Simpson v Bromson

[*1] Simpson v Bromson 2012 NY Slip Op 50888(U) Decided on May 11, 2012 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 11, 2012
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : WESTON, J.P., PESCE and RIOS, JJ
2011-1375 K C.

Mark P. Simpson, Respondent,

against

Joe Bromson, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered January 25, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,500 and dismissed defendant's counterclaim.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff, defendant's former tenant, commenced this small claims action to recover a security deposit in the amount of $1,800. Defendant interposed a counterclaim to recover the sum of $1,900 for lost rent due to the renovation of the premises necessitated by the damage caused by plaintiff. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,500 and dismissed defendant's counterclaim. On appeal, defendant contends that the court should have set off the sum sought by defendant in his counterclaim against the amount awarded.

Upon a review of the record, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (CCA 1804, 1807; see Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see [*2]Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as the trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]).

It is well settled that a security deposit remains the property of a tenant (General Obligations Law § 7-103 [1]) and must be returned at the conclusion of the tenancy (Cruz v Diamond, 6 Misc 3d 134[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50187[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]) absent, for example, proof that the tenant caused damage beyond that attributable to ordinary wear and tear (see generally Finnerty v Freeman, 176 Misc 2d 220, 222 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 1998]). As defendant did not properly establish the damages he claimed (see CCA 1804), we find no basis to disturb the Civil Court's award in favor of plaintiff and its dismissal of defendant's counterclaim. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Pesce and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 11, 2012