Matter of Guy J. Velella v New York City Local Conditional Release Commn.
Annotate this CaseDecided on November 29, 2004
Supreme Court, New York County
In the Matter of the Application of GUY J. VELELLA, Petitioner, For a Judgment Under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, in the Nature of a Writ of Prohibition and a Writ of Mandamus to Review,
against
THE NEW YORK CITY LOCAL CONDITIONAL RELEASE COMMISSION and THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Respondents.
In the Matter of the Application of HECTOR DELTORO, Petitioner, For a Judgment Under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, in the Nature of a Writ of Prohibition and Writ of Mandamus to Review, - against RICHMAN, CHAIRMAN, CITY OF NEW YORK CONDITIONAL RELEASE COMMISSION, MARTIN F. HORN, COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Respondents.
MANUEL GONZALEZ, Petitioner, - against NEW YORK CITY LOCAL CONDITIONAL RELEASE COMMISSION, DANIEL RICHMAN, CHAIRMAN, KERRI MARTIN BARTLETT, MIREYA CALDERIN D'ANGELO, SUSAN HERMAN, AND MILTON L. WILLIAMS, JR., COMMISSIONERS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondents,
In the Matter of the Application of CARLOS CABA Petitioner, For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, - against RICHMAN, CHAIRMAN, CITY OF NEW YORK CONDITIONAL RELEASE COMMISSION, MARTIN F. HORN, COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Respondents,
In the Matter of the Application of KAMALA STEPHENS, Petitioner, for a Judgment Under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, in the Nature of a Writ of Prohibition and a Writ of Mandamus to Review, - against -
against
THE NEW YORK CITY LOCAL CONDITIONAL RELEASE COMMISSION AND THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondents.
116476/04
Lottie E. Wilkins, J.
Does the New York City Local Conditional Release Commission have the authority to invalidate its own decision to grant conditional release to an inmate when it determines that its earlier decision was affected by fundamental procedural errors? That is the common question presented in each of the five separate proceedings before the Court. At the outset, it is important to note that these proceedings do not require the Court to pass on the question of whether any of the petitioners now before the court deserved conditional release when it was first granted or whether any of their conditional releases should now be continued as a result of personal circumstances that have befallen them since they were first released. Indeed, the Court does not have "interest of justice" jurisdiction in article 78 proceedings such as these (see Matter of Featherstone v Franco, 95 NY2d 550 [2000]). Likewise, the larger political question of whether local conditional release commissions are necessary or should continue to exist clearly lies within the purview of the Legislature and is not an appropriate subject of discussion here.
Four of the five petitions under consideration were received by the Court on November 22, 2004. The fifth petition, that of Kamala Stephens, was received the [*2]following day.[FN1] All petitioners sought a temporary stay of the New York City Department of Corrections order that they surrender to its custody by 5:00 p.m. on November 22, 2004. At 3:00 p.m on November 22, the Court granted the temporary stays pending its determination of these proceedings. During the temporary stays, all petitioners continued to be subject to supervision by the Department of Corrections and the terms of their conditional releases. In an effort to expedite resolution of these matters, the Court took oral argument from all parties on the application for a temporary stay and asked respondents to accept service of the petitions in court, which they did. Respondents also agreed to submit answers with opposition papers on November 23, 2004. Petitioners were given to November 24 at 3:00 p.m. to reply. Oral argument on the petitions was waived. On this abbreviated schedule for papers, the Court announced its intention to render a decision on each petition by Monday, November 29, 2004.
The factual circumstances common to each of these proceedings are well known as a result of the widely publicized events surrounding the release of former State Senator Guy Velella, although two petitioners have no relationship to Mr. Velella or his so-called co-conspirators. Briefly, each of the petitioners was granted conditional release by the New York City Local Conditional Release Commission (LCRC) which, at the time, consisted of four members. Thereafter, each of the four members resigned amid allegations that they had acted illegally and were replaced with five new members appointed by the Mayor of New York City. At a November 19, 2004 meeting, the newly-reconstituted LCRC adopted the findings of its legal counsel, the New York City Corporation Counsel, that the conditional releases granted to petitioners were invalid because petitioners' applications were improperly considered by the former LCRC and that a required quorum of at least three commissioners was not present for voting on petitioners' releases. As a result petitioners were directed to surrender themselves for reincarceration. These article 78 proceedings in the nature of prohibition and mandamus ensued.
The gravamen of petitioners' argument in support of their applications is rather straightforward: Petitioners contend that the LCRC derives its powers from statute and that the only statutory grounds for revocation of an inmate's conditional release are a relapse into criminal behavior or a violation of one or more conditions of his or her release (see Correction Law § 274 [1] & [10]). Petitioners further contend that, regardless of what name the LCRC wishes to give to its actions (invalidation, [*3]reconsideration, etc.), the conditional releases at issue here were revoked without the necessary finding that grounds for revocation existed. Petitioners charge that LCRC is now engaging in "doublespeak" or in "curiouser and curioser language" in an effort to gloss over the fact that it has acted in excess of its statutory authority in a blatant accession to political pressure.
The newly reconstituted LCRC also sees political pressure at work, but at the other end of the process. Respondents claim that the circumstances under which the conditional releases were granted were so jurisdictionally defective as to be entirely void. Specifically, respondents point to the failure to adhere to Correction Law § 273(1) & (6), concerning the form and timing of applications to the LCRC, and Correction Law § 273(2) which provides that conditional release determinations must be made by vote of at least three commission members present. Citing case law, respondents contend that these requirements must be strictly adhered to and that any deviation from them, such as those found to exist by the New York City Department of Investigation, renders a determination void.
While respondents' arguments are sound as far as they go, they do not directly address the central question in this matter, which is whether or not LCRC had the authority to invalidate its own prior determination when such functions are usually reserved to courts sitting in review pursuant to CPLR article 78. Specifically, CPLR 7803(2) provides that a special proceeding for review of an administrative determination may be commenced upon the grounds that a public body or officer has acted without, or in excess of, its jurisdiction. Indeed, the case relied upon most heavily by respondents, Matter of Winn v Rensselear County Conditional Release Commission, is an example of judicial invalidation of a commission's decision to grant conditional release, not an internal commission invalidation of its own determination (6 AD3d 929 [3d Dept 2004]). However, given the short time set by the Court for answers and other responsive papers in these proceedings, the absence of comprehensive argument by either side does not necessarily mean that no answer exists.
It has frequently been observed that an administrative agency, or in this case a commission, has only those powers which are expressly conferred or necessarily implied by statute (see, Matter of City of New York v State of New York Commn. on Cable Tel., (47 NY2d 89, 92 [1979]). There is little dispute here that LCRC does not have explicit statutory authority to review or invalidate its own conditional release determinations once they have been made (compare, Matter of Parkview Assoc. v City of New York, 71 NY2d 274, 281 [1988] [where NYC Administrative Code explicitly authorized Commissioner of Buildings to revoke permits which had been issued in error]). And while there are cases illustrating when an agency exceeds its implied statutory powers, there is little guidance on when it acts within them (see e.g. Matter of [*4]Callanan Industries v White, 118 AD2d 167 [3d Dept 1986]).
Nonetheless, under the specific circumstances presented here, this Court is compelled to conclude that a local conditional release commission acts within its implied legislative powers when it invalidates a prior conditional release determination which is the product of proceedings that, on their face, violate clear procedural requirements of Correction Law, article 12. Because of its important public trust, and the serious potential that improper grants of conditional release may go unchallenged (and probably have in the past), it is essential that the New York City LCRC can be counted on to police itself as an additional layer of protection to a judicial proceeding.
From the record before the Court, namely the recommendations of the Corporation Counsel and the findings of the Department of Investigation, it is apparent that LCRC's invalidation of its own prior proceedings was intended to enforce clear and unequivocal procedural requirements that must be followed when a conditional release application is under consideration in order to preserve the integrity of the deliberative process. Since this commission has been endowed with a particularly important public trust, i.e. the release of only the most appropriate and deserving inmates back into society, the Court is of the opinion that internal "housekeeping" powers of the kind that were exercised here must necessarily be implied from LCRC's legislative grant of authority (see Matter of the City of New York v State of New York Commn. on Cable Tel., 47 NY2d 89 [1979]). Moreover, with special reference to the New York City LCRC, such internal policing powers are all the more vital because overburdened district attorneys' offices and other potentially interested entities cannot be relied upon to commence a judicial proceeding in the public interest every time a conditional release commission makes a questionable determination (see, Matter of Winn, supra).
Having determined that LCRC has the implied authority to invalidate its own prior decisions when they suffer from obvious procedural defects which, by statute, make them void from the inception, the next step is to determine whether the particular determinations made here can survive judicial scrutiny. For this analysis, the Court looks to the familiar standard that an agency's interpretation of the statutes it administers should be upheld if not unreasonable or irrational (see, Matter of Rodriguez v Perales, 86 NY2d 361 [1995]). Here, application of that standard means that if LCRC's interpretation of its controlling legislation concerning the form and timing of applications, and the quorum requirements for voting, are reasonable and rational, then it should be upheld.
Although petitioners can and do argue in favor of different interpretations of the relevant provisions of the Correction Law, they have not carried their burden of showing that LCRC's interpretation was unreasonable or irrational. The procedural requirements at issue, notably those pertaining to the "presence" of commission [*5]members for voting on releases, are open to multiple and equally rational interpretations. LCRC's reading of its controlling legislation to require that applications for conditional release be made in a particular form and at particular times, and that voting be conducted by commission members who are physically present, are among those rational interpretations of the legislation. Although petitioners' interpretations are likewise reasonable, such a showing is not enough to warrant annulling LCRC's conclusions in this case.
The argument that LCRC's actions constituted a deprivation of Due Process rights does not have merit under these circumstances. A party claiming to be aggrieved by administrative action has the right to commence a special proceeding under article 78 to redress those grievances, which is exactly what petitioners have done here. Thus, any process that petitioners might allege to have been denied at the administrative level has been exercised in this forum where each side has been given the appropriate opportunity to make their cases.
Since each conditional release was invalidated for similar procedural defects, each petition must fail. Admittedly, the unrelated petitioners Carlos Caba and Kamala Stephens offer particularly compelling circumstances with respect to their entitlement to conditional release, however, the reasoning herein applies equally to all petitioners. If the LCRC acted without authority in granting conditional release as to one petitioner, then it lacked authority as to all. Accordingly, it is
Ordered and adjudged that the petitions are denied and the proceedings dismissed; it is further
Ordered that temporary stays issued by the Court on November 22, 2004 are hereby vacated and petitioners are to surrender themselves to the Department of Corrections at 100 Centre Street, Room 124 by 5:00 p.m.
It is recommended that petitioners be restored to the conditions of their confinement prior to the release that is the subject of this order.
This constitutes the decision and judgment of the Court.
Dated: New York, New York
November 29, 2004
_______________________________________
Lottie E. Wilkins, J.S.C.
Footnotes
Footnote 1: Although Ms. Stephens was subject to a similar order to surrender herself to custody at 5:00 p.m. on November 22, 2003, respondents agreed to delay her reincarceration pending the Court's review of her petition and application for a temporary stay of enforcement.
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