People v Estrada (Angel)
Annotate this CaseDecided on January 8, 2016
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : TOLBERT, J.P., IANNACCI and CONNOLLY, JJ.
2013-1929 OR CR
The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
against
Angel Estrada, Appellant.
Appeal from judgments of the City Court of Middletown, Orange County (Steven W. Brockett, J.), rendered August 30, 2013. The judgments convicted defendant, upon jury verdicts, of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest, respectively.
ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
On July 28, 2012, defendant was arrested on a charge of assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]), based on a domestic incident report involving his girlfriend. On November 9, 2012, defendant pleaded guilty to the charge. On that same date, he was sentenced by Middletown City Court Judge Steven W. Brockett to a term of three years' probation. Defendant agreed to enter a drug rehabilitation program
as a condition of his probation. The court also issued an order of protection. Defendant did not comply with the terms of his probation. On January 9, 2013, Judge Brockett signed a warrant authorizing defendant's arrest for violating his probation.
At approximately 11:45 p.m. on March 17, 2013, the City of Middletown police received a report of a dispute, apparently involving defendant and his girlfriend. Police Officer Nicholas Trapini was informed by another officer that there was an active warrant for defendant. Trapini was also advised, among other things, that defendant was driving a white Chevrolet Trail Blazer. While driving, Trapini observed a white Trail Blazer parked in a Mobil gas station and convenience store. Trapini had had five or six previous encounters with defendant, and recognized him standing inside the convenience store. Trapini told defendant, "Angel, you have a probation warrant." Defendant denied that he was Angel Estrada and attempted to exit the convenience store. Trapini told defendant that he was under arrest. At about that time, City of Middletown Police Officer Patricia Doremus arrived at the scene. Doremus pushed on the door of the convenience store, because defendant was attempting to leave. Defendant and the two officers engaged in a struggle, which continued in the parking lot for about one or two minutes. Officer Doremus then deployed her taser, after which defendant relented.
Defendant was originally charged with criminal contempt in the first degree (Penal Law § 215.51 [b] [v]), assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]), obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05), and resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30). The criminal contempt and assault charges were dismissed by the court before trial, on consent of the People. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of obstructing governmental [*2]administration in the second degree and resisting arrest.
Prior to the trial, defendant moved to suppress certain statements. The prosecutor argued that there "were verbal admissions" but no one, including, apparently, defendant, was "willing to actually place their verbal statements in writing." The court subsequently indicated that it "didn't see that there were any statements." The prosecutor agreed, stating, "I don't believe there was." Thus, the court denied the motion to suppress statements "as moot, [as] obviously there is no statement and the People would be precluded from introducing any admissions of the Defendant at trial as they are unnoticed." In addition, prior to the trial, defendant's counsel stipulated that the warrant authorizing defendant's arrest for violating his probation was admissible in evidence.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant stipulated to the admission of the warrant authorizing his arrest for violating his probation in evidence. Officer Trapini had informed defendant that he had a warrant authorizing defendant's arrest for violating his probation and that defendant was under arrest. Both Trapini and Officer Doremus testified that defendant had physically attempted to prevent the execution of the warrant. They further testified that defendant had struggled, flailed his arms, pushed, caused himself and the officers to fall to the ground, and had to be controlled by Trapini's use of her taser. This evidence was sufficient to support the judgments of conviction (see Matter of Shannon B., 70 NY2d 458 [1987]; People v Coffaro, 52 NY2d 932 [1981]; People v Wilkins, 104 AD3d 1156, 1156-1157 [2013]; People v Duncan, 241 AD2d 566 [1997]; People v Bullock, 42 Misc 3d 141[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50211[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]; People v Hopkins, 12 Misc 3d 130[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51041[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]; Matter of Arnell N., 28 Misc 3d 528, 531-532 [Family Ct, Kings County 2010]).
In fulfilling its responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), an appellate court accords great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Linares, 49 Misc 3d 131[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51430[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2015]). The court then reviews the record and weighs "the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" (People v Zephyrin, 52 AD3d 543, 543 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), and determines whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable based on the evidence presented. If so, the court determines whether the trier of fact failed to accord the evidence the weight it should have been accorded (see id.; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348; People v Rivera, 46 Misc 3d 143[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50190[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2015]).
In the case at bar, an acquittal would have been unreasonable. It was stipulated that the warrant authorizing defendant's arrest for violating his probation was admissible in evidence. The only witness who denied that Officer Trapini had told defendant that he was executing a warrant authorizing defendant's arrest for violating his probation was defendant's girlfriend, who confirmed the portion of the officers' testimony that defendant and the two officers wound up on the ground, and that defendant was "tased." Defendant claims that he had a right to resist excessive and unreasonable force used against him. However, defendant did not present a justification defense (cf. People v Stevenson, 31 NY2d 108, 112-113 [1972]; People v Carneglia, 63 AD2d 734, 735 [1978]). Consequently, we find that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
With respect to the admission into evidence of defendant's statements after the court had ruled that defendant's motion to suppress statements was moot, and that the admission of any unnoticed statements would be precluded, defendant did not object to the testimony that he had told Officer Trapini, "no, that's not me, I'm not Angel," and that he was "done" just before the [*3]altercation ended. Thus, the issue is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612, 615-616 [1977]; People v Fletcher, 258 AD2d 470, 470-471 [1999]; People v Douglas, 243 AD2d 280, 281 [1997]). Furthermore, defendant's counsel referred to and elicited the same testimony during cross-examination (see People v Welcome, 128 AD3d 990, 990-991 [2015]; People v Bryan, 50 AD3d 1049, 1050 [2008]; People v Farwell, 26 Misc 3d 26, 30 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2009]). In any event, there was no police questioning or other activity that could reasonably have been expected to elicit a declaration or response from defendant (see People v Read, 74 AD3d 1245, 1246 [2010]; People v Bailukonis, 35 AD3d 626, 627 [2006]; People v Guerrier, 291 AD2d 506, 507 [2002]; People v Vanterpool, 4 Misc 3d 137[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50840[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2004]). Thus, defendant's contention regarding the statements is without merit.
Defendant speculates that because the incident took place at a gas station, there must be a videotape of the incident. However, there is no evidence in the record that such a videotape, which could constitute Brady material (Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]), existed and, if so, was in the possession of the prosecution (see People v Cruz, 300 AD2d 1083, 1084 [2002]; People v Lent, 204 AD2d 855, 856 [1994]; People v Watson, 198 AD2d 461, 463 [1993]; People v Fappiano, 139 AD2d 524, 525 [1988]). In any event, defendant's claim involves factual allegations outside the record that are not reviewable on direct appeal (see People v Boyce, 118 AD3d 1016 [2014]; People v Bermejo, 77 AD3d 965 [2010]; People v Reyes, 60 AD3d 873, 875 [2009]).
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
Tolbert, J.P., Iannacci and Connolly, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: January 08, 2016
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