People of State of New York v Torres
Annotate this CaseDecided on October 29, 2013
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : NICOLAI, P.J., LaSALLE and MARANO, JJ
2011-2282 S CR.
The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
against
Jose E. Torres, Appellant.
Appeal from judgments of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Patricia M. Filiberto, J.), rendered July 22, 2011. The judgments convicted defendant, upon jury verdicts, of harassment in the second degree and resisting arrest, respectively.
ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
At a jury trial, the arresting officers testified that, upon responding to a radio report of a domestic dispute, they had encountered a person, who had identified herself as defendant's mother, outside a single-family residence in Wyandanch, New York. She informed the officers that she and defendant had argued, and she asked the officers to speak with defendant, then in his bedroom located at the rear of the premises, and provided directions to locate defendant in the darkened house. As the officers proceeded through the house, using flashlights, they identified themselves as police officers and called to defendant by name. Upon reaching the bedroom, the door of which was open, one of the officers informed defendant that they wanted to speak with him. Defendant responded with a vulgarity and a threat to "kill" the officers, and attempted to close the door, striking the officer on the head, arm, and foot with sufficient force to knock him backwards and to cause the officer to feel "alarmed and threatened." When that officer regained entry into the bedroom, defendant shoved the officer and, although ordered to place his hands behind his back, refused to be handcuffed. There ensued a physical altercation involving defendant and both officers, who eventually handcuffed defendant. One of the officers testified that, during the struggle, he had struck defendant once on the hand with a flashlight when defendant had appeared to be attempting to recover something from under the mattress. Defendant continued to verbally abuse the officers as they escorted him to the patrol car and, once seated in the car, began to thrash back and forth violently, repeatedly hitting his head on the passenger window and on a wooden crate that contained the officers' paperwork. At the police precinct, defendant complained of pain, and he was transported to a hospital for treatment. The People charged defendant with harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]) and resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30).
At the close of the People's case, defendant argued that the officers' testimonies were incredible as a matter of law and that their accounts of defendant's harassment of an officer were [*2]fabricated to conceal an illegal intrusion into defendant's home and to explain wounds inflicted on defendant while the police were arresting him for an offense for which they lacked probable cause. The District Court reserved decision on the motion. At the close of defendant's case, which included the testimonies of defendant, his mother, and his female companion, which generally contradicted the officers' description of the events leading to defendant's arrest, defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instruments on the ground that the People had failed to prove the elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The District Court denied the motion, the jury convicted defendant of both charges, and the court denied defendant's postverdict motion to set the convictions aside (see CPL 330.30).
On appeal, defendant argues that because the testimonies of the two police officers were incredible as a matter of law, the District Court erred in denying his initial motion to dismiss. Defendant also contends that the officers' presence in his house was unlawful, that his arrest was without probable cause, and that the People failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant had intended to harass the officer and that he was aware that he was being arrested when the altercation began. The judgments of conviction should be affirmed.
We initially note that the officers' presence in defendant's home was lawful. "[A] lawful search may be conducted without a warrant where permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises" (People v Adams, 53 NY2d 1, 8 [1981] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Here, there was proof that permission to enter the residence was obtained from a person claiming to be defendant's mother, who complained that she and her son had argued inside the house, and who provided information as to where defendant would be found and directions to that location. On these facts, the police reasonably relied on the apparent authority of defendant's mother, a co-resident of the house, to consent to their entry (e.g. People v Ehrenberg, 236 AD2d 420 [1997]).
Defendant's claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish all of the elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt is not preserved, as in his motion to dismiss he failed to identify, with the requisite specificity, any particular insufficiency in the proof (CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]). Moreover, the record does not support defendant's claim that the testimonies of the arresting officers were incredible as a matter of law. Such a finding typically results " [w]hen all of the evidence of guilt comes from a single prosecution witness who gives irreconcilable testimony pointing both to guilt and innocence' " and because " the jury is [thereby] left without basis, other than impermissible speculation, for its determination of either' " (People v Calabria, 3 NY3d 80, 82 [2004], quoting People v Jackson, 65 NY2d 265, 272 [1985]). The officers' testimonies do not appear " manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory' " (People v Coles, 62 AD3d 1022, 1022 [2009], quoting People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86, 88 [1974]).
Although the issues are unpreserved, we find the proof legally sufficient to establish that the police presence in defendant's home was lawful and that there was probable cause for defendant's arrest, and to establish, as well, defendant's intent to harass the officer and to resist his arrest for that offense. As a general rule, intent can be "inferred from the act itself or from the defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances" (People v Caulkins, 82 AD3d 1506, [*3]1507 [2011]; see also People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]; People v Prevete, 10 Misc 3d 78, 79-80 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]), and, here, that intent may readily be inferred from defendant's threatening language, from his attempt to close the door on a police officer, striking the officer in the head, arm and foot with sufficient force to drive the officer back, and from his shoving the officer when the latter re-entered the bedroom. Further, it was not necessary that the People prove that defendant was specifically informed that he was under arrest, inasmuch as defendant "knew or should have inferred that he was being lawfully arrested" (People v Lyons, 256 AD2d 422, 422 [1998]) based on "[the] inferences logically drawn from the attendant facts and circumstances" (People v Galvin, 253 AD2d 437, 438 [1998]; see also People v Eleazer, 12 Misc 3d 130[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51038[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006]; People v Vanni, 9 Misc 3d 130[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51577[U], *2 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]). Consequently, as the testimonies of the arresting officers were not incredible as a matter of law, the proof, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt (see e.g. People v Urena, 199 AD2d 443 [1993]; People v Collins, 178 AD2d 789 [1991]; People v Williams, 38 Misc 3d 4, 6 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]).
Finally, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, and observe their demeanor (People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). The police officers' narratives of the events leading to the altercation and arrest were consistent as to the material facts, constituted an entirely plausible scenario, and were corroborated in important respects by defendant's witnesses. To the extent that the testimony of defendant's witnesses contradicted the officers' accounts as to the critical events, this merely presented the jury with the task of evaluating the relative credibilities of all the witnesses.
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
Nicolai, P.J., LaSalle and Marano, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 29, 2013
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