Benavente v Auto One Ins. Co.

[*1] Benavente v Auto One Ins. Co. 2015 NY Slip Op 50215(U) Decided on February 24, 2015 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on February 24, 2015
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MARANO, P.J., IANNACCI and TOLBERT, JJ.
2013-972 N C

Gladys J. Benavente, Respondent,

against

Auto One Insurance Company, Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Michael A. Ciaffa, J.), dated April 9, 2013. The order denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint and granted plaintiff's cross motion for leave to serve an amended complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action to recover unpaid no-fault benefits, the complaint alleges that plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle which was owned by a nonparty, who had purchased an insurance policy from defendant, when the vehicle was involved in an accident. The complaint sets forth the number of the applicable policy and states that the policy provided for the payment of no-fault benefits. The pleading further states that plaintiff timely notified defendant of the accident, but defendant refused to perform its obligation under the insurance policy by failing to pay the submitted bills. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), arguing that the complaint was insufficient to state a claim of indebtedness. Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for leave to serve an amended complaint, which was annexed to the cross motion papers. Defendant appeals from an order of the District Court which denied defendant's motion and granted plaintiff's cross motion.

As stated by the District Court, on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint is afforded a liberal construction (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). The allegations contained in the complaint should be accepted as true, and the court must determine whether such facts fit any cognizable legal theory (see Morales v Copy Right, Inc., 28 AD3d 440 [2006]). Furthermore, "[t]he test to be applied is whether the complaint gives sufficient notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences intended to be proved and whether the requisite elements of any cause of action known to our law can be discerned from its averments" (JP Morgan Chase v J.H. Elec. of NY, Inc., 69 AD3d 802, 803 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Contrary to defendant's contention, the complaint states a cognizable cause of action and is sufficient to give defendant notice of the transactions intended to be proved. In addition, the District Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting plaintiff's cross motion for leave to amend the complaint to supplement the pleading (see CPLR 3025 [b]; Ryan v Town of Riverhead, 117 AD3d 707 [2014]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Marano, P.J., Iannacci and Tolbert, JJ., concur.

Decision Date: February 24, 2015