respondents denied Pitchal's appeal on the ground that POL § 87 [2][a] excepts from FOIL disclosure documents that are specifically exempted by state or federal statute and SSL § 422(4)(A) makes all reports regarding suspected child abuse and maltreatment confidential. Respondents further notified Pitchal that Children's Rights had earlier withdrawn its SSL § 422 request for approval of a research proposal and that SSL § 422-a only provides for limited access to confidential records that are specifically requested.
The Court rejects Children's Rights' argument that it was not required to make SSL §§ 422(4) and 422-a applications for the confidential material and that it could bypass those procedures and statutory restrictions simply by making a FOIL request. FOIL does not purport to eliminate non-FOIL measures for handling documents that are specifically exempted by statute and it makes no logical sense to reward Children's Rights and Pitchal for refusing to engage in the administrative process. A petitioner must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review unless "an agency's action is challenged as either unconstitutional or wholly beyond its grant of power ... or when resort to an administrative remedy would be futile ...or when its pursuit would cause irreparable injury" (Watergate II Apartments v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57). As noted [*2]previously, Children's Rights withdrew and never renewed its SSL § 422(4)(A)(h) application. Children's Rights also never made a request for information regarding a specific child pursuant to SSL § 422-a. Children's Rights therefore failed to exhaust its administrative remedies or obtain a final determination of its rights to the records pursuant to SSL §§ 422(4)(A)(h) or 422-a and is therefore not entitled to proceed with those parts of its challenge. Furthermore, there are no final SSL §§ 422(4)(A)(h) or 422-a determinations for the Court to review.
Even if it was assumed for the purposes of the argument that Children's Rights and/or Pitchal had exhausted their administrative remedies, the Court would reject Children's Rights' novel argument that FOIL standards and procedures not only govern access to documents that are statutorily exempt, but promote dissemination of such exempt documents. Social Services Law § 422(4)(A) makes confidential all reports made regarding suspected child abuse and maltreatment, information obtained, reports written or photographs taken concerning such reports. FOIL expressly excepts governmental records which, like the records at issue, are "specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute" (POL § 87 [2][a]). FOIL makes no provision for public access to documents that are exempt from disclosure.
Children's Rights' conclusory statement that "[u]pon information and belief, the requested records are not exempt from public disclosure" has not been supported. Children's Rights and Pitchal have failed to demonstrate that any of the records they seek are outside of the statutory exemption. By their failure to support their thesis, Children's Rights and Pitchal have implicitly conceded that the material they seek falls within SSL § 422(4)(A), and is therefore confidential and exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIL.
The baselessness of Children's Rights' position becomes even more apparent when one considers its desperate resort to trading on its supposed expertise as a basis for asking for special treatment under FOIL. FOIL was enacted to foster the public's "inherent right to know" the workings of government (Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567, 571). The status or interest of a person requesting documents or records under FOIL is irrelevant (Farbman & Sons, Inc. v New York City Hlth. & Hosps. Corp., 62 NY2d 75, 80-81; Matter of John P. v Whalen, 54 NY2d 89, 99). Furthermore, a FOIL requester is only entitled to receive documents that any other FOIL requester would ordinarily receive (Gould v New York City Police Dept., 89 NY2d 267, 274). Children's Rights' argument for special treatment is not only inconsistent with FOIL, but it implicitly recognizes that members of the general public are not entitled to the confidential records Children's Rights seeks and thus FOIL does not require their release.
There being no FOIL provision that carves out a special exception for requests filed by bona fide researchers or their attorneys, the Court rejects Children's Rights' FOIL claim to special treatment. The Court further finds that respondents have met their burden of specifically demonstrating that the material is exempt (Gould v New York City Police Department, 89 NY2d 267, 275; M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. v NYC Health & Hospitals Corp., 62 NY2d 75, 80) and that the SSL § 422 exemption applies to all the reports, allegations, records concerning investigations and prevention and mediation plans requested by Pitchal.
The Court is aware that Matter of Gannett Co., Inc. v County of Ontario, 173 Misc 2d 304 arrived at a different result when it interpreted SSL § 422-a and FOIL . The Court finds that the Matter of Gannett Co., Inc. analysis is not persuasive. The court there began its analysis with the unexplained assumption that SSL § 422-a is an exception to FOIL's provisions for releasing [*3]documents. Social Services Law § 422-a actually appears to be an exception to statutes such as SSL § 422(4)(A) that make the records confidential and thereby limit their distribution. As an independent exception allowing release of material that SSL § 422(4)(A) makes confidential, SSL § 422-a is clearly not subject to FOIL's restrictions. By mistakenly assuming that the legislature required that confidential information should be released to the public, Matter of Gannett Co., Inc. actually created the very problem that it urged the legislature to fix. Had that court properly interpreted the statutes, there would have been no problem to fix. In any event, the decision of a concurrent court is not binding on this Court (Siegel New York Practice 3rd Ed. § 449 p 724) and is rejected.
The Court also rejects Children's Rights' claims that FOIL creates a presumption in favor of releasing confidential information pursuant to SSL §§ 422(4)(A)(h) or 422-a or that those requesting information can force the commissioner to do a file by file search of all files by making nonspecific SSL § 422-a requests. When FOIL exempts material from disclosure it makes no provision for releasing any part of the exempt material. SSL § 422-a(1) makes no reference to requests for information, but instead merely permits agency commissioners to disclose otherwise confidential information if they make a series of determinations regarding the various statutory factors. Unlike FOIL, which favors releasing records and requires an explanation if agencies determine not to release documents, SSL § 422-a imposes no obligation to give any further explanation for refusing to release confidential material. The Court further finds no basis in the statute for imposing the obligation on commissioners to do a file by file analysis of every file if they receive a general request for information pursuant to SSL § 422-a.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed with $100 costs and the relief requested therein is in all respects denied
This Memorandum constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. All papers including this Decision and Order are returned to the Attorney General. The signing of this Decision and Order shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of that Rule respecting filing, entry and Notice of Entry.
SO ORDERED!
ENTER.
Dated: Troy, New York
February 22, 2005
JAMES B. CANFIELD
J.S.C.
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