Freeport Hous. Auth. v Stewart
Annotate this CaseDecided on November 12, 2010
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MOLIA, J.P., TANENBAUM and LaCAVA, JJ
2008-2155 N C.
Freeport Housing Authority, Respondent,
against
Janet Stewart, Appellant, -and- SHANIQUA STEWART, Undertenant.
Appeal from a final judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Scott
Fairgrieve, J.; op 20 Misc 3d 1139[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51791[U]), entered September 24,
2008. The final judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded possession to landlord.
ORDERED that the final judgment is affirmed without costs.
In this holdover proceeding, the District Court, after a nonjury trial, found that landlord had
established that tenant had violated her lease by allowing James Stewart,
her husband, to reside at the premises without listing him as a member of her household,
and awarded possession to landlord. We affirm.
The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). The determination of the trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as the trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]).
Tenant correctly argues that, because the exact source of statements in the police reports introduced by landlord was unclear, the reports should not have been admitted (see e.g. Noakes v Rosa, 54 AD3d 317 [2008]). However, the District Court explicitly found that, even excluding all of the police reports as well as the police testimony, the evidence still clearly demonstrated that tenant had allowed James Stewart to reside in the premises. That evidence consisted mainly of video surveillance showing that James Stewart had entered the building in question, using tenant's own key access card, over 240 times in a period of 6 to 10 weeks, in a pattern which was consistent with his regularly staying overnight. Tenant's explanation that James Stewart was helping her during her recovery from a medical procedure was not credible, as she agreed that she would only have needed such help for approximately two weeks. As the record supports the [*2]District Court's determination, we find no basis to disturb it.
Contrary to tenant's argument, the District Court correctly found that the notice of termination in this proceeding adequately specified both the factual and legal grounds for termination (see e.g. City of New York v Valera, 216 AD2d 237 [1995]; Matter of Chase v Binghamton Hous. Auth., 91 AD2d 1147 [1983]; Matter of Hall v Municipal Hous. Auth. for City of Yonkers, 57 AD2d 894 [1977]). Further, tenant, who had requested and received a grievance hearing prior to the instant proceeding, and who had been given full access to the evidence underlying this proceeding, also failed to demonstrate any other violation of her due process rights.
Moreover, termination of the tenancy in this case is not so disproportionate to the offense as to be "shocking to one's sense of fairness" (Matter of Riggins v Lannert, 18 AD3d 560, 562 [2005]), especially as tenant's lease explicitly stated that having an unauthorized family member residing in the premises may be grounds for termination of the tenancy (see e.g. Matter of Cuevas v Beacon Hous. Auth., 220 AD2d 179 [1996]).
Accordingly, the final judgment is affirmed.
Molia, J.P., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 12, 2010
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
